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1
Introduction
This book examines public governance in the Australian Commonwealth 
public sector, especially from the late-twentieth century to the early twenty-
first century. This a period in which public governance has been informed and 
influenced by the principles and actions of private sector corporate governance 
but also, more generally, by how government departments and agencies, in their 
decision-making processes, increasingly relate to other government bodies and 
to organisations outside the government sector. 
There are at least three strong reasons for the interest in the topic of public sector 
governance. One reason is the trend toward a general acceptance by government 
of the need to include more players in decision-making processes and to find 
new means of dealing with public policy questions. Another reason is the extent 
of the public sector’s incorporation of private sector and market experiences. 
A final reason lies in renewed attention to the role of government in an era 
of increased political, socio-economic and environmental interconnectedness, 
which is demonstrated worldwide through particular governmental responses 
to collective challenges, such as climate change and the 2008–09 global financial 
crisis.
This book concentrates on the Commonwealth level of government. Focusing 
primarily upon this level provides a common point of reference for those 
studying or engaged in governance, given the similarities and differences across 
all Australian jurisdictions. It also matches the focus that rests on the Australian 
Government within much of the literature (e.g. Keating, Wanna and Weller 2000) 
and key governance reform initiatives. Most importantly, the gradual expansion 
of Commonwealth power under the Australian Constitution, at the expense 
of the states and territories, makes the Commonwealth level of government 
pivotal in governance initiatives that are influential across levels of government 
in addressing cross-jurisdictional concerns, such as water management and 
conservation. So, this book also offers comparative insights for those charged 
with reviewing, reforming, or otherwise studying governance at other levels of 
government within Australia or in other countries.
Governance reform and terminology
From the 1980s, public sector reform drew on private sector ideas and practices 
in moving from traditional public administration to a public management 
approach. The language of corporate governance was transferred to the public 
sector as both an expression of that and through the need to revisit how to 
Public Sector Governance in Australia
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provide a corporate basis for transforming organisations in rapidly changing 
environments. This marked the first stage, in the 1990s, of the public sector’s 
appropriation of corporate governance models that drew on corporate law and 
governance in the sector’s design of legislation for statutory corporations and 
agencies (i.e. the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC 
Act)), as well as in major governance reviews of the early twenty-first century 
(e.g. Uhrig 2003). Governance modelling of the public sector upon the private 
sector also developed within a broader system of multi-level points of entry 
for enhanced central coordination and control of public sector bodies (Halligan 
2006; and MacDermott 2008).
As the thinking about corporate governance in the public sector matured and 
the fixation on the private sector passed, at least in public administration, the 
term ‘public governance’ also came into use. The differences in values between 
the public and private sectors, and in the dynamics of the relationships with 
shareholders and stakeholders, necessarily affected the automatic transference 
of ideas. The most notable conversion was that of the Australian National 
Audit Office (ANAO) which, having been the primary advocate of corporate 
governance within the public sector, in 2003 adopted ‘public sector governance’ 
for its guidelines.
In addition, ‘governance’ has entered the parlance of practice as a generic term 
that covers the internal workings of government as well as its interactions with 
others beyond the public sector itself. Within the rubric of governance, two 
applications reflect the activities and organisational basis of public agencies. 
Core corporate governance principles apply most directly to government 
enterprises, particularly public authorities with a board and other attributes 
that correspond to a private sector organisation. But there are also applications 
more generally to public organisations throughout the public sector, including 
departments of state. 
The Australian Government currently uses both corporate and public governance 
concepts. For example, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet refers 
to corporate governance as the process for directing and controlling agencies. 
The ANAO lists governance principles that cover accountability, transparency/
openness, integrity, stewardship and leadership. This book seeks to examine 
these various elements within a general conception of governance that illustrates 




The contemporary governance landscape in Australia has a number of regulatory 
landmarks and reform milestones. The regulatory landmarks in the late-
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries include the package of legislation 
for the governance framework (especially the CAC Act, Financial Management 
and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act) and Public Service Act 1999 (PS Act)), 
as well as the official governance guidance that has been produced in various 
forms by the Department of Finance and Deregulation (Finance), ANAO and 
other government agencies. Under official policy, public organisations can be 
formed under the FMA Act when they are departments of state or other budget-
funded agencies, while the authorities or companies of the outer public sector 
are regulated under the CAC Act.
The reform milestones of the twenty-first century’s first decade, which have 
significant governance implications, consist primarily of two government 
reports that examine Australian Commonwealth public administration: the 
Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders 
(Uhrig review) in 2003 and Ahead of the Game: Blueprint for the Reform of 
Australian Government Administration (Ahead of the Game) in 2010. While there 
are additional reforms of discrete aspects of Australian Commonwealth public 
administration, these two reports have been pivotal in setting governance 
frameworks for the Commonwealth public sector as a whole, with flow-on 
implications for governance structures and arrangements at the organisational 
level for public sector bodies. 
Each report reflects different conceptions, reform phases, and central government 
priorities for governance. Similarly, each report presents major challenges in 
creating and administering public sector bodies for the ends that they serve in a 
new era of governance. The reform of organisational governance structures and 
arrangements that is signalled in these two reports continues in aspects of the 
Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review (CFAR), which Finance began 
in late 2010 and continued to pursue as this book went to press in 2012. The 
major public discussion paper to have been released as part of the CFAR in early 
2012, Is Less More?: Towards Better Commonwealth Performance (DFD 2012b), 
takes the improvement of governance arrangements for a whole-of-government 
financial framework to a new level. In several chapters, this book takes into 
account the connections and disconnections between these governance reform 
milestones.
Public Sector Governance in Australia
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Orientations and audiences
As this introductory discussion shows, governance is a subject that can be 
studied from multiple disciplinary and work-situated standpoints. The concepts, 
regulation and practices of governance draw insights from public administration, 
management and law. This is reflected, for example, in the multidisciplinary 
backgrounds of the book’s co-authors. Governance is therefore relevant as a 
topic of study by academics and students in many different courses and fields 
of research, and by those engaged in the work of governance both within and 
outside the formal structures and processes of government. To assist the book’s 
various audiences, it contains key tables and figures, case studies and other 
examples, and relevant insights and models for reform that have been derived 
from experience internationally.
In addressing public governance, the co-authors are also mindful of what it 
has not been possible to cover within this book. Sub-national government 
only appears in the relationship of state and territory government to the 
Commonwealth government. Under revitalised notions of cooperative 
federalism, this is an increasingly important interaction in its own right. While 
the political executive is ever present, it is not at the core of this study, even 
though in practice it is the pivot of public governance in its governmental 
dimension. The significance of the political executive is evident as the source of 
policy initiative, the political dynamic and democratically based leadership, as 
well as a source of the limitations of good and effective governance. There are of 
course other studies that consider these matters as well as governance in sectoral 
terms (e.g. Brown and Bellamy 2007), and the increasing importance of the civil 
society aspects of governance (Osborne 2010). 
The analysis of governance directions in this book focuses mainly upon 
developments in the last quarter of the twentieth century and the early stages 
of the twenty-first century. In particular, this analysis takes into account the 
approach to governance of John Howard’s Coalition government from 1996 to 
2007, as well as the Labor government’s handling of public governance issues 
under the leadership of both Kevin Rudd and Prime Minister Julia Gillard to the 
end of 2011. As CFAR continued into 2012, this book also positions this major 





The first part of the book examines the context and frameworks of governance 
in its relevant forms. Chapter 1 explores several dimensions of governance 
as a baseline for its discrete explorations in subsequent chapters, including 
the different meanings and the growing use of more expansive and inclusive 
conceptions. Chapter 2 then examines the rise of corporate and public 
governance, considering in particular the evolution of official principles and 
practice that has occurred during the last three decades. Chapter 3 considers 
the defining tensions that arise in the assimilation of corporate governance with 
public sector governance more generally. This is informed by evidence-based 
assessment of the underlying tensions. 
The second part addresses governance in the public sector, with chapters that 
focus upon discrete features of governance, including system governance, 
departmental governance, board governance, and participatory governance. 
Chapter 4 focuses upon central government and cross-government activity. This 
is followed by two chapters on distinctive organisations and their governance: 
chapter 5 which explores governance of the departments of state, and chapter 
6 which considers board governance of authorities and state-owned companies. 
Chapter 7 explores the way in which citizens may be engaged in the policy 
process. 
The final part looks at key challenges for governance design and implementation. 
Chapter 8 is concerned with how to create or restructure public sector bodies 
and chapter 9 explores crucial issues that arise in appointing CEOs and directors 
to boards of authorities and bodies.
The book concludes in chapter 10 with a review of directions in public governance 
in Australia and overseas as a result of various challenges, in particular those 
that arise from the demands of integration within central government and 
collaboration across the public sector and with other sectors. It highlights the 
increasing permeability of government boundaries and the implications of this 
for public accountability.

Part I. Context and Framework
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1 . Dimensions of Governance for the 
Public Sector
Governance is concerned with how societies, governments and organisations 
are managed and led. Importantly, this includes how they structure and 
otherwise order their affairs, make decisions and exercise powers, and manage 
their relationships and accountabilities. Official governance frameworks 
and standards, which have been developed across sectoral and geographical 
boundaries, contain commonalities and differences in their illumination of 
key governance concepts, principles and applications. These features are not 
developed in a social, political and legal vacuum; they reflect underlying values, 
practices and other norms of governance, they are enshrined in the governance 
architecture and arrangements for Australia’s system of government and public 
administration, and they are responsive to the evolution of governance thinking 
and practice over time. 
Accordingly, this chapter explores the basic concepts and facets of governance 
and its governmental architecture, primarily as they relate to the Australian 
Commonwealth public sector, but with relevance for other Australian 
jurisdictions and comparable Westminster-based systems. It provides a 
connecting thread between underlying governance values and other norms, 
levels and components of governance, and the significance of looking at 
governance from a series of societal, governmental, sectoral and organisational 
perspectives. In doing so, it offers a glimpse of how emerging changes and 
limits to key aspects of the system of governance in the twenty-first century 
present challenges for the Commonwealth level of government and its public 
sector system. Finally, it introduces central themes of ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ 
governance, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of governance, and other analytical tools for 
understanding, regulating and practising governance. This chapter’s discussion 
of these different dimensions of governance serves as a foundation for the 
analysis of governance in later chapters. 
The problems of ‘governance-talk’
‘Governance’ has several meanings, a range of elements and sectoral contexts, 
and a variety of dimensions and forms. These differences are not reducible 
simply to matters of terminology. For example, the focus of governance for 
governments and others trying to coordinate mutual responses to national or 
global public policy problems is very different from its focus for any particular 
organisation in administering its own affairs or playing a role within a larger 
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enterprise. Similarly, the origins and manifestations of governance vary across 
national, sectoral and organisational boundaries. Moreover, the focus of the 
study and practice of governance also varies according to the institutional or 
individual standpoint from which governance is examined. 
This problem in talking about governance is exacerbated when its literature and 
official governance reviews offer only partial glimpses of the full complexity 
of governance. The normative evaluation and operational implications of 
alternative governance approaches and options for government can only be 
assessed holistically if the right number and combination of governance aspects 
are captured. So, every account of governance must be assessed according to how 
it relates to the whole picture of governance, both generally and for the purpose 
at hand. In particular, this affects scrutiny and evaluation of the governance 
frameworks outlined in the literature as well as landmark governance-related 
reforms within government (chapter 2). 
At the same time, if it is viewed primarily as a mass of complex and interactive 
layers and applications, governance risks losing its conceptual and operational 
effectiveness as an organising concept. The different discussions of governance 
throughout this book show that there are important levels on which discrete 
considerations of governance are both possible and necessary. The governance 
of organisations in the public and private sectors has different contexts and 
features, for example, and can be discussed sensibly in each case without 
escalation at every point to their interactions with each other or society as a 
whole. The present point is simply that those interactions also demand attention 
where they are relevant, and that discussions of governance and its applications 
are incomplete without appropriate attention to them. 
The next part of this chapter therefore commences with a taxonomy of governance 
and orders of analysis that can be brought to bear in understanding the true 
complexity of the concept in the contemporary Australian Commonwealth 
public sector. This is followed by a categorisation of the different values and 
other norms that infuse the political and legal infrastructure for governance 
at this level of government, only some of which are captured explicitly in 
legislation that is focused upon public sector values. Together, these opening 
parts serve as a platform for understanding some of the key drivers and features 
of evolving governance reform in this country (chapter 2), the resultant tensions 
in the political and legal architecture of governance (chapter 3), and their 
collective implications for governance interactions at central, organisational, 
and stakeholder levels within the Commonwealth public sector (chapters 4–7).
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Meanings and components of governance
Framing the taxonomy of governance
Most commentators now accept the futility of trying to develop an ideal one-
size-fits-all definition or model of governance, as well as the importance of 
systemic, jurisdictional and other underlying contexts for the usefulness of any 
definitions or models of governance that are used. Just as there is no single 
and universal theory of corporations across disciplines, so too ‘there is no one 
theory of governance in political science and public administration’ (Chhotray 
and Stoker 2009: 26). Nor does law or any other discipline supply such an 
overarching theory of governance. 
At its most basic level, governance covers ‘the management of the course of 
events in a social system’, whether such systems are conceived in organisational, 
sectoral or broader terms (Horrigan 2010: 49; quoting Burris et al 2005: 30). 
In that sense, the governance of systems embraces their structures, internal 
and external interactions, and modes of decision-making and other behaviour. 
In this vein, Chhotray and Stoker formulate an all-embracing definition of 
‘governance’ as follows (2009: 3): 
Governance is about the rules of collective decision-making in settings 
where there are a plurality of actors or organisations and where no 
formal control system can dictate the terms of the relationship between 
these actors and organisations. 
In short, governance is concerned with how and why systems of all kinds are 
constituted and operated. 
Beyond the commonly agreed position that all kinds of governance across the 
public, private, and community sectors require attention to core elements such as 
performance and accountability, each of those features also has different levels of 
meaning, application and context, about which there is relatively less consensus. 
Finally, all conceptions and definitions of governance-related concepts are 
contingent upon the particular scholarly, regulatory or other perspective that 
governance observers and participants bring to their governance standpoint or 
role (e.g. OECD 2002).
Recent debate about governance has focused on the extent to which it is 
government-orientated (as distinct from society-centric and, thus, involving 
non-state participants), relationship-focused (as distinct from hierarchical and 
authority-based), and network-centred (as distinct from organisation-based). 
The question of which of these models or orientations best suits the twenty-
first century governance environment is problematic because each provides 
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different insights into different dimensions of governance. In other words, they 
each reveal part of the broader complexity of governance within and beyond 
government.
All of this reinforces the central point that governance within a public sector 
context comprises different orders of governance — governance of a public 
sector body, within a whole-of-government approach to governance, sometimes 
across levels of government, and often involving governance interactions 
beyond the public sector. To foreshadow a later discussion, these different 
orders of governance are themselves underpinned by ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ 
dimensions of governance, as well as manifested through ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms 
of governance. 
Different concepts of governance
As governance is a multi-dimensional concept, the term ‘governance’ is used 
differently depending upon the frame of analysis, the standpoint of the 
observer and the particular sector or aspect under scrutiny. Understood from an 
organisational perspective, for example, the corporate governance of a public 
sector body connects to other orders of governance at governmental, societal 
and organisational levels.
The concept of ‘the state’ as a nation (with associated governance and regulatory 
dimensions) can be contrasted with the concept of self-governing states and 
territories in a federal system of government, as exists in Australia, Canada 
and the United States.1 As the role of the nation-state has changed under the 
pressures of new governance and the new regulatory state (chapter 2), so too 
must our understanding of the nature and forms of governance. Governance 
is increasingly responsive, for example, to multi-stakeholder standard-setting, 
non-state engagement in policy networks, external and independent monitoring 
of government, and the pressures of participatory governance and deliberative 
democracy (e.g. Chhotray and Stoker 2009: 48–51). One of this chapter’s themes 
is that there are connections between different senses of governance, state-
centric and society-centric standpoints on governance, and the engagement of 
state and non-state actors in the ongoing evolution of democratic mechanisms.
As the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) acknowledges in its 
assessment of the new environment for public sector performance and 
accountability, the old governance model of ‘hierarchical modes of decision-
1 Unless the context suggests otherwise, references in this chapter to ‘the state’ and associated terms and 
contrasts (e.g. ‘non-state influences’) are references to the nation-state, rather than to a particular Australian 
state or territory, such as the state of Victoria. The use of terms such as ‘the regulatory state’ and ‘non-state 
influences’ signals the emergence of a distinct body of cross-disciplinary regulatory studies that focuses upon 
the distinct and related regulatory roles of both state and non-state entities (e.g. corporations). 
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making’, ‘sequential approaches to problem solving’, and ‘single points of 
accountability’ no longer fits all governmental functions and must adapt 
to accommodate ‘new public policy implementation models’ that are more 
‘collaborative’ and be otherwise responsive to policy challenges that straddle 
traditional departmental lines of authority (APSC 2009b: 1–2). This view 
of governance in transition also reflects aspects of vertical and horizontal 
governance. 
In this way, governance now engages multiple institutions and participants 
in multiple governance interactions. Various governance systems containing 
‘a plurality of actors’ interact with one another in a series of ‘interconnected 
governance networks’, employing multiple mechanisms for distributing, 
wielding, and rendering accountable the exercise of power in society. At this 
level, governance focuses upon ‘the mechanisms (institutions, social norms, 
social practices)’ through which social goods such as ‘democracy, honest and 
efficient government, political stability and the rule of law’ are ‘instantiated’ in 
such systems (Burris et al 2005: 30–1). 
The outcomes of the Governance Stream at Australia’s 2020 Summit, for example, 
focus in part on ‘the need to strengthen the participation of Australians in 
their governance’. This occurs in part through the development of ‘innovative 
mechanisms to increase civic participation [and] collaborative governance to 
strengthen civic engagement and trust, facilitate “deliberative democracy” 
and strengthen citizen engagement’ (PM&C 2008: 32–3). In turn, this idea of 
citizen engagement has thematic links with collaborative governance within 
government (chapters 4 and 5) as well as participatory governance with societal 
stakeholders (chapter 7).
Nation-states and governments remain central to all systems of governance, 
regulation and responsibility (Bell and Hindmoor 2009), but there are ongoing 
fundamental changes in how governments engage with the people and how 
the people hold those who wield institutional power accountable. So, while 
governments therefore remain firmly at the helm in their own right or, 
alternatively, at the centre of networks that are devoted to national and global 
public policy development, non-state institutions and actors are increasingly 
coming to the fore, especially through multi-stakeholder standard-setting 
initiatives and extra-governmental mechanisms of societal scrutiny (e.g. 
Keane 2009: 688–89). This development also relates to democracy’s evolution 
to embrace such features, as is considered later in this chapter. Indeed, as 
this chapter shows, there are strong connections between governmental and 
non-governmental stakeholders, their involvement in different democratic 
mechanisms, and various orders of governance and their underlying values.
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A number of different but related governance concepts are therefore discussed 
in the following sections, including: (a) public governance (extending out from 
the government sector to the private and community sectors); (b) public sector 
governance (i.e. governance of the administration and business of government); 
and (c) corporate (or organisational) governance (i.e. the governance of particular 
bodies in particular sectors). Each of these concepts of governance, which are 
represented in Table 1.1, can be viewed from national, comparative or global 
perspectives. 
Table 1 .1: Governance concepts
Level of analysis Macro Meso Micro
Description Public governance Public sector governance Corporate governance
Focus Society ` a Government   ` a Organisation
The close relationship between public governance, public sector governance 
and corporate governance sits within the broader framework of other societal 
and global governance, as is outlined earlier in this chapter. Farrar explains the 
relationship between the different orders of governance as follows (Farrar 2008: 
6–7, quoting respectively Keasey, Thompson and Wright 1997: 2; and Cioffi and 
Cohen 2000: 307, 313):
In a wide sense, corporate governance includes ‘the entire network 
of formal and informal relations involving the corporate sector and 
their consequences for society in general’. It can be seen as ‘the nexus 
of law, markets, public and private hierarchies, and national and 
international political economies’. It is capable of subsumption under 
broader concepts of contractual and social governance. Every country 
approaches corporate governance from the background of its own 
distinctive culture … In any study of corporate governance we must, 
therefore, look at other systems and consider the evolving norms of 
‘global’ corporate governance. Indeed corporate governance provides a 
good perspective for viewing some of the contradictions in globalisation.
An understanding of governance in the Commonwealth public sector requires 
comprehension of at least some of these related governance concepts, both 
in their own right and in how they relate to it. As outlined in what follows, 
the sharpest point of distinction for present purposes is between ‘corporate 
governance’ as conventionally understood and what is described as ‘public 
sector governance’ in official or suggested governance frameworks at more than 
one level of government in Australia (ANAO 2003c: 5–6; Weller and Webbe 
2008: [4.2.4]). This point draws support from the statement by Patrick Weller 
and Simone Webbe that ‘different constitutional, legislative and environmental 
considerations steer variances in the respective practice, and results, for 
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corporate governance and public sector governance’ (2008: 28). Thus, the 
different conceptions of governance offer insights on different parts of the 
complex whole that is ‘governance’.
Public governance
Public governance occupies a central place in this scheme of governance-related 
concepts. It focuses upon governance within the public domain at large, 
including but not limited to the function and operation of government. This 
acknowledges that governance in the public sector covers broader processes 
extending beyond the formal structures of government (e.g. Davis and Keating 
2000). Public governance, therefore, embraces not only governance as it 
relates to the institutions and business of government, but also government’s 
engagement with non-government parties in the governance process. Considered 
from this perspective, the general notion of ‘governance’ (and ‘governing’) is 
conventionally associated with ‘the processes that create the conditions for 
ordered rule and collective action within the public realm’ (Chhotray and Stoker 
2009: 71). 
In the age of ‘new public governance’ (chapter 2), for example, governance in 
the guise of ‘public governance’ can be broken down into subcategories such as 
‘socio-political governance’ (i.e. governance of societal relations), ‘public policy 
governance’ (i.e. governance of the public policy process), ‘administrative 
governance’ (i.e. governance of the business of government), ‘contract (or third 
party) governance’ (i.e. governance of public procurement and contracted 
service delivery to the people), and ‘network governance’ (i.e. governance 
through state and non-state networks that are engaged in policy-making and 
public service delivery) (Osborne 2010: 6–7). Collaborative governance, which is 
raised in chapters 2, 4 and 5, might also be added to this list, given its operation 
within and between levels of government, and even beyond government (e.g. 
participatory governance: see chapter 7), as well as its relationship to some of 
these governance spheres (e.g. network governance). Public sector governance 
also straddles several of these spheres. 
As such, public governance embraces relations between different governments and 
societies as well as relations within the one society and level of government. In this 
sense, it captures ‘that other sense of “governance” … which sees our communities 
“governed” through complex interactions between the public (government), private 
(market) and civil (third) sectors, emphasising the importance of constructive 
networking between these sectors’ (Wettenhall 2005: 42). More broadly, the debate 
between ‘society-centric’ and ‘state-centric’ views of governance (Bell and Hindmoor 
2009: 71) can be seen as part of a wider evolution in ideas, forms, and tools of 
governance that remains a work-in-progress on multiple levels, not least in the public 
sector (Chhotray and Stoker 2009: 16–26). 
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This particular conception of governance can also be viewed within the broader 
perspective of global public governance, in which transnational government 
networks operate as the hubs of a series of interconnected networks, which 
involve governmental, business, and community actors who are all engaged ‘in 
the pursuit of a larger conception of the global public interest’ (Slaughter 2004). 
The point in common is that public governance is integrally involved with 
government, but also transcends government at both national and international 
levels.
Despite public governance’s increased attention to governance networks that 
involve a range of actors (Rhodes 1997), the state-centric perspective has 
remained highly influential, and covers several approaches: top-down authority 
and control (e.g. law and coercion), network steering by government, policy 
and regulatory instruments (focused on effectiveness and efficiency) and the 
role of institutions (Peters and Pierre 2000: 37–46). Operating within this frame, 
‘governance’ is regarded as ‘the tools, strategies, and relationships used by 
governments to help govern’ (Bell and Hindmoor 2009: 2). This more discrete 
and government-focused notion of governance resonates particularly with 
public sector governance and its focus upon the ‘steering’ role of government in 
society (chapter 4).
Public sector governance
Public sector governance focuses attention more discretely upon governance 
within the public sector generally, or a designated level of government in 
particular. This is distinct from the broader conceptions of ‘public governance’, 
which were considered in the preceding section. Governance within the formal 
system of government remains a distinct dimension of governance in its own 
right. It deserves separate consideration.
Public sector governance concentrates upon governance as applied to the 
governance of organisations within and across the government sector, including 
different levels of government and their interactions with one another and other 
societal groups. So, public sector governance is not limited to governance as 
applied only to the formal administration of government, largely through the 
executive branch of government. In the context of the system of government 
and public administration that lies at the core of public sector governance, the 
‘steering’ role of government is paramount (chapter 4), not least in terms of the 
‘capacity of government to make and implement policy — in other words, to 
steer society’ (Pierre and Peters 2000: 1). 
In material that has been endorsed by the Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO), Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), and APSC, ‘governance’ is defined 
in the context of Australian public administration as ‘the set of responsibilities 
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and practices, policies and procedures, exercised by an agency’s executive to 
provide strategic direction, ensure objectives are achieved, manage risks and 
use resources responsibly and with accountability’ (ANAO and PM&C 2006: 13; 
APSC 2008). This definition of governance straddles corporate governance (see 
discussion below) and public sector governance. Similarly, the ANAO framework 
for public sector governance also straddles these different conceptions of 
governance, as follows (ANAO 2003c: 6):
The term ‘public sector governance’ has been chosen to focus this guide 
on the governance arrangements for public sector organisations at the 
Commonwealth level in Australia, as outlined in the definition below.
Public sector governance has a very broad coverage, including how 
an organisation is managed, its corporate and other structures, its 
culture, its policies and strategies and the way it deals with its various 
stakeholders. The concept encompasses the manner in which public 
sector organisations acquit their responsibilities of stewardship by 
being open, accountable and prudent in decision-making, in providing 
policy advice, and in managing and delivering programs.
Considered from within the system of government, Commonwealth governmental 
bodies are responsive to one or more sources of public sector regulatory 
influence, according to their organisational type. This system of monitoring and 
review includes portfolio oversight and extends beyond the Commonwealth 
public sector and its members to other components of the executive arm of 
government (e.g. auditor-general, ombudsman, and other mechanisms of 
administrative review). 
However, considered from a broader governance perspective, Commonwealth 
governmental bodies are also increasingly subject to an array of public scrutiny 
and influence. So, this system of monitoring and review also extends to other arms 
of constitutional government (e.g. judicial review and parliamentary committee 
scrutiny) and, even further, to the non-government sector and community as 
well. To the extent that this reflects enhanced scrutiny of government and input 
into public policy and standard-setting from organisations and communities 
outside of government, it resonates with the tension that exists between state-
centric and society-centric views of governance. It also connects with the 
concerns of monitory, deliberative and participatory democracy (Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004; and Keane 2009), as discussed later in this chapter.
Corporate governance
Corporate governance in the public sector focuses upon the governance of 
organisations in that sector, as well as upon the governance of their relations 
and interactions with others, both within and beyond the sector. In official 
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governance guidance for Australian public administration, terms such as ‘public 
sector governance’ and ‘governance’ in the context of the centre of government 
are often contrasted with those such as ‘corporate governance’, to avoid ‘any 
perceived ambiguity concerning the application of the term “corporate” to 
“non-corporate” public sector organisations’ (Barrett 2003: 5).
By way of comparison with the private sector, the Australian Securities 
Exchange Corporate Governance Council’s (ASX CGC’s) Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations state that corporate governance ‘encompasses 
the mechanisms by which companies, and those in control, are held to account’ 
and ‘influences how the objectives of the company are set and achieved, how risk 
is monitored and assessed, and how performance is optimised’ (2010: 3). Here, 
the ASX CGC also draws upon the HIH Royal Commission’s view of corporate 
governance (which is considered, along with other authoritative definitions of 
corporate governance, in chapter 2). Still, as the ASX CGC also acknowledges 
(2010: 3): ‘There is no single model of good corporate governance.’
The perception of standard corporate governance elements such as performance, 
conformance and accountability is affected by the prism of constitutionalism, 
managerialism, or any other organising theory of public administration that 
holds sway from time to time (chapter 2). Contemporary understanding and use 
of core corporate governance concepts such as ‘accountability’ occur against 
a background of recent governmental reform history in which ‘arguments 
about independence, accountability and efficiency are endemic to the “new 
managerialism”’ (Bottomley 1994: 529). Public law’s concern with judicial 
review of administrative action has similarly meant grappling with the forces 
that are unleashed by ‘new managerialism’ (Bayne 1991: 17). 
As this connection between governance trends and elements confirms, the 
literature on governance at the organisational level strongly identifies it 
with at least the elements of performance, legal and policy compliance, and 
multiple accountabilities. To these can be added factors such as assurance, 
management and planning, as well as leadership, ethics and even fairness (e.g. 
Barrett 2003: 7–8). Based upon authoritative governance guides for Australian 
public administration (e.g. ANAO 2003c: 13–15), a more nuanced cataloguing 
of governance elements might further divide them into groups of substantive 
elements (e.g. conformance, performance and accountability), qualitative 
elements (e.g. fairness, integrity, leadership and ethics), structural elements (e.g. 
management, committee and advisory structures) and functional elements (e.g. 
planning, resourcing, management (at several levels), monitoring and reporting).
Commonwealth bodies that are responsible for its oversight describe corporate 
governance as providing ‘a framework for the management and accountability 
of key decision-making bodies’ (DFA 2001). A more expansive conception 
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involves integrating ‘the main elements of corporate governance within a 
holistic framework, which are communicated effectively throughout the 
entire organisation and underpinned by a corporate culture of accountability, 
transparency, commitment and integrity’ (Barrett 2002b).
Considered mainly from the organisational perspective placed within a wider 
public sector context, the APSC views agency governance as follows (APSC 
2010a):
While there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to governance, it is important to 
realise that effective governance will contain the following building blocks:
•	 ‘strong leadership, culture and communication’;
•	 ‘appropriate governance committee structures’;
•	 ‘clear accountability mechanisms’;
•	 ‘comprehensive risk management, compliance and assurance systems’;
•	 ‘strategic planning, performance monitoring and evaluation’;
•	 ‘flexible and evolving principles-based systems’; and
•	 ‘effective operation across organisational boundaries’.
However, there are limits to simply listing or cataloguing governance elements 
at an organisational level. First, each of governance’s key elements has multiple 
guises. Management embraces management of risks, personnel, resources, 
and relationships. Accountability not only embraces internal and external 
constituencies and mechanisms, but also embraces different functions such as 
monitoring, evaluation, and review.
Secondly, their meaning and application are each subject to sectoral nuances. 
The organisational and regulatory architecture for the accountability of 
corporations in the private sector differs in important ways from that which 
applies to organisations in the public sector. This is illustrated by the difference 
between accountability to shareholding ministers of state-owned enterprises 
and accountability to shareholders who hold and trade shares in a regulated 
stock market (chapter 2). Similarly, the kind of stakeholder consultation and 
engagement that is followed within government circles in the development and 
implementation of public policy (chapter 7) differs from the kind of stakeholder 
engagement that characterises publicly listed companies under prevailing 
standards of corporate governance.
Thirdly, under some conventional notions of governance, there is a tendency 
to limit too narrowly the relationship between owners, managers, and 
constituencies. In the private sector context, this means conceiving of 
governance only in terms of the relationship between a company, its board 
and management, and its shareholding ‘owners’. In the public sector context, 
Public Sector Governance in Australia
20
equivalent narrowing occurs when governance attention is focused solely upon 
the relations between a department’s or agency’s governing body, its CEO, and 
relevant ministers of state (Barrett 2003: 5). Such a limited conception of public 
sector governance risks overlooking the governance significance and nuances 
of ‘the systems, processes, policies and strategies that direct operations, assure 
quality, monitor performance, and help manage [board and CEO] obligations to 
stakeholders’ (Barrett 2003: 5).
Finally, simply listing or cataloguing elements of governance in the abstract says 
nothing about the relationship and synchronicity between those elements. In 
other words, it is one thing to identify elements of governance and something 
different to show how those components relate to one another in a coherent and 
workable notion of governance. Focusing upon the related notion of corporate 
governance in primarily a private sector context, Steven Cole suggests that a 
conception of corporate governance whose crux is the alignment of its different 
components (Cole 2002). According to his view, corporate governance involves 
the organisational systems and processes that align the roles and responsibilities 
of managers with the corporation’s internal and external relationships to produce 
strategic, measurable and otherwise accountable outcomes. This produces a 
holistic view of corporate governance, especially from the practical perspective 
of those responsible for governing an organisation.
These limits to the listing of corporate governance elements in the abstract can 
be contrasted with the beneficial emergence of principle-based frameworks for 
corporate governance. Examples already exist of principle-based frameworks 
of corporate governance for public sector bodies and environments, to 
be compared and contrasted with those that now prevail for listed public 
companies in Australia (e.g. ASX CGC 2010), New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
and elsewhere. The Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public 
Services in the United Kingdom, for example, identifies ‘six core principles of 
good governance’ in its Good Governance Standard for Public Services. According 
to this standard, the requirements of ‘good governance’ include the following 
six elements (OPM and CIPFA 2004: 5):
•	 ‘focusing on the organisation’s purpose and on outcomes for citizens and 
service users’;
•	 ‘performing effectively in clearly defined functions and roles’;
•	 ‘promoting values for the whole organisation and demonstrating the values 
of good governance through behaviour’;
•	 ‘taking informed transparent decisions and managing risk’;
•	 ‘developing the capacity and capability of the governing body to be effective’; 
and
•	 ‘engaging stakeholders and making accountability real’.
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Such principle-based frameworks across the private and public sectors are 
characteristically seen as more flexible and less prescriptive than rule-based 
frameworks, therefore allowing more room for customisation to particular 
organisations and other circumstances. The distinction between principle-based 
and rule-based standards also corresponds to that between soft and hard law. 
The relationship in each case is also interdependent given, for example, the 
significance of governance legislation for ancillary governance guidelines and 
principles within each sector.
The use of principle-based standards within the Commonwealth public sector 
is evidenced by the frameworks underpinning the Commonwealth Financial 
Accountability Review (CFAR) and the Australian government’s governance 
guidelines for Commonwealth government business enterprises (GBEs), both of 
which were released in 2011. For example, the former rests upon principles 
of ‘comprehensiveness’ (e.g. clarity of objectives and accountabilities), 
‘flexibility’ (e.g. technological adaptability) and ‘user-friendliness’ (e.g. ease of 
understanding and accessibility) (DFD 2011a), and the latter is underpinned by 
a common set of key principles of governance responsibility and accountability 
for all Commonwealth GBEs (DFD 2011b). Both, however, are also supported by 
relevant governance legislation for the sector. 
From governance conceptions to governance 
planes and forms 
In summary, the relation and nuances between public governance, public sector 
governance, and corporate governance in the public sector extend beyond mere 
grammatical differences, to express differences in scope, orientation and context 
as well. These three different conceptions of governance can be compared 
and contrasted with official and other authoritative definitions of governance 
(especially corporate governance) in the wider literature (chapter 2). 
Just as analytical distinctions can be made between these related governance 
conceptions, so too can analytical distinctions be made between different planes 
and forms of governance. Two major analytical distinctions are commonly made 
in the literature — one between ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ planes of governance, 
and the other between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of governance. These distinctions 
and their significance for the Commonwealth public sector are outlined next.
The relationship between these governance conceptions, planes and forms is two-
fold. The governance planes and forms apply to each of the different conceptions 
of governance discussed here, and therefore transcend any particular sector or 
jurisdiction. In addition, any governance model that purports to approach the 
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full complexity of governance in the contemporary business of government 
must pay some attention, at least, to these different conceptions, horizontal and 
vertical planes, and hard and soft forms of governance, to which this chapter 
now turns. 
‘Horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ governance
As applied to government, the notions of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ governance 
apply to relations within and across different levels of government. In addition 
to governing itself, for example, a public sector body might liaise with other 
agencies within the same government (under a whole-of-government governance 
framework), its equivalents in other levels of government (as in cooperative 
federalism), and its counterparts in other countries (as in trans-Tasman 
cooperative regimes and other regional initiatives). Moreover, it might have 
governance interactions beyond the government sector. This more expansive 
notion of the ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ dimensions of governance is a theme 
that underpins several chapters in this book. 
The distinction between horizontal and vertical governance can be viewed 
successively from system-based, sector-based and organisation-based 
standpoints, with network-based governance cutting across one or more of 
these standpoints. The usefulness of this distinction as an analytical tool 
for understanding important features of governance is evidenced by its 
incorporation in official guidance from the APSC on the overall responsibility 
and accountability framework for the Commonwealth public sector. As 
identified in key guidance for the Australian Public Service (APS), for 
example, ‘the traditional model of accountability describes a vertical chain that 
provides a continuum of accountability relationships between the electorate, 
the Parliament, the Government and the public service’, which is matched by 
administrative law developments that ‘have extended and strengthened the 
horizontal accountability of public servants and Ministers’ (APSC 2009b: 6). The 
APSC also states that ‘public servants are accountable mostly through a vertical 
and hierarchical chain, but it does include some horizontal accountability to 
external review bodies’, and also adds that ‘other horizontal accountability 
arrangements are emerging’ (APSC 2009b: 8). 
In its most basic and conventional form, the distinction between horizontal and 
vertical governance refers to the notional vertical line that exists between the 
inner governance of an organisation and those to whom it is ultimately answerable 
(e.g. ministers and the centre of government), together with the notional 
horizontal line of outer governance relationships for organisations with others 
in the public sector and beyond. This simple horizontal-vertical governance 
dichotomy is packed with underlying nuances about the shifting core of essential 
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governmental activity, the rise of non-state influences upon public governance, 
the swinging pendulum between centralisation and fragmentation of executive 
government control, and both the relevance and limits of hierarchical chains of 
institutional authority and accountability (Chhotray and Stoker 2009: 18–23; 
Bell and Hindmoor 2009: 85–9).
The distinction between horizontal and vertical governance has relevance for 
other modes of governance, such as participatory and networked governance. 
The relationship between these various modes of governance is a key feature of 
contemporary governance frameworks for the public sector. As confirmed by 
the initial public discussion paper for the CFAR, which was released in early 
March 2012, ‘traditional models for delivering public services, based on vertical 
and hierarchical governance and accountability, need to be complemented by 
participative and networked arrangements’ (DFD 2012b: 7). This is critical in 
meeting a number of CFAR’s possible outcomes, including ‘an opportunity 
to develop a more coherent, portfolio-based governance framework, which 
rebalances devolution and accountability’ (DFD 2012b: 88).
Viewed beyond their application within a single organisation, these horizontal 
and vertical planes of governance can also extend outwards in a series of 
concentric circles of coverage. This wider coverage includes: horizontal 
and vertical interactions within one level of government (e.g. ‘public sector 
governance’: ANAO 2003c); horizontal relations between levels of government 
(e.g. COAG agreements); governance interactions between multiple organs of 
government at national and transnational levels (e.g. ‘horizontal government 
networks’ and ‘vertical government networks’ across ‘disaggregated’ nation-
states: Slaughter 2004); and governance interactions between governmental and 
non-governmental institutions and actors. These various planes of governance are 
present, for example, in the institutional governance tensions that are identified 
in chapter 3, the nature of participatory governance as outlined in chapter 7, 
and the society-centric and other conceptions of governance canvassed in this 
chapter. 
‘Hard’ and ‘soft’ governance
Connections exist between horizontal and vertical planes of governance, on one 
hand, and ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of governance, on the other. In managing 
horizontal and vertical governance from organisational and other standpoints, 
much depends upon the successful marriage of the external and internal 
influences upon an organisation’s governance, and the hard and soft aspects of 
governance. This necessity reinforces the holistic nature of governance.
The distinction between hard and soft governance throws light on the complete 
set of factors that characterise well-governed organisations, including not only 
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formal and structural aspects (i.e. ‘hard’ governance factors) but also behavioural 
and relational aspects (i.e. ‘soft’ governance factors; e.g. Edwards and Clough 
2005). In terms of the private sector, leading empirical studies of effective boards 
bring both hard and soft factors together, for example, in a complete picture of 
board efficiency and effectiveness that embraces board structures, membership 
and skills mix, and processes and behaviours (Leblanc and Gillies 2005: 139; see 
chapter 6, in this volume, further on board governance). Similarly, in terms of 
the public sector, the formal (e.g. structural) features of institutional governance 
architecture, such as legislated whole-of-sector governance requirements (e.g. 
the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth), Financial Management and Accountability 
Act 1997 (Cth), and Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cth)), 
differ from the informal features of governance (e.g. organisational governance 
practices and conduct).
This distinction between hard and soft governance can also be elevated at a 
systemic level to a distinction between the formal institutional and regulatory 
architecture and associated ‘rules’ that govern decision-making for collective 
entities such as corporations and governments, on one hand, and their less 
formal counterparts in ordering and otherwise influencing ‘collective decision-
making’ and behaviour, on the other (Chhotray and Stoker 2009: 3–4). In this 
way, the distinction between hard and soft governance parallels the distinction 
between ‘hard’ law (i.e. legislation and court judgments) and ‘soft’ law (i.e. 
other forms of regulation, such as official codes and guidelines). 
Important connections also exist between governance and regulation, the 
horizontal and vertical dimensions of an organisation’s governance, and hard 
and soft forms of governance. As explained by Chhotray and Stoker (2009: 23–
24), these connections matter in terms of organisational autonomy, regulatory 
guidance and performance outcomes:
Governing by regulation from a governance perspective is about 
one public organisation aiming to shape the activities of another [in] 
the rolling out of a governing technique in the context of complex 
architecture of governance. Regulation can be a soft form of governance 
where the regulated agency or organisation is not commanded to do 
something but acts with autonomy, within prescribed limits, and is held 
to account against the achievement of certain goals or outcomes.
1 . Dimensions of Governance for the Public Sector
25
Norms of public sector governance in their 
broader governance context
Connections between values and governance
The different conceptions, orders and other aspects of governance canvassed 
in this chapter both reflect and shape a variety of values that are embodied in 
the structures, processes and behaviours surrounding governance in its various 
senses. Values and other norms of conduct therefore underpin governance on 
many levels. Sometimes, they explicitly form an integral part of the governance 
framework, as in the incorporation of designated values in governance legislation 
and other official guidance. 
In terms of public sector values, authoritative sources of governance guidance 
for Australian public administration, such as the ANAO governance framework, 
list ‘accountability’, ‘transparency’ (or ‘openness’), ‘integrity’, ‘stewardship’, 
‘leadership’, and ‘efficiency’ as fundamental principles and values of governance 
(ANAO 2003c: 8). The APS values, which were originally enshrined in the ‘APS 
Values’ and ‘APS Code of Conduct’ sections of the PS Act, include values as 
diverse as societal values (e.g. community ‘diversity’), democratic values (e.g. 
‘the effectiveness and cohesion of Australia’s democratic system of government’), 
governmental values (e.g. ministerial responsibility), workplace values 
(e.g. meritorious, non-discriminatory, and equal opportunity employment), 
professional values (e.g. an ‘apolitical’, ‘impartial’, and ‘professional’ outlook, 
for the provision of ‘frank, honest, comprehensive, accurate and timely advice’ 
to the government of the day).2
Even the revision and streamlining of the APS Values that are recommended 
in Ahead of the Game: Blueprint for the Reform of Australian Government 
Administration (see chapter 2, in this volume) serve value-driven aims of 
cohesion, effectiveness and excellence in government (e.g. greater clarity of 
expectations, roles and responsibilities). The recommendations outlined in 
Ahead of the Game also reflect values of integration (e.g. whole-of-government,3 
intergovernmental, and cross-sectoral initiatives), cooperation (e.g. cross-agency 
2 Assuming that it becomes law in a form that does not differ too greatly, or at all, from the Bill introduced 
into the federal parliament in early 2012, the Public Service Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) separates and 
consolidates public service values into two lists — a list of ‘APS Values’ and a list of related ‘APS Employment 
Principles’. The APS Values embrace being ‘ethical’, ‘respectful’, ‘accountable’, ‘impartial’, and ‘committed 
to service’, with broad descriptions of each of those values also included in the Act. The APS Employment 
Principles are similarly defined, with a subset of principles covering appointment and promotion on merit. 
3 For example, under reforms introduced in the Public Service Amendment Act 2012, the responsibilities of 
departmental secretaries include portfolio responsibility for developing ‘a strong strategic policy capability 
that can consider complex, whole-of-government issues’.
Public Sector Governance in Australia
26
coordination and collaboration),4 monitorability (e.g. regular agency reviews), 
efficiency (e.g. regulatory simplification and ‘deburdening’), and innovation 
(e.g. digitalisation, flexibility, responsiveness, and adaptation). Similarly, the 
value-laden trends of the last 25 years of Australian public administration 
reflect ideals of openness, consultation, engagement and efficiency, amongst 
others (McPhee 2009b: 5–6).
As understandings and practices of government evolve, so too do the underlying 
thematic influences and emphases in governance values. Some degree of 
correlation exists, for example, between how society views the role of the state 
and the public sector governance trends that prevail from time to time (chapter 
2). The shift from the welfare state to the regulatory state and, lately, to a more 
pluralistic and facilitative state brings with it changes in the conceptions and 
practices of public sector governance that themselves mark shifts in sets of 
values and their priorities (Osborne 2010: 2–10). Similarly, some key institutional 
tensions in governance at systemic, departmental and agency board levels stem, 
in part, from competition between different values (chapters 3–6).
At the same time, new and underlying themes of cross-institutional and trans-
sectoral integration, interdependence, and shared responsibilities combine with 
old underlying themes of organisational capability, efficiency, and effectiveness.5 
In these ways, the values of governance, as they are explicitly embedded or 
otherwise fostered through public sector regulation, connect on various levels 
to the components and elements of governance and its institutional architecture 
within government and society.
Categories of governance values and other norms
This connection between governance architecture, reforms and values makes 
it imperative to map such values in some detail, for the purpose of discussion 
in this and subsequent chapters. At least four distinct but related categories 
of values and other norms shape the governance arrangements and supportive 
regulatory architecture for the Commonwealth public sector. They can usefully 
be summarised in the following table, in descending order of systemic breadth 
and governance specificity:
4 For example, under reforms introduced in the Public Service Amendment Act 2012, the roles of departmental 
secretaries include ‘providing stewardship within the Department and, in partnership with the Secretaries 
Board, across the APS’. 
5 For example, one of the functions of the Secretaries Board, which was established under the Public 
Service Amendment Act 2012, is ‘to draw together advice from senior leaders in government, business and the 
community’, while one of the key responsibilities of each departmental secretary is ‘to manage the affairs of 
the Department efficiently, effectively, economically and ethically’. 
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Table 1 .2: Categories, focus and examples of governance norms
Category of norms Focus Example(s)
Broader societal governance
Integration of internal and 
external systemic responsibility 
and accountability
Social trust, cooperation, 
transparency, 
contestability and 




Constitutional system of 
democratic government in 
Westminster-based systems
Rule of law, responsible 
government and 
sovereignty of the people 
(chapters 1–3)
General public sector 
regulation, management 
and administration
Reforms to the executive branch 
of government and its relations 
with other governmental 
branches and levels
Public managerialism, 
regulatory state and 
new public governance 
(chapters 2–6)
Governance-specific 
public sector regulation, 
management and 
administration
Regulation of governance 
values, structures and other 
arrangements for public sector 
bodies (e .g . PS Act, CAC Act 
and FMA Act)
APS Values (chapter 1), 
Uhrig review templates 
(chapters 2, 6 and 8) and 
official Finance governance 
guides (chapters 1, 6, 8 
and 9)
At an overarching level, societal norms both permeate and underpin governance 
ideas and practices. The values of social trust and cooperation, for example, 
are as important for civil society as they are for the workings of government 
and business. Values such as these also have discrete governance implications, 
especially in terms of public responsibility and accountability, under both 
state-centric and society-centric views of governance and the tensions between 
them, as explored in various chapters in this volume. This category of norms 
informs both internal and external dimensions of public responsibility and 
accountability, in the sense that these values condition public responsibility 
and accountability through the formal institutions of government as well as 
through engagement of the private sector and civil society. 
The norms for the governance of society as a whole have both similarities 
and differences with the norms that relate to the governance that operates 
through a system of democratic government. In each case, values such as trust, 
cooperation and transparency remain important, although often with different 
contexts and mechanisms.6 The trust that is necessary in business transactions 
and professional life is not the same, for example, as the trust that voters place 
in elected governments. At the same time, the system of government also reflects 
and gives effect to particular values in particular ways.
6 On the importance of trust in a governmental context, see: Uhr 2005; and Braithwaite and Levi 2003. On 
the importance of transparency as a dominant value in business regulation worldwide, see: Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000.
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A series of democratic, constitutional and other values underlie notions of the 
public trust, public service, and public accountability, which infuse systems 
of government and their governance arrangements (e.g. Finn 1993; Hood 1998; 
Finn 2010). Whatever the ongoing normative and operational significance of 
these organising principles for the framework of government today (Finn 2010: 
350), they have a powerful legitimising and standard-guiding influence over 
what the people expect from their governments and how governments should 
themselves behave.
Within the system of government, the connection between governance and 
values is reflected in constitutional and legislative arrangements, such as the 
Australian Constitution’s incorporation of the rule of law and the reference to 
ministerial responsibility in the APS Values. In addition, the values associated 
with liberal democratic government must accommodate and adapt to democracy’s 
own evolution. The tension between contemporary democracy’s state-centric 
manifestations (e.g. the institutions of representative democracy) and its society-
centric forms (e.g. deliberative democracy) also impacts upon governance and 
its manifestations (e.g. network, collaborative and participatory governance). 
The governance of the public sector is also discrete from governance within 
the broader system of government. In terms of the public sector as a whole, 
there is general regulation of public sector management and administration, 
which is underpinned by a series of sectoral values, some of which are explicit 
and legislated (e.g. APS Values) and some of which are implicit and reflected in 
governmental behaviours and processes (e.g. public service conventions and 
protocols). Indeed, the APS Values cut across both general regulation of the 
APS and the governance of particular Commonwealth public sector entities. 
More broadly, norms of public sector regulatory infrastructure are also 
located in public accountability laws (e.g. laws of judicial and administrative 
review, freedom of information and privacy) and general laws that apply to 
governmental and non-governmental organisations alike, at least to some degree 
(e.g. governmental liability under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(previously Trade Practices Act 1974)). 
Accordingly, the Commonwealth public sector also contains within it a discrete 
set of governance-specific laws and official guidance, from both whole-of-
government and organisational perspectives, with underlying values and 
principles that are grounded in the prevailing notions of good governance. 
Here, the main governance-specific legislation consists of the FMA Act, CAC 
Act and PS Act. Together, these acts supply the primary legislative framework 
for regulating the governance of Commonwealth public sector bodies of all 
kinds, in terms of governance structures and values, financial and reporting 
responsibilities, and other governance responsibilities and arrangements.
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Other major governance-specific frameworks and policy initiatives in this 
category include the governmental adoption of most of the recommendations 
of the Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office 
Holders (Uhrig review) and their extension throughout the Commonwealth 
public sector (chapter 2). These recommendations are supplemented by ANAO 
frameworks and guides on governance, together with what the Department 
of Finance and Deregulation (Finance) describes as ‘principles for helping 
determine the most appropriate structure and governance arrangements for 
Australian Governmental bodies’ (DFD 2007, as outlined in DFD 2005b) as well 
as other official guidelines on governance from Finance (e.g. DFD 2011b). These 
are important sources of governance principles and related norms.
At a final level, in descending order from societal, governmental and sectoral 
governance, we reach the organisational level of governance. All of these levels 
of governance have their associated values and other norms. Some of these norms 
integrate, at an organisational level, the governance norms that operate from a 
whole-of-government perspective, including sector-wide norms such as the APS 
Values. Some of them reflect effectiveness, efficiency and other values that are 
derived from official governance templates (e.g. the Uhrig review templates) and 
other official guidance (e.g. DFA 2005b), while still others are more organisation-
specific in nature. These organisation-specific values are derived from sources 
as various as particular organisational statements of expectation and intent, 
organisational charters and missions, and other aspects of organisational design 
and strategy. Good organisational governance at this level can also model good 
governance values and practices from other organisations within the public 
sector and beyond. 
In short, viewing governance in these societal, governmental, sectoral and 
organisational terms reinforces the connection between cross-cutting spheres 
of governance and their associated values. These cross-cutting connections 
between governance and values are demonstrated by a series of accountability 
mechanisms from the inner and outer public sector to wider society. These 
accountability mechanisms and the borders that they transcend also offer insight 
into governance as a multi-dimensional system of interdependent parts. The 
final part of this chapter considers key aspects of this interrelationship between 
governance architecture and its underlying norms in more detail. In particular, 
it illustrates how changes and limits to this architecture and its norms create 
challenges for the Commonwealth level of government and its public sector 
system.
Public Sector Governance in Australia
30
Governance changes, limits and challenges
The form and substance of governance in Australia and other Anglophone 
countries is integrally connected to the prevailing system of democracy and 
government.7 Neither that system, nor our understanding of its features and 
limits, remains fixed forever. Accordingly, there are progressive insights about 
this system and its ongoing evolution that any serious study of governance 
must accommodate. Three such insights bring together many of the themes 
underpinning this chapter, and serve as a platform for the analysis of governance 
in later chapters.
First, the forms and institutions of democratic government are evolving to 
accommodate new societal expectations and mechanisms of public engagement 
and accountability. Governance must adapt to contemporary democracy’s 
transition from a primary focus upon majoritarian democracy, which is 
characterised formally as rule by majority vote in parliament, to embrace what 
is variously termed ‘government by discussion’ (Sen 2009: 324), a ‘partnership 
conception’ of democracy (Dworkin 2011: 5), and governance through multi-
order monitoring of all institutional exercises of power over the people in 
the new era of ‘monitory democracy’ (Keane 2009: xxxiii). So, too, are the 
organs and actors of democratic government exposed to enhanced standards 
of public contestability, deliberation and justification in their official decisions 
and actions, under related notions of ‘deliberative democracy’ (Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004).
Democratic norms are also the subject of continuous conceptual recasting and 
operational application to changing circumstances. For example: democracy 
is now concerned as much with respect for individual freedoms and human 
rights as it is with majoritarian rule; responsible government and ministerial 
responsibility are both affected by the party-based system of government; and 
popular sovereignty and the rule of law are still works-in-progress in their 
application to the contemporary complexity of executive government and the 
legal conditions for exercising public power on behalf of the Australian people 
(Finn 1995: 7, 13, 20). Electoral outcomes are another and increasingly volatile 
dynamic in recent democratic history, in light of the transition from majority 
government to minority government and post-election coalition formation in 
the United Kingdom, Australia and other Anglophone countries. The relations 
between government and the people change as the understanding and practices 
of representative democracy change too.
7 Governance has many systems. The system of democracy and government discussed here is only one such 
system. Another is the public sector governance system discussed in chapter 4.
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The central idea in this new era of participatory, deliberative and monitory 
democracy is that governance and regulation in democracies now involves 
interactions between state and non-state actors, greater accountability to the 
people for what governments do, and enhanced means of public engagement and 
monitoring in the democratic process. This includes societal standard-setting, 
norm-shaping and regulatory influence beyond simply their governmental 
forms in policy-making and law-making. It also includes discrete and sometimes 
shared responsibilities across the public, private, and community sectors (and 
even national boundaries) in developing and implementing public policy and 
regulation, steering and ordering societal behaviour, and monitoring and 
calling to account the use and abuse of institutional power. This evolution of 
democratic governance has clear connections to other aspects of governance, as 
explored in this and other chapters.
Secondly, the public trust is connected to democracy’s evolution and resultant 
impact upon governance, in the following sense. The public trust remains a 
central concept that underpins the system of government, accountability 
to the electorate and democracy’s evolution to embrace meaningful public 
engagement beyond periodic elections. This is why talk of the public trust in 
law and government remains meaningful and action-guiding, rather than merely 
aspirational or even passé.
At the very least, this central concept requires that those who are governed are 
enabled to give their fully informed consent to the exercise of power over them by 
governing institutions and public officials (Funnell 2001: 149). In constitutional 
and legal terms, the public trust informs official standards and behaviours 
including those enshrined in public sector codes and other regulation (Finn 2010: 
330–39, 350). In political terms, the UK Nolan Committee’s mid-1990s warning 
against improper financial relationships between non-government parties 
and politicians reflects deeper concern about safeguarding the public against 
breaches of the public trust invested in elected representatives (Committee on 
Standards in Public Life 1995; Finn 1995). 
The core principle is that those in government who are invested with political 
and legal power exercise that power for and on behalf of the people, whatever 
the ultimate foundation for this public trust. This grand theme of making the 
people the masters and not the servants of public power permeates the conferral, 
conditioning and proper use of that power over people’s lives. Consider, in 
this context, the governance significance of recent legal recognition of the 
sovereignty of the Australian people as the ultimate source of constitutional 
authority. If the people are the source of all democratic power, for example, 
those institutions and public officials who wield such power do so on trust 
from and for the people, and are accountable to them through various electoral, 
agency-based and Westminster-style mechanisms (Finn 1994: 227–28, 234–35). 
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Finally, these ideas and mechanisms of public trust and accountability also 
make it necessary to consider how Australia’s system of government and 
public administration sits within a broader tradition of Westminster and other 
influences (Rhodes et al 2009). This common reference point for convergence and 
divergence across systems of government means that Australia and countries 
such as the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and others can look to one 
another for models of good governance regulation and practice (Finn 1995; 
Halligan 2003a, 2007a; Wettenhall 2005; and Rhodes et al 2009). The reform 
of Australian public administration that is foreshadowed in Ahead of the Game 
(see chapter 2, this volume) acknowledges the comparative lessons from other 
jurisdictions (AGRAGA 2010: 64). Using governance comparisons and lessons 
across jurisdictions to model governance reforms is another theme in several of 
the following chapters, as is Australia’s debt to the influence of Westminster-
based ideas and conventions of government.
In what is sometimes called the ‘Washminster’ model (e.g. Thompson 2001), 
Australia’s system of government combines aspects of the American system 
of a written constitution, separation of powers and bicameral legislature with 
the British system of responsible government, ministerial accountability and 
Westminster conventions. At the same time, there are questions of lingering 
legal and political significance about the extent to which Westminster 
notions are actually enshrined in the Australian constitutional structure, the 
apparent non-applicability of such notions to Australian innovations in the 
use of statutory authorities and state-owned enterprises, and the resultant 
challenges to core tenets of associated doctrines such as individual ministerial 
responsibility (Finn 1995: 12–13). Together, they serve to highlight ‘the limits, 
limitations and uncertainties of “Westminster” theory and practice’ (Finn 1995: 
12–15, 22–9). Similarly, residual questions remain about the consistency of 
Westminster-style machinery and doctrines with the progressive tightening of 
public accountability measures that involve administrative review, the public 
service and corporate governance (Bottomley 1997). 
In other words, what is suitable under Westminster conventions for the 
governance of a public service within a unitary system of government that is 
based upon a constitutional monarchy, an unwritten constitution and the ultimate 
supremacy of parliament does not necessarily translate fully to contemporary 
Australian democratic, constitutional and political conditions. Even after 100 
years of Australian constitutional jurisprudence, the High Court of Australia is 
still hearing cases that explore the extent to which the doctrines, prerogatives 
and conventions that relate to the Crown in right of the UK government remain 
applicable to Australia’s constitutional system of government.8 
8 E.g. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v. Baxter Healthcare (2007) HCA 38; Pape v. 
Commissioner of Taxation (2009) HCA 23; and Momcilovic v. The Queen (2011) HCA 34.
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An alternative to the view of an inevitable erosion or dilution of Westminster 
principles of responsible government and good public administration is the 
view of ‘traditions under challenge that reshape reform as reforms reshape them’ 
(Rhodes et al 2008: 472). In characterising recent developments in Westminster-
based systems, one set of public sector management commentators characterises 
developments variously in terms of ‘innovative ways of combining past 
traditions with new organising principles of governance’, and ‘a convergence of 
traditions as Westminster-derived jurisdictions wrestle with new challenges to 
their understanding of governance’, The result has been that a series of models 
co-exist in some form of layers and sedimentation (Halligan 2010d). In the words 
of Rhodes et al, ‘it is not a question of “in with the new, out with the old”, but 
of “in with the new alongside key components of the old”’ (2008: 474). 
Conclusion
As presented in this chapter, governance in the public sector is the product of 
different orders of governance within society and their underlying norms, all 
of which impact upon one another to varying degrees. The design and practice 
of governance in the contemporary public sector manifests itself through 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of governance that infuse the ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ 
governance interactions of public sector bodies, with multi-textured governance 
relationships across and within different levels of government as well as with 
others beyond government. 
All of this occurs within an overall system of governance that itself draws upon 
and interacts with other systems of societal, democratic and legal governance. 
None of these things are captured fully for their own purposes or adequately 
for overall evaluative purposes by focusing on select governance models (e.g. 
government-centric models), features (e.g. structure and performance) or 
outcomes (e.g. financial probity) to the exclusion of others that are of equal 
significance. At the same time, different concepts of governance — especially 
public governance, public sector governance and corporate governance — 
retain their own settings and features that demand attention in their own right. 
Accordingly, this book’s chapters collectively develop and present a kaleidoscopic 
view of governance as a multi-level systemic, holistic and reflexive enterprise. It 
is systemic in the sense that different components contribute to a system with a 
coherent overall focus upon a unit of governance (e.g. a nation, its public sector, 
or bodies comprising it) that itself interacts with other systems of governance. 
For example, the governance of each public sector body is conducted within a 
system of governance for the sector as a whole, which itself sits within wider 
systems of political, legal, and socio-economic governance (chapters 1–7).
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Next, governance is holistic in the sense that it is a multi-layered and multi-
textured enterprise, to be considered and practised on a range of levels that are 
distinct from and yet also related to one another. For example, both the design 
and implementation of governance arrangements for particular public sector 
bodies and the appointment and staffing at senior levels for public sector bodies 
must be understood within a broader system of federal public sector governance 
that is observed from central, organisational, and community stakeholder 
viewpoints (chapters 4–9).
Finally, governance is reflexive in the sense that its values, practices and 
other features both shape and are shaped by their surrounding environment, 
through multiple points of interconnectivity. For example, the different 
phases of Australian governance reform from the late-twentieth century to the 
early twenty-first century have an impact upon different central and agency 
conceptions of governance (chapter 2), just as the governance of particular 
kinds of public sector bodies is responsive to both state-centred and society-
inclusive dimensions of public governance (chapter 3). This reflexivity extends 
from systemic and institutional levels to organisational and individual levels 
too, with the accountability of public servants evolving to include their 
internalisation of public sector values and professional ethics, in addition to the 
norms served by traditional external scrutiny (APSC 2009b: 6). 
Such a view of governance means that the more that we can appreciate how 
the different aspects of governance bear upon one another, the better that we 
can understand and practice it in all of the discrete ways that matter to those 
engaged in the work of governance, especially the business of government. 
Accordingly, our understanding of Australian public administration and its 
changes over time cannot be compartmentalised away from these influences.
Understanding public governance, public sector governance and corporate 
governance on their own terms as well as in relation to one another is essential 
for the discussion of different aspects of governance in this and the following 
chapters. Using this opening discussion as a platform, the next chapter explores 
in more detail the evolution of the different forms of governance that are related 
to Australia’s system of government and the role of public administration in it.
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2 . Rise of Corporate and Public 
Governance
This chapter examines the emergence of governance as a primary concept 
during the last three decades and the ways in which two different forms of 
governance — corporate governance and public governance — have risen to 
prominence in the Australian public sector. To understand the significance of 
this it is necessary to explore the context of public sector reforms, and specific 
policy and reform agendas. The changing theories and broader conceptions of 
governance that were considered in chapter 1 assist with this task. 
The intersection of the public and private sectors has been a fundamental and 
under-researched dimension of changing governance. The connections between 
the public and private sectors that have been so central to reform over the last 
three decades build on a much longer history as governments have turned to 
business for advice about efficiency and economy. There are two streams within 
this relationship. The first is the transfer of private sector ideas and techniques 
to the public sector (ranging from different modes of management to the 
corporatisation of functions and marketisation). The second is the flow of assets 
and various forms of outsourced activity from the public sector (this includes 
variations on privatisation). Underlying the relationship are the shifting 
boundaries between government/public concerns and market/private concerns.
Prior to the term ‘governance’ coming into vogue, the nomenclature used 
for similar concepts was that of government and public administration. This 
nomenclature provides the backdrop for mapping movements in the emphases 
of public sector governance, which are examined in this chapter in terms of 
three phases of public sector reform over the last 30 years. Reflected in these 
phases we find distinctive modes of governance emerging during different 
decades: corporate management in the 1980s, corporate governance in the 1990s 
and public governance in the 2000s. The pattern for the 2010s is still emerging 
during a period of turbulence and uncertainty.
Three phases in public sector reform
The Australian experience can be summarised with reference to the phases 
of reform and the decade in which they became significant during the reform 
era (from the early 1980s) (Table 2.1). Managerialism (Pollitt 1993; Zifcak 1994; 
Considine and Painter 1997; Halligan 2007b) best reflects the first phase in 
which management became the central concept and reshaped thinking as part 
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of a paradigm change. This was succeeded by a phase that, for a time, came close 
to the mainstream depiction of new public management (NPM) (Hood 1991), in 
which the market element was favoured and features such as disaggregation, 
privatisation and a private sector focus were at the forefront. In turn, NPM 
was followed, although not displaced, in the 2000s by integrated governance 
(Halligan 2006).
The sequence of reform has run from administration to stages that have been dominated 
first, by management, then markets, and then performance-based governance. The 
Australian tradition has been administrative rather than managerial; the latter being 
historically more closely identified with the commercial arms of government than 
the core public sector. In each of the three reform phases it is possible to distinguish 
elements that applied particularly to the departments of state and those that pertained 
to statutory authorities, corporations and companies (Table 2.1). 
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The initial period of reform in the 1980s displaced traditional administration with 
a package of reforms that were based on management. Over about a decade, a new 
management philosophy was developed and implemented, which replaced the 
emphasis on inputs and processes with one on results (Halligan and Power 1992).
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The main elements of the reform program (under a Labor government) focused 
on the core public service (including commercialisation, decentralisation and 
the senior public service) and improving financial management, followed by 
corporatisation and later privatisation. The Financial Management Improvement 
Program (FMIP) dominated the reforms of the 1980s. The Australian focus on 
results, outcomes and performance-oriented management dates from this time, 
although the emphasis then was on program budgeting and management. The 
flagging reform momentum in the mid 1980s produced new directions that 
were linked to an emerging micro-economic reform agenda, the most significant 
element being the major reorganisation of the machinery of government (for 
details see Campbell and Halligan 1993; Zifcak 1994; Halligan 1997). 
A central element of reform was creating more business-like operations in the 
public sector. The movement towards corporatisation that occurred from the late 
1980s, through either GBEs or incorporation as companies, produced significant 
changes to the status of major organisations (Halligan and Power 1992: 109–10).
New public management
The first phase of this reform era displayed incipient NPM in several respects, 
but the dominant theme was management improvement. The commitment to 
neo-liberal economic reforms that existed in the 1990s, following the advent of 
a conservative coalition government, led to the public service becoming highly 
decentralised, marketised, contractualised and privatised. 
This new reform stage became most apparent with the increasing acceptance 
of the need for market-oriented reform by the mid 1990s. A major impetus for 
the application of market principles came from the National Competition Policy 
Review (1993), which was a flow-on from the micro-economic reform agenda 
that emerged in the mid 1980s. The Commonwealth and the states agreed to 
implement its recommendations, including competitive neutrality between 
the government and the business sector, and the structural reform of public 
monopolies to allow competition between providers within sectors. By the mid 
1990s, the Australian public service was again in transition as the pressures 
for further reform intensified. The new agenda centred on competition and 
contestability, contracting out, client focus, core business, and the application 
of the purchaser/provider principle. 
Market principles were applied first to the outer public sector and subsequently 
to the core public service. The private sector and market forces were closely 
related: the exporting of responsibilities to the private sector and/or making 
the public sector subject to market disciplines; and the importing of business 
techniques combined with attempts to replicate market conditions internally. 
Several tiers of markets became accepted within the public sector, the main 
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distinction being between the internal (or activities within the public service 
involving purely public transactions, such as user charging) and the external 
market (or public–private transactions, such as contracting out). A more 
significant dimension of management reform occurred in instances where there 
was a major organisational transformation (corporatisation or privatisation: 
Wettenhall 2001), although this was normally within the broader public sector. 
The national focus on improving competitiveness, and the emergence of a 
Council of Australian Governments, produced an agenda for rationalising and 
decentralising the delivery of services within the national public sector.
The agenda also covered a deregulated personnel system; a core public service 
that was focused on policy, regulation and oversight of service delivery; and 
contestability of the delivery of services with greater use of the private sector. 
A major financial management framework was introduced with budgeting on 
a full accrual basis for 1999–2000, implementation of outputs and outcomes 
reporting, and extending agency devolution to budget estimates and financial 
management. 
The devolution of responsibilities from central agencies to line departments 
(responsible for specific functions) was highly significant in the late 1990s 
and resulted in a diminished role for central agencies (Halligan 2003b). As a 
result, the Australian Public Service Commission’s (APSC) role was modest while 
the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet’s (PM&C) interventions were 
constrained and it was no longer providing overall public service leadership. 
The role of the then Department of Finance also contracted substantially. 
Integrated governance
The new phase, integrated governance, which began in the 2000s, had an 
impact on relationships within and the coherence of the public service, delivery 
and implementation, and performance and responsiveness to government 
policy. Four dimensions were designed to draw together fundamental aspects of 
governance: resurrection of the central agency as a major actor with more direct 
influence over departments; whole-of-government as the new expression of a 
range of forms of coordination; central monitoring of agency implementation 
and delivery; and departmentalisation through absorbing statutory authorities 
and rationalising the non-departmental sector. A centralising trend within the 
Commonwealth system was also identified within specific policy sectors. In 
combination these provide the basis for integrated governance (Halligan 2006).
These trends placed greater emphasis on horizontal relationships through 
cross-agency programs and collaborative relationships. At the same time, 
vertical relationships were extended and reinforced. The whole-of-government 
approach was centralising in that central agencies were driving some policy 
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directions across agencies and the public service. The result was the tempering 
of devolution through strategic steering and management from the centre and a 
rebalancing of the positions of centre and line agencies. 
An underlying element was political control: the use of programs to improve 
financial information for ministers; greater emphasis on strategic coordination 
by cabinet; controlling major policy agendas; the abolition of agencies and 
bodies as part of rationalisation and integration; and monitoring the delivery 
and implementation of government policy. These measures increased the 
potential for policy and program control and integration using the conventional 
machinery of cabinet, central agencies and departments as well as other 
coordinating instruments. 
The intensity of the Australian reassertion of the centre and the ministerial 
department resulted from both system shortcomings and a response to the threat 
of uncertainty, which favoured the security of a stronger centre. A core principle 
of the 1980s was to require departments to manage as well as to provide policy 
advice. The language of the mid 2000s came to emphasise effective delivery as 
well as policy advice with the latter defined in terms of outcomes (Shergold 
2004b). Departmentalisation was expressed through absorbing statutory 
authorities and reclaiming control of agencies that were managed by hybrid 
boards that did not accord with a particular corporate (and therefore private 
sector) governance prescription. 
Underlying change, then, was a mainly state-centric focus on sorting out the 
architecture and processes of systems to provide for more effective government. 
Less apparent was thinking and action about external relationships. Those 
concerns were evident in the whole-of-government agenda, and the rhetoric 
intensified about citizen engagement and collaborative governance (O’Flynn 
and Wanna 2008), but the Commonwealth government had yet to centre public 
governance more clearly within societal processes.
Modes of governance at the system and 
agency levels
A different mode of governance has emerged during each of the last three 
decades, reflecting the tone and content of the then reform agenda: the narrow 
concept of corporate management in the 1980s, corporate governance in the 
1990s and two variants of public governance in the 2000s. Their relationship 
to the reform agenda discussed above is indicated in Table 2.2. The society-
centric notion of collaborative governance indicates general discourse about, 
and official aspirations for, public governance in the 2010s that has yet to be 
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properly reflected in reality. Nevertheless, Ahead of the Game: Blueprint for the 
Reform of Australian Government Administration, which is discussed later in the 
chapter, gives the idea of collaborative governance a more substantial foundation 
in public governance. At the very least, collaborative governance involves 
aspects of wider societal accountability, shared intra- and intergovernmental 
governance accountabilities (chapter 1), and participatory governance and 
stakeholder engagement (chapter 7).
Table 2 .2: Reform agenda and agency modes of governance
Period Public management reform agenda Governance mode
Pre-reform Public administration Machinery of government
1980s Managerialism Corporate management
1990s New public management Corporate governance
2000s Integrated governance Public governance (state-centric)
2010s Collaborative governance Public governance (society-centric)
The first phase of reform had embedded management and more commercial 
thinking, whereas the second phase placed increasing emphasis on markets, 
contracts and disaggregation. Labor governments favoured the public sector but 
pushed it towards the private sector; the Coalition government favoured the 
private sector but recognised the need to maintain a strong core public service. 
A focus on corporate thinking as a means of binding new management 
systems and processes produced the more powerful combination of corporate 
governance, only to be supplanted but not entirely succeeded by public 
governance, the second version of which points to the more inclusive reform 
agenda of collaborative governance.
In terms of the organisational focus, three public sector reviews need to be noted. 
The first was the Dawkins/Walsh reforms of the 1980s (Wettenhall 1988), which 
sought a specific refocusing of relationships between ministerial departments 
and authorities. The second was the revision of legislation governing public 
bodies in the 1990s, which lead to new Acts — the Financial Management and 
Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) (FMA Act) and the Commonwealth Authorities and 
Companies Act 1997 (Cth) (CAC Act). The third was the Review of the Corporate 
Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (Uhrig 2003) which lead, 
in the 2000s, to more generally integrated governance, and is discussed later 
in this chapter (see also chapter 8 on the implications of the Uhrig review for 
governance design). These reviews had an impact on the role, constitution, 
numbers and significance of public bodies.
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Finally, it is worth observing that a distinguishing feature of much reform is 
that it has been comprehensive, and involves different phases and modes of 
governance over time. There is now international acceptance that, through the 
reform process, no one model dominates and that layering, sedimentation and 
hybridisation have occurred. Recent analysis of patterns of change indicates 
that successive phases of reform have added new governance frameworks rather 
than replacing old ones (Christensen and Lægreid 2006) and that coordination 
and integration have co-existed with disaggregation (Richards and Smith 2006). 
Public sector systems such as that in Australia display several tendencies 
concurrently as they have wrestled with different demands to deregulate and 
regulate, devolve and control. 
Ultimately, one reason for governments pursuing contrary actions is that 
contradictions exist between reform agenda (Aucoin 1990). Where once it was 
appropriate to articulate and operate within a single coherent model, this has 
become increasingly difficult. The consequence is hybridisation, which involves 
multiple modes of governance that may be exchanged or combined with variable 
results. 
Rise of corporate governance
Corporate governance in government must be understood and practised within 
a variety of related systems and dimensions of governance. It is neither fully 
derived from, nor transposable to, the private sector. At the same time, an 
understanding of some key comparisons and contrasts between the two sectors 
is important, for reasons outlined in chapter 1. Throughout the 1990s, private 
corporate governance held some sway over public sector management (Table 2.2) 
and it is largely as a result of experience that was gained during this period that 
each sector continues to have governance insights for the other. Contemporary 
governance challenges often engage both sectors, and therefore presuppose 
awareness of the governance dynamics in each. Private sector notions and 
experiences still exerted residual gravitational pull in the public sector at the 
outset of the twenty-first century (e.g. Uhrig 2003), although they were less 
influential on public service agenda by the end of its first decade (e.g. Moran 
2010a). 
In the private sector, a number of forces for improved corporate governance 
can be traced from the late 1980s through to the 1990s. These forces continue 
to identify some of the most distinctive features of corporate governance today. 
The initial stimulus for improved corporate governance stemmed in the late 
1980s from the failures of private law and regulation that became so evident, 
internationally, in the collapse of many major corporations. Given the rapidly 
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inflating asset values of the 1980s, many entrepreneurial and highly leveraged 
shareholders were able to take control of corporate boards and, with this, 
the control of major corporate assets. The corporate role of the ‘owner’, who 
commonly filled the roles of both chief executive and chairman of the board, 
remained ill defined. The roles of other directors sitting on the board were also 
poorly defined, so that much of the corporate governance debate throughout the 
1990s involved the separation of the roles of the chairman and chief executive, 
and the clarification of the roles of non-executive directors and specialist board 
committees. 
The era was marked by a shift in legislative style to provide more prescriptive 
processes for board and corporate decision-making, thus providing checks 
upon the discretionary power of the board. Reinforcing these legislative 
developments, voluntary codes and practice guides further clarified the roles 
and responsibilities of individual directors and specialist board committees 
such as the audit and remuneration committees. Commonly, these processes also 
involved a clearer supervisory and regulatory role for the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC). These developments have provided the 
backbone for both corporate ‘self-regulation’ and ‘co-regulation’. Good examples 
of these prescribed processes include those for company officers declaring their 
material personal interests in transactions and for the approval of directors’ 
remuneration reports by the general meeting.
In addition to a more prescriptive legislative approach to the processes of 
management and corporate decision-making, clearer obligations upon directors 
and executive management were also added to assist ASIC in its regulatory 
role, together with an array of new civil penalties that were designed to aid 
ASIC in dealing with company officers who contravened the law. Many key 
elements of corporate governance that were introduced over this period had 
the effect of highlighting deficiencies in corporate law and regulation, which 
became evident throughout the 1990s in the articulation of voluntary codes of 
practice. By the end of the 1990s, the market and market judgments of corporate 
governance practice had also come to provide important non-judicial elements 
in the public assessment of corporate management decisions and the exercise 
of corporate powers generally. As part of this process, in 2003, the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) finally released its Principles of Corporate Governance 
(ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003).
The impact of these key developments in modern corporate governance is 
now well understood. A less well-appreciated influence upon the evolution 
of corporate governance in the private sector was the rise of large, publicly 
responsible shareholders, such as superannuation and investment funds, to 
displace small, individual shareholders in public companies. It is arguable that 
this circumstance brought corporate governance in the private sector closer 
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to public sector and public governance. The activism of these shareholders, 
particularly in the late 1990s, refined the measures of corporate and management 
performance and established a clearer link between good corporate governance 
practice and superior corporate performance. While this activism has waned 
since the early 2000s, a period that has seen the codification of shareholders’ 
voting policies, pension and investment funds remain an important force in 
determining corporate policy on issues such as director remuneration and other 
aspects of board governance that attract public attention. Most significantly 
for the evolution of public sector governance, pension fund shareholders are in 
essence trustee investors and they are themselves responsible for maintaining 
significant social obligations. Thus, their influence as trustees continues to 
broaden the responsibilities of corporate management beyond their more 
narrowly conceived legal obligations to the company. 
Over the last 20 years, the four most enduring legacies of corporate governance 
in the private sector have been: first, the incorporation of a number of statutory, 
voluntary and market checks upon discretionary management power through 
the refinement of the responsibilities of board members and the processes of 
decision-making within the corporation; secondly, the embedding of corporate 
self-regulation and cooperative regulation rather than ‘command and control’ 
styles of regulation; thirdly, the adoption of voluntary codes and practice guides 
to supplement corporate law and regulation; and fourthly, a greater reliance 
upon the market for public assessments of corporate governance practice and 
corporate performance. 
Corporate governance’s contribution to public sector 
governance
Within the framework that was established in chapter 1, it has been seen 
as convenient to consider corporate governance as a subset of public sector 
governance, public governance and governance more generally. At the same 
time, however, corporate governance has provided both one impetus for the 
governance debate in the public sector and the foundational principles and 
codes of practice on which public sector governance is based. In recent decades, 
the public sector has adopted many of the ideas and practices of private sector 
management and corporate governance (Horrigan 2002; Edwards 2002; Nicoll 
2002; Ahn, Halligan and Wilks 2002), which have covered language, forms, 
structures and practices, in moves to enhance goals as various as management 
efficiency, stakeholder representation, organisational responsibility, and overall 
public accountability (Halligan 1997; Barrett 2002a; Edwards 2002). This 
process has been apparent across the full range of agencies, from departments of 
state, statutory authorities to government corporations (Wettenhall 2000, 2001; 
Thynne and Wettenhall 2002).
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Perhaps the most obvious influence of the private sector is seen in the adoption 
of the corporate form itself, and with this a corporate-style board with 
autonomous power approaching that enjoyed in private corporations. The 
adoption of Commonwealth companies, and the incorporation of the same law 
and directors’ liabilities that are applicable to corporations incorporated under 
the Corporations Act 2001, may have suggested a reason for importing also the 
corporate codes and corporate governance practice that were developed for 
private corporations throughout the 1990s. 
While the link between corporate failures in the private sector, board dynamics, 
and bad corporate governance requires closer analysis, the elements and impact 
of corporate governance provide one focal point for assessing organisational 
performance and accountability (Heracleous 2001; Bhagat and Black 2002; 
Edwards and Clough 2005). Together, organisational and individual performance 
constitutes a key component of corporate governance, on any definition of it that 
applies across sectors. At the same time, differences in values across the public 
and private sectors, and in the dynamics of relationships with shareholders and 
stakeholders across both sectors, all affect the degree of corporate governance 
transposition from one sector to the other (Bottomley 2000; Barrett 2002a, 
2002b; Horrigan 2003). This has implications for performance measurement 
and evaluation too, not least because of the different context for public sector 
performance.
Given the origins of corporate governance conceptually and operationally within 
the private sector domain, the transposition and transmutation of corporate 
governance to government is anathema to some. Yet, applying the term to aspects 
of the relationship between organisational governance and government has a 
tradition within government and academia in countries like Australia and the 
United Kingdom. The strong common emphasis upon components of corporate 
governance such as accountability, conformance, performance and assurance, 
in both the public and the private sectors, also indicates points of convergence 
that exist across the two domains.
Corporate failures expose gaps in the law and 
regulation of corporate boards
In the United Kingdom, the failure in the early 1990s of media owner Robert 
Maxwell’s company and the international bank, Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), spurred the publication of corporate governance codes 
and practice guidelines throughout that decade. In many respects, the United 
Kingdom took the lead internationally in promoting corporate governance 
reform and articulating the principles of corporate governance throughout the 
period. 
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In Australia, the collapse of Rothwells Ltd in 1987 provided the impetus for 
a decade of corporate law reform and the examination of the legal duties of 
directors. This initial period of law reform was accompanied by great public 
interest in better defining the roles and responsibilities of non-executive 
directors, chairmen and chief executives more generally. With the collapse of 
Enron Corporation in 2001 and the passage of the Sarbannes–Oxley Act (2002) 
in the United States, the royal commission investigating the collapse of HIH 
Insurance extended reforms in corporate governance to include examinations 
of the functional roles and liabilities of senior executive management operating 
below board level (HIH Royal Commission 2003: 130).
The early codes and practice guides that built upon the 1992 Cadbury Report 
were framed as voluntary codes, emphasising corporate management ethics and 
providing guidance for directors and management in practice. By the end of the 
1990s, however, driven by the growing power of pension funds and investment 
managers, these codes increasingly linked corporate governance practice to 
improved corporate performance and began to incorporate a wider range of 
corporate social obligations and responsibilities to stakeholders other than 
shareholders. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the different aspects of these expanded codes were 
consolidated internationally in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance (1999). Accumulated 
codes and practice guides were adopted in 2001 in the United Kingdom by the 
London Stock Exchange in its Combined Code, and by the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) in 2003 in its Principles of Corporate Governance (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council 2003).
Corporate governance within a private sector context was authoritatively defined 
in the landmark Cadbury Report in the United Kingdom in 1992 (CFACG 1992). 
Many later regulatory, organisational, and academic definitions of corporate 
governance across sectors and jurisdictions take their lead from the Cadbury 
Report. Indeed, its definition probably sets more of the tone and structure of 
contemporary definitions of corporate governance than any other single source. 
According to the committee, which was chaired by leading company chairman 
and corporate governance expert, Sir Adrian Cadbury: ‘Corporate governance is 
the system by which companies are directed and controlled’ (CFACG 1992: 2.5). 
What follows in that definition has become a classic statement of the formal and 
structural components of corporate governance (CFACG 1992: 2.5–2.7):
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. 
The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and 
the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance 
structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting 
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the company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into 
effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to 
shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s actions are subject to 
laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting.
Within that overall framework, the specifically financial aspects of 
corporate governance … are the way in which boards set financial policy 
and oversee its implementation, including the use of financial controls, 
and the process whereby they report on the activities and progress of 
the company to the shareholders.
The role of auditors is to provide shareholders with an external and objective 
check on the directors’ financial statements, which form the basis of that 
reporting system. 
For anyone concerned with corporate governance in the public sector, what is 
striking about the Cadbury Report’s crystallisation of corporate governance is 
how many of its features are tied not only to the ‘hard’ structural and formal 
aspects of corporate governance, but also to the institutional arrangements and 
management practice of the private sector. 
In Australia, a more recent consideration of corporate governance occurred in 
the Report of the HIH Royal Commission, following the collapse of one of the 
country’s largest insurers, HIH Insurance Ltd. A significant addition made by 
Royal Commissioner, Justice Owen, to the development of corporate governance 
in Australia was his consideration of the roles and responsibilities of executive 
management below the level of the board. Owen observed that ‘corporate 
governance’ refers to the control of corporations and to systems of oversight and 
the accountability of those in control’, and ‘Many publications describe corporate 
governance in terms that emphasise the structures, systems and processes in 
existence to ensure that an entity is properly directed and controlled’.
To this point, his analysis conforms to the Cadbury conception of corporate 
governance, but Owen (HIH Royal Commission 2003: xxxiii) then embraces the 
formal, behavioural, and relational elements:
Corporate governance … describes a framework of rules, relationships, 
systems and processes within and by which authority is exercised and 
controlled in corporations. Understood in this way, the expression 
‘corporate governance’ embraces not only the models or systems 
themselves but also the practices by which that exercise and control of 
authority is in fact effected. 
These extended insights on corporate governance embrace both the ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ aspects of governance, which were mentioned in chapter 1, while their 
context remains firmly fixed in the private sector. 
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The OECD Principles formalise codes and ‘relational’ 
responsibilities 
A significant extension to the Cadbury Committee’s conception of corporate 
governance was apparent in the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance 
(1999). The importance of these principles lies in the new international standards 
in corporate governance that they established. A distinguishing feature of the 
OECD principles is the description of corporate governance in terms of a series 
of ‘relationships’ between those involved in or affected by decisions, rather 
than in terms of corporate law and traditional constitutional board powers. This 
confirms the interest of shareholders, and even stakeholders, as participants 
in corporate decision-making. The OECD (1999: 11) principles define corporate 
governance as:
a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides 
the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and 
the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper 
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are 
in the interests of the company and shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring, thereby encouraging firms to use resources more 
efficiently. 
These principles have potential for application beyond the private sector to 
state-owned enterprises (OECD 2004a: 11). Here too are glimpses of the wider 
systemic dimensions of organisational corporate governance: ‘The presence of 
an effective corporate governance system, within an individual company and 
across an economy as a whole, helps to provide a degree of confidence that is 
necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy’ (OECD 2004a: 11). 
The 2004 OECD guidelines refer to the range of company-specific investments 
by various stakeholders that contribute to a company’s success (OECD 2004a: 
11). A company’s interests need to be assessed over the long term, and it is 
in a company’s long-term interests to stimulate ‘wealth-creating cooperation 
among stakeholders’, thus emphasising the importance of the relationship-
based aspects of corporate governance. Yet, despite the relationship-focused 
orientation of such conceptions of corporate governance, the context of 
relationship-management in the private sector, with its fundamental concern 
for the business of business, differs in important respects from that applicable in 
the public sector, with its fundamental concern for the business of government.
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Corporate governance, ‘self-regulation’ and ‘co-regulation’ 
Contemporary corporate governance has evolved beyond a ‘top-down’ and 
‘command-and-control’ vision of how corporations are structured, managed, 
and controlled. Its coverage also extends beyond the relations between corporate 
directors, managers, and shareholders as corporate actors engaged in private 
ordering of private interests. Responding to canonical accounts of corporate 
governance that focus on boards mediating relations between corporate 
management and investors, four leading corporate governance scholars have 
argued for accountability to relevant constituencies (Bradley et al 1999: 11). 
Under their formulation corporate governance extends beyond:
the relationship between the firm and its capital providers. Corporate 
governance also indicates how the very constituencies that define the 
business enterprise serve, and are served by the corporation. Implicit 
and explicit relationships between the corporation and its employees, 
creditors, suppliers, customers, host communities … fall within the 
ambit of a relevant definition.
Such views of corporate governance again highlight the importance of the 
formal and structural (i.e. ‘hard’) aspects of corporate governance in tandem 
with its informal and non-structural (i.e. ‘soft’) aspects (chapter 1). They also 
dovetail with other authoritative, contemporary encapsulations of corporate 
governance that are sensitive to the importance of meaningful stakeholder 
relations and engagement, such as guidelines on stakeholders in the OECD’s 
principles (2004: 46). In addition, they introduce the notion of multiple levels 
and forms of accountability to different corporate governance participants. 
Bringing all of these different levels, contexts, and forms of governance to bear, 
overall ‘corporate governance’ can be viewed in terms of the mechanisms by 
which organisations in all sectors conduct their affairs and interact with others 
within and across relevant systems and dimensions of governance.
Redefining governance in the public sector: 
Ahead of the Game, CFAR and Uhrig
Ahead of the Game and the Uhrig review represent different official attempts 
at the federal level, from different perspectives and times in the evolution of 
Australian public administration, to grapple with the interactions between basic 
aspects of public administration, on one hand, and influences from the external 
global and societal environments upon public administration, on the other. 
In doing so, these reports relate policy-making and law-making, regulatory 
oversight and enforcement and delivery of public services to core elements 
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of corporate governance for public sector organisations and whole-of-sector 
governance frameworks and arrangements. They also connect those related 
aspects to wider influences from the external global and societal environments 
upon public administration. 
Recent refinements to corporate governance: The 
Uhrig review
The Uhrig review was significant because it addressed an important difficulty 
with absorbing autonomous corporate entities and their boards within the 
public sector. The review identified the features of a truly autonomous decision-
making board and suggested that such a board be restricted to use by those 
bodies that were most clearly able (and expected) to act independently of 
government. 
Chaired by an experienced company director, John Uhrig, the review of 
governance arrangements of key agencies was announced by the Coalition 
government of John Howard in 2002. The Uhrig review’s main brief from 
the government was to examine the governance structures and practices of 
Commonwealth governmental authorities and office-holders, especially those of 
particular relevance to the business community, such as the Australian Taxation 
Office, ASIC, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority, and the Reserve Bank of Australia (see chapter 
8), but also other major agencies such as Centrelink (Uhrig 2003: 105–06). Those 
terms of reference also established the Howard government’s expectation that 
the Uhrig review would result in ‘a broad template of governance principles and 
arrangements’ (see chapter 8). 
Importantly, extending any principles more widely than the remit provided 
to Uhrig was always likely to prove difficult, since the terms of reference 
required the review to concentrate its attention chiefly upon the eight 
specified administrative and regulatory entities that were considered likely 
to have particular impact upon the business community. These entities were 
quite diverse in character — they included some which were constituted as 
authorities and statutory agencies, some reporting under both the FMA Act and 
the CAC Act, and some with boards that were established for both advisory and 
governance roles. For these reasons, the ‘Board’ and ‘Executive Management’ 
templates that were ultimately proposed by Uhrig need careful consideration in 
their application to public sector bodies generally. 
In approaching the terms of reference, Uhrig considers governance ‘[to be] 
about ensuring the success of an activity’ (Uhrig 2003: 21), and then examines 
the proper pathway to success through good governance and the well-defined 
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roles of individuals. Uhrig also stated the central importance of identifying 
the clear function and purpose of the entity concerned. In this respect, the 
Uhrig review thus provided a different starting point than had the Australian 
National Audit Office (ANAO 2003c) guidelines for governance in the public 
sector. Implementing the ANAO guidelines had been an issue for certain CAC 
bodies. While defining the role and authority of individuals within the public 
sector would seem a sensible restatement of agency principles for individuals 
reporting under the FMA Act, legislating the role and authority of a governance 
board within the CAC Act, without also unduly confining its authority and 
rationale, is a more difficult task. 
Criticism of the Uhrig review
The Uhrig review approach has been criticised from many standpoints. One 
long-standing commentator on public administration and statutory authorities 
summarised the immediate post-Uhrig reaction of commentators as follows 
(Wettenhall 2005: 45):
Corporate lawyers have been kindest to the report, at least in the sense 
of proclaiming its likely strong reformative impact … Mostly, however, 
commentators have been less supportive, with criticisms focusing on a variety 
of perceived problems such as the style of writing; inadequate consultations; 
excessive reliance on private sector models; subservience to business; lack 
of concern with relevant history, academic research and overseas experience; 
massive generalising from just eight cases; failure to see that government is 
often the problem rather than the authorities themselves.
Despite its rhetorical references to constitutional, parliamentary, and public 
responsibility and accountability, some critics noted the relatively light 
treatment of these dimensions in the review’s recommendations about 
governance arrangements and accountability frameworks, compared to the 
heavy emphasis upon executive government control of public sector entities and 
their accountability to the executive government. In particular, some decried 
its scant incorporation of parliamentary accountability within its governance 
arrangements and frameworks, given the interdependent relationships that exist 
between parliament, ministers, and departments concerning the establishment 
and operations of statutory authorities (Wettenhall 2005). 
The review was also criticised for extrapolating too simple a two-limbed 
template for statutory authorities from too limited a sample of investigated 
bodies — a deficiency that, if present, was compounded by the Howard 
government’s extension of the Uhrig review’s recommendations to all portfolio 
bodies. Some castigated it for overestimating what private sector lessons on 
corporate governance might offer the public sector, and for underestimating 
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some aspects of the public sector that affect the easy transposition of corporate 
governance lessons from the private sector. Others queried the review’s lack 
of engagement with earlier official reports and inquiries, comparative public 
sector developments overseas, and the wider body of governance knowledge 
and expertise in the national and international literature on public sector 
governance generally and corporate governance in particular. 
Considered from a legal perspective, there is a clear tension between the apparent 
simplicity of the Uhrig-based twin templates for governance arrangements 
and the more complex reality of the law’s regulation of the distribution, use, 
and abuse of public power. In other words, the design and implementation 
of both cross-sectoral and organisational governance arrangements must also 
navigate the public sector governance implications of public law’s allocation 
and conditioning of public power across the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches (Gath 2005: 18; Miller and Sanders 2006: 28). 
While there has been criticism of the ultimate extension of the Uhrig review’s 
recommendations beyond those governmental regulators to the Commonwealth 
public sector as a whole, that possibility was also foreshadowed in the 
terms of reference (Uhrig 2003: 105). As the main department charged with 
implementing the Uhrig review’s recommendations, the Department of Finance 
and Administration produced governance guidance for other Commonwealth 
public sector bodies in the form of its Governance Arrangements for Australian 
Government Bodies (DFA 2005b; and chapter 8, this volume). 
The new public service agenda: Ahead of the Game
The review of the Reform of Australian Government Administration was 
announced in September 2009 as a six-month process. A discussion paper was 
released the following month (AGRAGA 2009), and the report, Ahead of the 
Game: Blueprint for the Reform Australian Government Administration in March 
the following year (AGRAGA 2010). The head of PM&C, Terry Moran, chaired 
the advisory group.1 Kevin Rudd’s Labor government charged the advisory 
group with moving from incremental and stop-gap reforms to Commonwealth 
public administration to producing ‘a more sweeping reform driven by a long-
range blueprint for a world class, 21st century public service’ (Rudd 2009a). 
The Ahead of the Game recommendations directly affect departments and 
agencies as well as having implications across the sector. The report covered 28 
recommendations in nine reform areas that were organised under four themes: 
citizen needs, leadership and strategic direction, public sector workforce 
capability, and high standards of operational efficiency. The nine reform areas 
1 For details of the process, see the comprehensive review by Evert Lindquist (2010).
Public Sector Governance in Australia
52
were more specific about a melange of questions, such as service delivery, open 
government, policy capability, a new APSC for driving change, strategic planning 
and agency expectations (agility, capability, effectiveness, and efficiency) (see 
Appendix 1). The recommendations also reflected the emerging governance 
significance of relations with other Commonwealth public sector bodies, non-
governmental actors, and levels of government. Specific recommendations 
addressed the roles and responsibilities of secretaries and agency capability 
reviews, while others were pitched at the APS level, such as strengthening 
leadership, assessing the senior executive service, and cross-portfolio and sector 
relationships. 
The overall tenor of Ahead of the Game was to fine-tune, and augment, systemic 
features of the Australian public service. The corporate governance and NPM 
emphases of previous public sector reform were not prominent. Instead, new 
themes like mechanisms of transparency, engagement, integration, collaboration, 
and shared responsibility joined traditional ones of efficiency, deregulation and 
public sector values. 
Critique and aftermath of Ahead of the Game
Ahead of the Game picked up a number of matters that were already the subject 
of discussion, debate and reports within the public sector. The catalogue of 
items compiled in the report included efficiency dividends, revising APS values, 
reducing red tape, the roles of secretaries — including stewardship as a response 
to short-termism — weaknesses in policy making, and the consequences 
of different conditions of employment for joint activity. Without an ‘urgent, 
politically “hot” reform trigger, the Moran group … found it difficult to weave 
a coherent narrative that holds the disparate activity clusters together’ (‘t Hart 
2010). This lack of a distinctive and unifying core issue or theme contributed to 
the mixed acceptance of the overall reform agenda. 
By its nature, this was not an exercise that had the potential to generate 
innovations that would rank internationally. Compare the earlier creation of 
Centrelink, for example, which was originally hailed internationally as a multi-
purpose delivery agency for providing services to purchasing departments, 
and for seeking customer-focused delivery that provided integrated services 
(Halligan 2008b). This is not to say that innovation might not emerge in the 
continuing implementation process, and a commitment to being innovative is 
evident (MAC 2010).
The report did present ideas that were new to the APS, but which were based 
on practice elsewhere. The report addressed the question of citizen engagement, 
which had been the subject of debate within governance circles for some time 
(Briggs 2009), and borrowed from Canada and New Zealand the technique of 
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conducting satisfaction surveys. Capability reviews were adopted from the 
United Kingdom and directed at departments, but the concept was substantially 
adapted to Australian needs. 
It is possible to see the report as an exercise in comprehensive design and 
maintenance, but the way that it is perceived depends greatly on the execution 
of its recommendations; Ahead of the Game was essentially the precursor to an 
extended reform process that is managed by the public service. It contains an 
agenda for change, which addresses a large range of elements and encompasses 
many players (in particular, two leadership groups, a new secretaries board 
and APS 200, a senior leadership forum for supporting the secretaries). In this 
respect, the era presaged by Ahead of the Game was not unlike the 1980s and the 
2000s, except there was no roadmap then. 
With the removal of Rudd from the prime ministership in 2010, the implementation 
process was disrupted. Prior to the 2010 elections, several processes were under 
way to implement the report’s recommendations. The most significant was the 
augmentation of the APSC’s powers by government endorsement of Ahead of the 
Game. It was made the lead agency for around half the recommendations and 
the APSC was allocated $39 million for the purpose of implementation under 
the 2010 budget. This sum was heavily cut by the new Labor prime minister, 
Julia Gillard, when she projected fiscal rectitude during the election campaign, 
and the funding was reduced for a succession of budgets (Sedgwick 2011a). The 
reform agenda has not been a priority for the prime minister, as indicated by 
the inattention to Ahead of the Game — which received a passing reference only 
in her 2011 Garran Oration to the Institute for Public Administration (Gillard 
2011). Without explicit political support, and given some ambivalence towards 
the overall reform exercise within the senior public service, the implementation 
of Ahead of the Game will be constrained and selective.
Nevertheless, some discrete agendas that were derived from Ahead of the Game 
have been pursued. Of particular significance were those associated with a 
reconstituted APSC, which continued to be the lead agency for reform. The 
commission’s new approach was to engage collaboratively with departments 
and agencies in pursuit of common outcomes. The agencies have funded the 
commission to provide a range of services covering leadership and skills, talent 
management, workplace planning and standards, and a range of staffing matters, 
which affect public service capacity. Special reviews have become standard and 
they include the piloting of capability reviews of several agencies and a system 
review of the senior executive service (Sedgwick 2011a, 2011b, 2011c).
The overall coordination and review of the results of reform lies with the 
Department of the PM&C, with a departmental network being important for 
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both systemic agendas and agency-specific reforms. The constitution of the 
secretaries’ board as a formal central mechanism, which is chaired by the PM&C 
secretary, and secretaries’ performance agreements have been implemented.
The Public Service Amendment Bill 2012 proposed a legislative basis for the 
revised roles of a number of actors, which was foreshadowed in Ahead of the 
Game, including secretaries, a secretaries board, the senior executive service 
and the public service commissioner. Reformulated public service values were 
also to be enacted.
In addition there were two sets of recommendations for ‘improving agency 
efficiency’ (Halligan 2011b). One set addressed the need to strengthen the 
governance framework by simplifying governance structures for new and 
existing entities; and amending the governance arrangements to ensure clarity 
for interjurisdictional entities and that new (and existing agencies) were ‘fit-
for-purpose’ (chapter 8). Finance was charged with reviewing ‘the different 
categories of entities … with a view to simplifying and rationalising them’. 
The department was to amend the governance policy framework and to review 
‘(e)ntities in portfolios that could be amalgamated either due to efficiency 
and/or synergies in structures and tasks; and opportunities for small agencies 
to be incorporated into departments or other agencies’ (AGRAGA 2010: 
recommendation 9.2). 
With the second group of recommendations, efficiency was accorded primacy 
with arguments expressed in terms of maximising outcomes against inputs 
and improving productivity in a challenging fiscal environment (AGRAGA 
2010). This led to Finance producing the Review of the Measures of Agency 
Efficiency (2011: 46), which proposed elements of a strategic efficiency agenda 
to be centred on ‘Efficient structures: reviewing the shape of government and 
identifying opportunities for rationalising the number of government bodies’. 
The review recommended rationalising the number of small agencies because of 
inefficiencies arising from duplication and the costs of corporate services, and 
for the economies of scale to be derived through managing programs. The review 
also focused on the efficiency dividend as a mechanism having implications for 
portfolio management, as discussed in chapter 5.
Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review
Another inquiry of broader and greater significance, the Commonwealth 
Financial Accountability Review (CFAR), was commenced in 2011 as an internal 
public service consultation around a series of issue papers, which led to a public 
discussion paper in 2012 (DFD 2012b).2 The issue papers ranged widely over 
2 Twelve issues papers were released plus an overarching paper on foundations for better government. The 
papers were for internal circulation and feedback within the public service.
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financial and related matters including governance. In some respects, CFAR 
is more important as a review than Ahead of the Game as it has resulted in 
extensive opportunities for consultation via a process run by a team in Finance, 
but the discussion paper is more reflective and thought-provoking.
The essential purpose of CFAR is to review the existing financial framework, to 
examine options and to develop a new framework. In doing so, the discussion 
paper ranges over major questions about accountability and transparency, 
governance, improving performance, and the handling of risk. The rationale for 
change, and the prompt for undertaking the review, reflects both the limitations 
of the existing financial framework and the need to respond to attitudinal and 
environmental changes concerning the role of citizens, policy complexity, 
technological developments, and joined-up government interdepartmental 
coordination. The directions being taken by Finance, which have been prompted 
by the significant issues raised by the CFAR process, will become apparent after 
the responses to the discussion document have been digested in mid 2012.
The emergence of public governance
Having reviewed the evolving corporate and public governance agenda 
and formulations, three strands can be seen as converging to produce new 
understandings of governance in its public form: corporate governance-like 
features that are inherited from NPM; public governance; and governance in 
general.
First, NPM had opened up government to new ideas and approaches. As 
NPM reforms were introduced into the public sector, elements of corporate 
governance ‘began to accompany them as the default accountability and control 
tool advocated to replace the traditional process-based controls that historically 
had been used’ (Tucker 2010: 3). The flow on from government outsourcing 
is the acceptance of third party relationships as a normal part of government. 
The experience with markets led government to regard non-hierarchical (ie non-
bureaucratic) instruments as an option for solving a policy problem. Moreover, 
the policy imperatives of the last decade have increasingly required joint action 
and collaboration.
Secondly, as discussed in chapter 1, the rise of a broader concept of governance 
has been significant in that the role non-government organisations is recognised. 
It has a range of meanings and definitions in the relevant literature such as an 
over-arching theory of institutional relationships within society (Kooiman 1999) 
or self-organising inter-organisational networks (Kickert 1993) — the common 
element being the breadth of the application. A traditional view defines 
governance in terms of a governing process associated with formal structures of 
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government. A society-centric conception sees governance in terms of networks 
of public and private interactions (Rhodes 1997). A new public governance 
perspective (Osborne 2006: 384) recognises a:
plural state, where multiple inter-dependent actors contribute to the 
delivery of public services and a pluralist state where multiple processes 
inform the policy making system. As a consequence of these two forms of 
plurality, its focus is very much upon inter-organisational relationships 
and the governance of processes, and it stresses service effectiveness and 
outcomes. 
The formulation that has received considerable acceptance, however, covers 
both the traditional and recent conceptions. Central governments remain 
central as the responsible decision-makers on public policy, but they are 
expected to use third parties and networks, to be responsive to external 
preferences and to incorporate meaningful interactions with citizens and civil 
society. In the OECD context, when it is removed from any specific national 
or sectoral limits, governance is defined in terms that embrace a broader set 
of relationships, processes and outcomes, and thus includes more than public 
administration and the institutions, methods and instruments of governing. It 
also encompasses the set of relationships between governments and citizens, 
acting as both individuals and as part of or through institutions, e.g. political 
parties, productive enterprises, special interest groups, and the media (OECD 
2000). Recent agendas reflect a growing concern with horizontal relationships 
inside and outside government and citizen engagement (see chapters 7 and 10).
Thirdly, the official position on corporate governance in the public sector has 
evolved through several stages. The rhetoric from ministers and departments 
originally paid lip service to the concepts, but did not produce an over-arching 
formulation, leaving the ANAO to take up the mantle for articulating and 
propagating ideas. The auditor-general at that time, Pat Barrett, ‘was an early 
and intense advocate of corporate governance: of the 139 public addresses he 
made between 1995 and 2005, one in three addressed public sector corporate 
governance and accountability issues’ (Tucker 2010: 3). The ANAO also took the 
lead with a series of statements on corporate governance for the public sector 
in general and a statement of principles and better practice for authorities and 
companies in particular (ANAO 1999). In contrast, there appear to have been 
minimal contributions from government ministers, although several, such 
as Senator Eric Abetz (2003a; 2003b), advocated corporate governance as an 
approach in the public sector. According to Tony Tucker (2010: 3) these were 
‘isolated occurrences by individual ministers rather than a comprehensive 
approach endorsed by government’. 
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As chapter 1 has indicated, the ANAO then adopted the term ‘public sector 
governance’ when it came to issuing guidelines in 2003 for principles that 
covered both board agencies and government departments (ANAO 2003c). By the 
mid 2000s, a range of central agencies (APSC and PM&C) and integrity agencies 
(ANAO and the Commonwealth Ombudsman) were contributing statements and 
guidelines as governance failure became a central issue. In these subsequent 
statements, both governance and corporate governance were used in official 
documents, as discussed in chapter 5 (ANAO and PM&C 2006; PM&C 2009a).
The lack of a coordinated approach has, according to Tucker (2010), contributed 
to interdepartmental ‘variations in the acceptance of corporate governance’. 
A different approach was adopted by PM&C (based on the Australian 
Securities Exchange guidelines) to that taken by the ANAO in its departmental 
requirements for annual reporting of corporate governance. Both approaches 
involved parliament, in one case an officer of the parliament, the auditor-general, 
while in the other, PM&C’s statement was endorsed by the Joint Committee 
on Parliamentary Accounts and Audit. ‘With such a failure of Parliament and 
central agencies to agree on the nature of corporate governance there is little 
wonder at the lack of uniformity of application in the APS’ (Tucker 2010: 4).
The consequence of this history is that there is general understanding of the 
principles of corporate and public governance, and of the variations between 
different types of government organisation (particularly departments of state 
and authorities with executive boards), but no formal framework to put 
good governance into operation. Chapters 3 and 5 pick up the variations in 
perceptions of governance for these different public sector bodies, while chapter 
4 concentrates upon the central perspective.
Conclusion
The revolution in public management of the 1980s to 1990s was the introduction 
and institutionalisation of public management that was based, in large part, 
on private sector practice. There was much debate about the merits and 
applications and the contradictory components (Considine and Painter 1997) 
but, by international standards, a remarkable level of change was accomplished 
and sustained in Australia (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Halligan 2007b). This 
was succeeded by a lesser-understood ‘quiet revolution’ in the late 1990s to 
the early 2000s, through the infusion and acceptance of corporate governance 
as a mode of operating in the public sector, thereby continuing the application 
of business-like forms and practices across the public sector. In addition, 
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the acceptance of governance as a generic term that applies at several levels, 
and particularly across multiple boundaries, has extended the operative and 
collaborative basis of government.
The public sector governance of today has absorbed these influences to produce 
a blend of these features. An organisation may be inclined towards public sector 
governance features such as private sector aspects, citizen engagement or core 
public service values, depending on its location and function in the system of 
public administration. The overall mix, though, appears to emphasise traditional 
public administration principles, which are discussed in later chapters.
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3 . Exploring Tensions in Public 
Governance
Chapter 3 explores a number of tensions that underlie the different aspects of 
public sector governance that are examined in subsequent chapters of this book. 
These areas of tension are firstly: those currently encountered in the relationship 
between politicians and the bureaucracy; secondly, those existing within 
the organisational foundations of central government departments; thirdly, 
tensions arising in the integration of authorities and companies established 
under the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cth) (CAC Act); 
fourthly, tensions arising in processes of coordination and collaboration within 
government and between government and external groups; and finally, tensions 
associated with defining and adopting the broader governance concepts of 
accountability, corporate regulation and performance across the public sector 
as a whole. 
One source of these tensions was examined in chapter 2, which discussed the 
state-centric and society-centric elements of public governance that are now 
sought to be integrated in a central government responsible for providing both 
strong leadership and strategic direction within the sector (AGRAGA 2010: 
20). This integration requires the reinforcement of traditional vertical lines 
of accountability and responsibility and, in this respect, tensions exist in the 
relationship between ministers and the senior public service, in organisational 
aspects of government departments and line agencies (chapters 4 and 5) and in 
integrating bodies that have been established under the CAC Act (chapter 6). 
At the same time, however, difficulties in horizontal integration across 
government departments and portfolios increasingly intrude, pointing to the 
tensions that are associated with maintaining the traditional bureaucracy while 
admitting flexibility in policy formation and program delivery. The society-
centric elements of public governance add new horizontal elements, requiring 
further collaboration within government and between government and external 
groups (chapter 7). Collaboration is increasingly a problem for governments as 
it may involve those from outside the public sector in decision-making and, 
thus, these horizontal elements may be less formally defined. Nevertheless, 
they must be permitted to open central government to the influence of new 
ideas and collaboration with others such as academics, business and the broader 
community (AGRAGA 2010: 20). 
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Tensions in context 
Tensions in public governance have existed, at least in a proto-modern sense, ever 
since ministers’ roles were more clearly differentiated from those of departments 
and a variety of public organisations began to emerge.1 Invariably these tensions 
are centred on boundaries and relationships, on politicians and the extent of 
their reach over different organisations. In addition to these tensions within 
government, some tension also arises in the integration of several different 
forms of corporate-style organisations, and their boards, on which governments 
have at times relied. In Australia, these organisations have included statutory 
authorities and government business enterprises. 
For the purposes of this book, the focus is on the last decade of change and the 
contemporary position. Evidence of the tensions referred to above emerge from 
studies undertaken by the authors during three significant periods over the last 
ten years. Few empirical studies have captured this breadth of public sector 
bodies and officials in transition during the implementation of new governance 
measures. The significance of the interviews undertaken in this study is that 
they capture point-in-time reactions of high-level participants while they were 
engaged in these reform periods. The interviews are utilised elsewhere in the 
book to illustrate clear attitudes and approaches to significant structural and 
legislative developments that were identified within the sector.
Many of the issues that were suggested by the authors’ earliest interviews in 
2002 were confirmed and explored further in the more comprehensive range of 
interviews they later undertook, in 2005–07, with representatives of all arms of 
the Commonwealth public sector for the Australian Research Council–funded 
grant: Corporate Governance in the Public Sector. These interviews were 
undertaken with all federal government departments and a wide selection of 
statutory agencies, authorities and companies following the release of the 2003 
Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders 
(Uhrig review). The interviews sought to clarify the understanding of the terms 
‘corporate governance’ and ‘governance’ within the Australian public sector, 
the value and utilisation in practice of key governance indicators for improved 
performance, the assumption of responsibility for the regulation of governance 
and the effective coordination of governance across the sector as a whole. A note 
on the methodology adopted for this study and the interview schedule can be 
found in appendix 1. Further interviews and analysis were finally undertaken 
in the post-Uhrig review period of the late 2000s, as the public sector landscape 
began to settle, and in the transitional years of the early 2010s.
1 For details from administrative history dating from the nineteenth century, see Halligan and Wettenhall 
1990; Wettenhall 2007.
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Interviews that were undertaken in 2002 with representatives of CAC bodies 
had confirmed the existence of manifestations of new public management and 
revealed difficulties in the adoption of the Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO) governance principles in practice. A lack of clarity was registered in 
the different roles played by executive and management boards within federal 
government departments and agencies — given the adoption of more formally 
constituted ‘corporate’ boards under the CAC Act in Commonwealth authorities 
and companies. The interviewers sought to explore the ways in which CAC 
bodies were being utilised and adopted within the sector (Edwards, Nicoll and 
Seth-Purdie 2003).
The interviews suggested uncertainty as to the ‘independence’ of the boards 
and directors of CAC bodies. They also revealed uncertainty in the processes for 
the appointment of directors, difficulties in ensuring that the appropriate skills 
were represented upon the board and problems associated with the dynamics 
of decision-making by CAC boards in the public sector context. Overall, they 
suggested that significant difficulties were being encountered within the 
public sector in integrating the new legal concepts of board authority and 
individual director responsibility, which were introduced by the CAC Act, and 
the associated concepts of corporate governance, corporate self-regulation and 
performance measurement. 
The interviews that were undertaken from 2005–07 sought to examine 
governance issues within the public sector system as a whole. Within federal 
government departments and agencies, interviewees asserted their strong 
support for maintaining the traditional legal authority and responsibility of the 
chief executive. At the same time, those sitting on the boards of bodies reporting 
under the CAC Act, which were generally conceived in law as commercially 
oriented and independent ‘decision-making’ boards, appeared acutely mindful 
of government policy while mostly maintaining the independence of their boards. 
Importantly to the coordination of governance across the system as a whole, the 
clear endorsement of the authority of the secretary and chief executive, and 
the assertions of the independence and authority of the decision-making board 
by many directors within CAC bodies, pointed to continuing difficulties in the 
integration of corporate entities and governance within the sector.
As these interviews were undertaken during the period in which the Uhrig 
review was being implemented, the representatives of corporations and 
authorities operating under the CAC Act were conscious of the possible 
conversion of authorities and companies to agencies. Interviewees were therefore 
clearly giving thought to questions such as the ‘independence’ of their board 
and the features of ‘corporate’ governance that were applicable to their body. 
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Across the sector, these interviews confirmed great diversity of opinion in the 
understanding of the concept of corporate governance and its application in the 
public sector.
Many of the elements of corporate governance that have been seen to be so 
influential in the private sector are often considered to be inappropriate for the 
federal public sector. The mechanisms for the scrutiny of public sector decision-
making are seen to be far more significant checks upon the proper exercise of 
public powers than the regulatory controls and management checks that are 
associated with corporate governance in the private sector. In keeping with 
the strong support for the authority and responsibility of the secretary and 
chief executive, governance for many agencies in the public sector is seen in 
terms of meeting compliance and reporting requirements. Many other essential 
differences in the application of principles of governance drawn from the 
private sector, which were identified in 2002 interviews, were also confirmed in 
the later interviews. The processes for appointing board members, maintaining 
relevant skills on the board, and measuring the performance and effectiveness 
of governance arrangements, were all seen to be different in the public sector.
Organisational basis for the governance of public bodies
The spectrum of public bodies is summarised briefly in Figure 3.1. To the right 
of the spectrum lie the departments of state and executive agencies, which are 
the central organisational forms associated with the constitutional supremacy of 
parliament, ministerial and executive responsibility and the features of vertical 
accountability within the Westminster system. To the left lie the corporate-
style bodies that have been created by parliament but influenced substantially 
by private corporate law. In the middle lie a mix of government and statutory 
authorities, which in part reflect the historical evolution of the relationship 
between the state and private corporations. While the CAC Act defined the legal 
and constitutional features of authorities and companies operating within the 
public sector far more sharply in terms of corporate law concepts than ever 
before, the features of a mixed model remain clearly in evidence. The minister, 
for example, makes appointments to the boards of CAC bodies, and the chief 
executive of several CAC bodies reports directly to the minister.
It might be anticipated that both the closeness and complexity of the relationship 
between government and private corporate bodies generally will continue to 
grow. So, too, will the exchanges between government and private corporations 
as new bodies evolve to meet changing circumstances. This is largely due to the 
fact that the corporation has proven a remarkably adaptable and convenient 
legal form, not merely for the conduct of private enterprise but for a wide range 
of other governmental and organisational purposes as well.
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Figure 3 .1: Commonwealth organisational spectrum and legislative basis
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Source: Adapted from ANAO 2003c: Figure 3.
For the purposes of outlining the statutory institutional framework within 
which public sector governance must operate, the Department of Finance and 
Deregulation (Finance) has fully catalogued the bodies that are relevant to 
governance in the public sector in its List of Australian Government Bodies and 
Governance Relationships (DFD 2009). It also provides a regularly updated ready 
reference guide to this list of Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 
(Cth) (FMA Act) agencies and CAC bodies in a flipchart (DFD 2012a). A copy of 
the flipchart is reproduced in appendix 2. Table 3.1 summarises the number and 
types of different bodies reporting under the FMA Act and under the CAC Act.
Table 3 .1: Agencies and other bodies under the FMA Act and CAC Act
 111 Agencies under the FMA Act
Departments of state 20
Departments of the parliament 4  
Prescribed agencies 67
Prescribed agencies encompassing ‘executive agency’ 8
Prescribed agencies — statutory but staffed through departments or agencies 2
Prescribed agencies — non-statutory and staffed through departments or agencies 5 
Prescribed agencies — engage staff under their own act 5
84 Bodies under the CAC Act 1997
Statutory authorities 62
Commonwealth companies 22
 Source: Chart of Agencies and CAC Bodies (Finance 2010).
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Within this framework, those bodies that are most immediately relevant to 
the organisation and management of the business of government comprise 
the departments of state, departments of parliament and ‘prescribed agencies’ 
— which are named as such in regulations promulgated under the FMA 
Act. The essential governmental character of these 111 agencies is set by the 
distinctive and varied statutory requirements under which they operate. 
These requirements set the constitutional and operational parameters for these 
agencies and, therefore, they provide the ultimate point of reference when 
defining their roles in integrated government. There are 20 departments of state 
that are regulated under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) (PS Act) and four 
departments of the parliament regulated under the Parliamentary Service Act 
1999. Of the prescribed agencies, 67 are also statutory agencies under the PS 
Act. The remaining agencies are referred to in Table 3.1. 
The central importance of these FMA agencies to government, and to the business 
of government, is established by their capacity to receive appropriations in 
their own right and by the ‘materiality’ of 41 such agencies to government. The 
essential character of these bodies as government agencies is established in the 
FMA Act, which renders the chief executive of the agency solely responsible for 
the efficient, effective and ethical use of Commonwealth resources.
Tensions between the political and executive 
arms of government
Under the Westminster model, the relations between politicians and bureaucrats 
have traditionally centred on the coexistence of the neutral public service and 
responsible government. The embedded tension between the two elements has 
been kept in balance by applying well-established principles. During the last 
30 years, however, an imbalance between these two branches of government 
has become apparent and politicians, in response to the ascendancy of the 
bureaucrats, have sought to expand their authority. 
The continuing jostling between politicians and public servants was maintained 
during the last decade with the role of ministerial advisers featuring prominently 
as the main source of tension. A new factor became more salient as the short-
term inclinations of politicians exerted continuous working pressures, thereby 
exacerbating relations with public servants scrambling to meet real time 
demands (a new meaning of responsiveness?). Measures to ameliorate the last 
problem came into play in the 2010s.
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Organisational tensions within departments 
and agencies
Committees and ‘decision-making’ bodies within 
departments
Executive management boards, advisory boards and cross-jurisdictional 
commissions have long been utilised in government departments and agencies 
(Horrigan 2001: 62–6). These boards are not conceived to have independent 
autonomy or authority, however, and they must be considered in the context 
of the ultimate responsibility of the chief executive for the ‘efficient, effective 
and ethical use’ of Commonwealth property and resources. They are committees 
conceived to assist the departmental secretary or chief executive in the 
discharge of his or her ultimate statutory responsibilities. The Commonwealth 
Financial Accountability Review (CFAR) discussion paper Is Less More: 
Towards Better Commonwealth Performance (2012) notes that the use of boards 
within departments can provide a diverse range of skills and experiences that 
secretaries might utilise, although the paper also makes it clear that such boards 
do not function as corporate boards and should not affect a secretary’s authority 
and accountability for the operations of the department (DFD 2012b: 41).
For a time following the passage of the CAC Act, these boards sometimes 
appeared to assume a more ambiguous place than they had held previously 
within FMA agencies. Despite the attempt (Uhrig 2003) to resolve ambiguities 
by drawing the distinction more clearly between ‘governance’ (or ‘decision-
making’) boards and ‘management’ boards — the term ‘board’ continues to be 
used by some secretaries even though, in the context of executive government, 
the terminology is misleading. Management boards are essentially committees 
appointed by the secretary. The important consequence of conceiving boards as 
merely ‘advisory’ or ‘executive management’ within the overall responsibility 
of the departmental secretary or chief executive is that their operation is 
ultimately subject to a number of different mechanisms of statutory oversight. 
This statutory oversight of public sector boards differs markedly from the 
internal checks and balances upon private sector boards that are now achieved in 
modern corporate governance through a mix of prescribed statutory processes, 
voluntary codes of practice and market assessments.
The governance arrangements that have been published by Finance tend to 
predispose against the formation of new bodies. They begin by asking whether 
it is necessary to create a new body at all and whether new functions might not 
be best accommodated within departments (DFA 2005b: 13). They suggest that 
an FMA agency should be the ‘preferred form’ in establishing new bodies (DFA 
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2005b: 18). At the same time, however, Finance’s List of Government Bodies also 
identifies four decision-making ‘bodies’ within departments. These bodies are 
interesting because they arise within government departments, rather than in 
CAC bodies. Unlike management and advisory boards, however, they sit less 
comfortably with the supervening authority of the secretary. 
The four bodies that are nominated by Finance are: those with ‘distinct 
functional branding’, ministerial councils, joint Commonwealth–state or 
international bodies, and advisory bodies. Joint Commonwealth–state bodies, 
ministerial councils and international bodies bear scrutiny since they appear to 
require the representation of particular interests on the board. In this respect 
Finance, in its 2005 governance arrangements, suggests that governance boards 
should not be ‘representative’ boards and that such boards should not find a 
place within departments in which they appear difficult to reconcile with the 
ultimate authority and responsibility of the chief executive under the FMA Act.
In interviews, which were undertaken around the time of the Uhrig review, 
interviewees confirmed that boards such as intergovernmental committees and 
regulatory commissions might be considered to have a role beyond providing 
mere advice and management. When referring to the boards of Commonwealth–
state bodies, regulatory, and international bodies, they spoke of the value of a 
collective (or even representative) decision-making board. If such boards do not 
sit comfortably within FMA bodies, they may be suggesting the possibilities for 
an advisory board of a distinctive character in the public sector.
Regulatory commissions, particularly, were not seen to fit comfortably within 
the FMA Act-reporting framework. Finance has generally returned such 
commissions to the FMA Act fold, suggesting that a regulatory body should 
be constituted as an FMA agency when it is required to enforce the law 
under enabling legislation. Further, Finance would generally discourage the 
appointment of particular ‘representative’ appointees to such FMA agencies. In 
the case of such commissions, good governance may prove difficult in a dynamic 
federal system in which some state representation may be desirable. 
External appointments to management and advisory 
boards
It might be thought that, because of the ultimate authority of departmental 
heads and chief executives, the scope exists for tailoring boards with the 
addition of members who are equipped with the necessary external skills — 
effectively ‘designing’ the management or advisory board to provide maximum 
assistance to the secretary. The CFAR discussion paper notes the potential 
benefits in doing this (DFD 2012b: 41). This possibility, however, is said to meet 
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with the significant obstacle in Australia that most appointments are likely to be 
internal appointments. Those reporting under the FMA Act expressed concerns 
for the appointment of ‘external’ (i.e. outside the portfolio) representatives on 
departmental boards. Executive and management boards are generally filled by 
internal appointees, who are all accountable to the departmental head or chief 
executive — and interviewees generally agreed with the view that ‘nothing 
would ever be implemented with an independent “expertise-based” board’. 
External appointees may be chosen only to provide the necessary expertise or 
to meet the particular needs of the case. As might be expected, audit committees 
were cited as one important exception — a special case in which external 
appointments and more formal procedures were seen to be most desirable. 
Commissions were cited as another special case.
At the same time, those representing the boards of agencies reporting under 
the FMA Act also noted that it was becoming increasingly difficult to find 
internal appointements to the board with the appropriate skills. One reason 
for this was seen to be the high turnover of staff; small agencies, in particular, 
were seen to suffer as a result of staff turnover. These comments suggest that, 
despite concerns being expressed for importing external expertise, the pool of 
‘internal’ expertise within the Australian public sector may now be too limited 
to fulfil the need for expertise-based board members.
Tensions in integrating authorities, companies 
and corporate governance 
Tensions in the adoption of corporate entities and concepts of corporate 
governance have been recognised for some time in the literature and appear 
likely to persist. As noted above, the CAC Act has, more clearly than previously, 
defined the legal features of authorities and companies that operate within the 
public sector in terms of corporate law concepts. Because of this, corporatisation 
now raises ‘in acute form’ the public/private distinction (Farrar 2005: 445). The 
distinction is particularly marked, not only because of the different functional 
roles that are fulfilled by corporatised entities in the public sector (Bottomley 
1994: 530), but also because of the essentially different regulatory and market 
frameworks that prevail in the public and private sectors (Farrar 2005: 446). 
So, public sector governance must accommodate differences between sectors 
in transposing structures and standards from one to another, as well as in 
developing suitable engagement and accountability mechanisms. 
In terms of the recent assessment of the public sector in Ahead of the Game: 
Blueprint for the Reform of Australian Government Administration (AGRAGA 
2010), the same public/private distinction seems likely to arise in endeavouring 
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to maintain a strong central government — one that is capable of steering and 
coordinating the whole public sector, while also maintaining control over the 
outer reaches of government. In this broad sense, the ‘outer reaches’ of government 
include both line agencies, which are more removed from departmental control 
within portfolios, as well as the departments and agencies of other portfolios. 
As a result, maintaining central control invokes both vertical and horizontal 
(or lateral) dimensions. Chapter 7, in particular, notes the ‘pressing’ tension 
that exists today between the horizontal responsibilities of government for non-
government organisations and citizens and the vertical accountabilities of the 
Westminster system (Briggs and Fisher 2006: 16; Fung 2009). 
The key players in the effective coordination of these vertical and horizontal 
elements of government are first, ministers and departmental secretaries; 
secondly, the departmental advisory and management committees that are 
utilised by secretaries; and thirdly, the corporate entities and boards governed 
chiefly by the CAC Act. Like departmental advisory boards, the corporate 
boards of authorities and companies may broaden the scope for participatory 
governance, but their appointment processes also present greater challenges for 
governments because independent and external board members pose potential 
obstacles to lines of accountability and responsibility within traditional public 
sector administration (chapter 9).
Following the Uhrig review (chapter 2), and consistent with strengthening 
the centre, the number of Commonwealth authorities has declined and a more 
cautious approach has been adopted by Finance in establishing new entities 
(chapter 8). For some time, there have been underlying tensions in the workings 
of the corporate-style boards of authorities and companies — tensions that are 
considered in greater detail at board level in chapter 6. 
Sources of tension in integrating authorities 
and companies 
Successive phases of private sector influence have placed stresses upon 
the traditional vertical hierarchy of authority and accountability in public 
sector administration. The reasons for this are best understood through a 
brief consideration of the statutory framework and Finance’s catalogue of 
government bodies, as outlined above. This framework assists in identifying 
the legal authority and reporting requirements of individuals, agencies and 
corporate bodies within the public sector. A potential difficulty arises because 
more recent concepts of corporate law and governance, which are associated 
with bodies regulated under the CAC Act, have been superimposed upon this 
departmental framework, thereby raising possible tensions between traditional 
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statutory mechanisms for government accountability and more recent private 
sector principles directed to improving the accountability, efficiency and 
performance of CAC bodies.
The difficulties found in integrating corporate bodies within a public sector 
setting, and positioning them within a framework of individual and agency 
accountability in central government, arise firstly, because the corporate board 
is conceived as an autonomous board that is empowered and authorised to make 
collective decisions embracing diverse views, rather than as a single decision-
making secretary or officer. Secondly, further difficulties arise in integrating 
corporate bodies in the public sector setting because the authority of the board 
remains subject to significant government controls both in law and practice. 
The features of the CAC Act that are most relevant to the governance of 
Commonwealth authorities and companies are outlined in greater detail in 
chapter 6, but it may be seen in Table 3.1 that 84 authorities and companies, 
which lie at arms length from central government, report under this legislation. 
Both authorities and companies operate in a corporate form with boards of 
directors whose members are subject to duties cast in similar terms to those 
of the directors of private corporations. This statutory formulation for the 
structure of authorities and companies, the authority of their boards and 
the responsibilities of their directors and officers all suggest the difficulties 
encountered in their assimilation within government departments and other 
agencies within government portfolios.
More broadly, the quantitative performance metrics of listed corporations 
(such as rates of return on investment, assets or equity) as well as both ‘hard’ 
performance measures (board composition and independent directors) and 
‘soft’ or strategic measures (such as leadership and risk-taking), which are now 
included in governance ranking research, are ultimately founded upon market 
and shareholder assessments. A difficult question then arises as to whether it is 
sustainable to proceed with the multiple accountabilities that are now required 
for both public and private entities across the system (chapter 7). 
The passage of the CAC Act highlighted several related areas of tension — 
some of less practical significance than others. In so far as the CAC Act refers 
to Commonwealth companies that are subject to the Corporations Act 2001, and 
imports the principles of directors’ duties from the Corporations Act, there is 
continuing legal uncertainty as to the regulation and accountability of CAC 
bodies. Questions may arise, for example, as to whether the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC) or ministerial shareholders should be 
responsible for the regulation of these bodies and the enforcement of directors’ 
duties. In addition, developments in Australian corporate law surrounding 
directors’ duties and the defences available to them will affect the interpretation 
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of equivalent law governing the directors and officers of agencies and companies 
under the CAC Act. Further questions may arise as to the extent to which 
concepts of private corporate governance, now supervised by ASIC, should 
govern the constitution and processes of the board. Finally, questions may also 
arise as to the extent to which measures of corporate performance, founded in 
the private sector upon shareholder and market expectations, provide valuable 
performance measures for corporations operating in the public sector. 
In other areas, real tensions are felt in practice. In chapter 6, the authority of 
the boards of many authorities and companies reporting under the CAC Act 
is considered in the light of the various controls exercised by government in 
practice. In particular, board members must remain mindful of government 
policy and their appointment to the board generally rests upon responsible 
ministers — a factor examined in detail in chapter 9. These and other factors 
in practice remain significant constraints upon the authority and independence 
of such boards. Seen in this context, CAC bodies may never have been quite 
as independent of government as they have sometimes been assumed to be. 
Nevertheless, the corporate structure of these bodies makes them at once both 
critical to coordination between central government and the outer reaches 
of government and open to the kind of collaboration with outsiders that is 
envisaged in Ahead of the Game.
Directors of corporate bodies within the public sector
Within the public sector, particular tensions are now likely to be felt by the 
directors of corporate bodies. These difficulties stem largely from the legal 
authority of the body’s board, the legal duties owed by directors to the corporate 
body and the governmental constraints upon the body that arise in practice. 
Within the board, these tensions manifest in the constraints under which 
the directors and corporate officers themselves must exercise their corporate 
powers while remaining mindful of the supervening influence of government 
and responsible ministers. The purpose of the CAC Act is to regulate certain 
aspects of the financial affairs of Commonwealth authorities and companies. 
With respect to Commonwealth-owned or controlled authorities, the CAC Act 
provides detailed rules about the reporting obligations of authorities and their 
accountability. It also deals with the conduct of the directors and officers of 
authorities, and with their banking and investment obligations. For companies, 
the Act provides reporting and other requirements that apply in addition to 
those encompassed by the Corporations Act.
These provisions dealing with directors’ duties provide a good example of the 
way in which statutory provisions, of great significance in the private sector, 
may seem less relevant in an Act designed to regulate director behaviour in a 
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public sector entity. In practice, the directors of CAC bodies are less likely to 
be sued by shareholders or called to account by regulators for contravention 
of the Corporations Act than are their private sector counterparts. Their legal 
duties highlight the essentially different character of corporate boards and their 
regulation within the private sector. Directors in this context owe their legal 
duties specifically to the corporate body — note the public duty of the chief 
executive under s 44 of the FMA Act to make ‘efficient, effective and ethical 
use’ of Commonwealth resources. Accordingly, their duties, as stated in the CAC 
Act, stand to be judged by reference to their corporate (as distinct from their 
governmental) responsibilities. Other potentially difficult legal questions may 
also arise in the future as to the applicability of directors’ defences that are 
generally available in private corporate law — such as defences of due diligence 
and business judgment — in the foreign context of the public sector. 
Difficulties in coordination and collaboration 
within and external to government
A further difficulty that continues to arise is that of coordinating collaboration 
across agencies and portfolios within the public sector and externally. This 
tension arises partly because of the need to coordinate policy formation and 
implementation vertically through the Commonwealth and state governments as 
well as horizontally, across the institutional ‘silos’ of each level of government. 
Effective policy implementation and service delivery across the whole of the 
public sector may sit uneasily with the formation of policy within government 
departments that are adhering to principles of individual responsibility, line 
accountability and the ultimate authority of parliament within the Westminster 
system. Chapter 5 outlines the formal mechanisms for collaboration between 
departments, which include interdepartmental committees and task forces.
An important consideration in advancing cross-government approaches is the 
recognition that the key foundations for cross-governmental coordination are 
often the ‘softer’ associations of an informal and unstructured character, which 
supplement more formal processes such as interdepartmental committees. Senior 
executives interviewed for this project generally felt that the contact they 
undertook with others to maintain whole-of-government approaches, although 
informal, was extensive, relevant and effective. One rationale given for the 
effectiveness of this contact (that seemed to sum up the general sentiment) was 
that ‘the public sector works for the public good while the private sector has the 
profit principle as its bottom line’. Participants were generally happy to maintain 
informal relationships across departments, which they believed to be effective. 
One CEO said of the exchange of information: ‘In terms of policy — none of 
Public Sector Governance in Australia
72
these forums provides an opportunity. I don’t think that there is a need to set 
up something formal but we do our policy work better when we are talking to 
other people about it. We try hard to have open lines of communication with 
other departments but I’d be hesitant to say that it could not be improved.’
Managing government ‘as a whole’ represents a distinct element in the 
conception of governance within the public sector literature. It addresses a 
practical and conceptual difficulty in the public sector that is quite distinct from 
the conceptual problems addressed in private corporate governance.2 The most 
significant issue, and the most significant source of tension within the public 
sector, however, remains one of horizontal coordination in practice within a 
traditional system that is built upon individual and agency accountability.
Reflections of difficulties in practice
Reflecting the tensions between vertical and horizontal government identified 
above, interviewees in the mid 2000s, who were required to report under the 
FMA Act, tended to acknowledge the continuing difficulties in realising the 
concept of whole-of-government. They noted that the FMA Act did not encourage 
whole-of-government approaches — rather, it simply made the chief executive 
separately accountable. Mindful of the responsibility of the chief executive for 
the efficient, effective and ethical use of resources under the FMA Act, one chief 
executive said: ‘The FMA Act focuses on the individual responsibility of the 
CEO. I like the concept of separating decision making from the minister (e.g. 
through a board), but I also like the concept of me being personally responsible. 
Requiring the co-signature of the CFO was a good move’.
It was also said that some CAC bodies, which had been set up for program 
delivery, were assuming a policy-making role. This perception emerged in 
interviews with some CAC body interviewees whose bodies operated within 
small portfolios, and was significant in the case of Centrelink, an FMA agency 
that is discussed in chapter 5. 
FMA agency respondents remarked upon the increasing accountability 
requirements, both in CAC bodies reporting to central agencies and in the ANAO’s 
performance audits. One interviewee observed that ‘the layers are building up’. 
Thus, the effective integration of agencies and authorities within the whole-of-
government remains a significant difficulty. With an eye to improving this, one 
option considered by FMA agency participants was to make portfolio bodies 
accountable to the minister. They saw a ‘fragmentation’ of the bureaucracy at 
2 At times, there appear to be analogies with the broader concerns of private corporate governance — for 
example, the improvement of corporate social responsibility and corporate ethics may appear to have similar 
ultimate objectives to some whole-of-government objectives.
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the very time when service delivery and national security demanded greater 
coordination within government. They thought, for example, that the delivery 
of extended entitlement programs now presented difficulties, as did achieving 
broad political agreement among commissions. They commented on the 
difficulties now associated with performance management and understanding 
the risk profiles of quite different organisations across the public sector.
Some more specific structural and procedural issues, which have tended 
to highlight this fragmentation, were also referred to. These included the 
fundamental difficulty perceived in the minister delegating power to a board 
and the difficulties involved in strengthening the relationship between minister 
and chair (a suggestion made by the Uhrig review) when the chief executive 
remained the full-time employee. Another related issue was a clear concern 
among many FMA agency interviewees for the difficulties and ultimate value 
in maintaining stakeholder representation. There appeared a weakening faith 
in the value of the ‘representative’ board — the only possible exception to 
this being the value seen by many interviewees in maintaining jurisdictional 
representation in regulatory commissions.
Finally, senior executives saw a significant gap between the concept of 
‘governance’, considered as a universal code of good practice within the public 
sector, and the need for more active public engagement with (and access to), 
the public sector in practice. A few interviewees felt that the ‘governance’ era 
had been less successful in publicising and addressing its ‘sins of omission’ as 
distinct from highlighting its achievements. They questioned their true capacity 
to control what was actually happening in the field.
Cross-portfolio board representation 
In chapter 9 it is noted that, for some secretaries, departmental representation 
on CAC bodies is considered a part of their role. The explanation given by those 
reporting under the FMA Act for not undertaking such representation was their 
concern for ‘ending up in a position of political vulnerability with the minister — 
since the minister is ultimately accountable’. This group also provided plausible 
explanations for their view that representation by CAC body representatives 
on departmental executive boards would not be a good idea. They emphasised 
the need to preserve the confidentiality of agency decisions and their concern 
for the lack of public CAC Act responsibility within the sector. FMA agency 
participants were also equivocal about the value of the chief executive sitting 
on the boards of CAC bodies. Other difficulties in secretarial representation on 
boards are canvassed in chapter 9. 
Further, FMA agency participants commonly saw other more effective and 
less risky ways for departments to obtain input from CAC bodies (e.g. through 
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portfolio chief executives’ meetings, representation of CAC bodies on policy 
committees and other specific departmental subcommittees). As noted earlier, 
some FMA agency participants expressed their concern for ‘external’ (i.e. 
outside the portfolio) representatives on executive boards. For example: ‘I 
wouldn’t want it. Perhaps on subcommittees yes, for technical expertise. But 
not on the executive board because some of the business is highly confidential 
and what does a non-executive director become — a conscience?’
Coordination with CAC bodies 
Departmental perspectives on their relations with CAC bodies and other portfolio 
agencies were also addressed during interviews. Within state-centric public 
governance, the effective coordination of department and agencies within the 
portfolio is a key indicator of the successful melding of horizontal and vertical 
governance. For their part, CAC bodies often held a firm view that departments 
could do more to keep them informed of policy directions and suggested 
that more representation by departments upon their boards might be helpful 
(chapter 6). As noted above, however, some agency heads saw difficulties in 
their being represented on the boards of CAC bodies. These difficulties emerged 
in this comment: ‘I would never come between a chair and the minister, but 
they (i.e. CAC bodies) do need to understand that the minister will ask advice 
of the secretary. It’s the secretary’s responsibility to report to the minister on 
the whole portfolio’. This divergence in the views of those reporting under the 
FMA and CAC acts identifies a potential difficulty for integrated government 
and whole-of-government objectives. 
Tensions in accommodating concepts and 
language of governance
The difficulties of absorbing corporate entities within the framework of central 
government are relatively apparent in the previous consideration of the statutory 
framework. Possibly less well understood, however, has been the extent to 
which private corporate law and governance has tended to import to the public 
sector new concepts and measures of corporate regulation and performance 
monitoring (chapter 2). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the passage of the 
CAC Act served to highlight once again the different and distinctive aspects 
of the public/private divide that are associated with corporatisation and the 
privatisation of public enterprises (Farrar 2005: 445; Bottomley 1994: 530). One 
ongoing difficulty for the governance of the public sector in the future will be 
the need to sustain the variety of accountability regimes that are best suited to 
bodies of varying public and private character.
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The very language of accountability in the public sector echoes the vertical 
responsibilities of those deriving their power and authority from the 
constitutional power and authority of parliament and cabinet. By contrast, the 
corporate board enjoys relative constitutional autonomy and its members are 
subject only to external regulation by ASIC, an independent corporate regulator. 
For this reason, difficulties may be expected to arise in considering whether 
ASIC or the Finance Minister should assume responsibility for bringing legal 
action against the directors of such bodies (DFD 2012b). Corporate governance 
in the private sector can only be understood by reference to market expectations 
and monitoring. Questions therefore arise as to the way in which the multiple 
concepts of accountability within government might be reconciled with the 
regulation and market monitoring of private corporations and corporate entities. 
In the authors’ empirical study, questions of accountability were raised in three 
areas in particular, namely interviewees’ recognition of structural (or ‘hard’) 
elements in regulation and accountability, their recognition of ‘soft’ elements 
of accountability, and their measuring and promoting of superior performance. 
‘Hard’ and ‘soft’ elements in accountability and 
governance
As noted in chapter 1, the distinction drawn between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ elements 
in governance recognises differences between the formal and structural (hard) 
elements and the behavioural and relational (soft) elements (Edwards and Clough 
2005). In practice, many in the public sector identify three ‘hard’ elements 
of accountability within the Commonwealth public sector. These are first, 
the system of arrangements, organisational structures and processes that are 
employed to ensure accountability and responsibility in policy/service design 
and delivery; secondly, the multifaceted elements of public accountability, 
compliance, and performance (chapter 1); and thirdly, the demands of essential 
governmental functions which include service delivery, policy outcomes, 
legislative administration, statutory responsibilities, reporting lines and 
financial management.
In interviews with the authors, there remained a primary emphasis upon 
‘hard’ rather than ‘soft’ governance, with relatively fewer references to ‘soft’ 
governance elements. Nevertheless, interviewees appeared aware of the 
importance of both hard and soft elements in measuring ‘good governance’ 
and monitoring performance within the sector. A typical ‘hard’ governance 
orientation was: ‘Governance is primarily about the compliance environment in 
which we operate. It’s about ensuring that we implement the systems, processes 
and safeguards so that we are operating legally and appropriately within our 
remit.’ In considering this environment, FMA agency interviewees commonly 
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referred to parliamentary accountability (senate estimates), accountability to 
ministers and accountability through ‘informative and comprehensive’ annual 
reporting (chapter 5). 
Some FMA agency interviewees distinguished between ‘accountability’ in a strict 
sense and other, more informal, monitoring mechanisms such as stakeholder 
surveys, meeting performance measures or adopting risk management 
techniques, such as ‘traffic lights’ warning systems. Others were reluctant to 
accept the views of outside stakeholders as a measure of accountability. One 
interviewee put it this way: 
I don’t find our constituencies all that helpful. If you look at the mission 
statements of some of them it’s the ‘take no prisoners’ approach — 
protecting the environment at all costs. They don’t take account of 
economic factors and so on … there is no one style of leadership that is 
necessarily right. I’ve seen secretaries at extremes — highly directive or 
a kibbutz-style management. Neither is right — I want to hear people’s 
views, but then I take action.
The responses of interviewees demonstrate that, while both hard and soft factors 
are considered relevant at different times, there is a wide range of different 
approaches adopted and no particular method is favoured. This range of 
different approaches tends to reflect interviewees’ recognition and management 
of multiple accountabilities and their underlying public values, as detailed in 
chapter 1.
While most interviewees emphasised hard elements of governance, there 
was nevertheless a clear appreciation (especially at departmental level) that 
governance is not limited to ‘hard’ elements alone (i.e. structures and processes). 
A number of ‘softer’ elements were also identified as very significant, including 
transparency, trust, behaviour and ethics. These elements reflected the norms 
and values of public sector governance that were outlined in chapter 1. One 
atypical ‘soft’ governance approach that appeared more conducive to integrated 
governance was: ‘to start with a couple of softer concepts … and then, given the 
establishment of the sum of that, we set out the systems and the structures that 
go together to make up the governance arrangements’.
Measuring and promoting superior performance
At the time the CAC Act was passed in 1997, many of the accepted elements 
of good corporate governance in the private sector appeared to have possible 
application in the public sector as well. In the private sector, a positive 
correlation had been found between good corporate governance and improved 
efficiency (Millstein and MacAvoy 1998), although the link proved difficult to 
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establish satisfactorily until more complex composite measures of both hard 
and soft factors in corporate governance were utilised (Larcker, Richardson and 
Tuna 2004; Edwards and Clough 2005). 
Although good corporate governance (measured across a range of hard and 
soft variables) has been acknowledged to improve corporate performance in 
the private sector, those reporting under the FMA Act seem less convinced 
of its relevance to improved performance in the public sector. Individual and 
organisation performance management had been well established in the public 
sector since the 1980s (Bouckaert and Halligan 2006; Mackay 2004).
As might have been expected, participants reporting under the FMA Act, in 
particular, tended to see issues of accountability and performance in terms of 
their accountability to the minister and parliament. There seemed a less technical 
approach generally to assessing and measuring performance, suggesting that 
this driving force for good corporate governance practice in the private sector 
might be one area deserving of closer consideration in its application in the 
public sector. One interviewee said, for example: ‘There’s a performance 
assessment with the secretary to individual executive members. There isn’t a 
formal process. However, I monitor it closely in my head and am very conscious 
of it all the time’.
Further comments, which served to reinforce the impression that improved 
performance may not have been among the primary considerations for 
interviewees, were these: ‘We focus on behaviours, rather than measuring 
performance assessment against outcomes. But I guess it’s hard to assess 
behaviours without having some link to outcomes,’ and ‘We don’t have an 
instrument for measuring and assessing the decision-making success of the 
board — and perhaps we could have’. A number of interviewees referred to 
the excessive focus they saw upon individual performance agreements and 
assessments rather than upon the collective performance of the board.
Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted several tensions that are associated with the state-
centric and society-centric elements of public governance; these are explored 
further in subsequent chapters of the book. Some tensions within the vertical 
lines of traditional departmental authority have acquired new dimensions. The 
relationship between ministers and the senior public service, for example, has 
been complicated by the interposition of ministerial advisers. Less prominent 
aspects of departmental authority may also have been brought into sharper 
relief following the passage of the CAC Act, the implementation of the 
recommended Uhrig review board templates and the subsequent classification 
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of public sector bodies by Finance. The advisory and executive management 
status of departmental committees remains clearly established within 
government, although, the status of certain ‘decision-making’ bodies, such as 
joint Commonwealth –state bodies, regulatory bodies, international bodies and 
ministerial councils raise interesting questions. 




4 . System Governance
System governance refers to public sector governance that is focused on the 
centre of government and takes that perspective in viewing departmental 
governance (chapter 5) and authority governance (chapter 6). This typically 
involves cross-public service (or public sector) activity, which has significant 
implications for the specialised line agencies that make up the bulk of the 
machinery of government. There is a pervasive vertical basis to the public sector 
that reflects hierarchical relationships, but also a strong horizontal quality in 
the sense that agencies are required to comply and respond to standards across 
the sector and increasingly expected to collaborate (chapter 1). These horizontal 
and vertical dimensions become more complicated where they are extended to 
other sectors and levels of government. How these relationships work out vary 
with the governing styles of the political executive and the demands from and 
responses to the changing environment.
In addressing the dimensions of system governance, this chapter first seeks 
to clarify administrative and political machinery and dimensions of system 
governance and central steering. It then addresses changing approaches to 
governance and strategies for coping with complex and intractable problems. 
The chapter concludes with a consideration of challenges and governance styles, 
the limitations that arise in practice and the implications for the effectiveness of 
public governance.
Overview of system governance
The governance of the public sector system is focused on the central agencies 
and, of course, the political executive. The domain may be either the public 
service as a whole (centred on departments of state and their associated 
portfolios and agencies) or the non-departmental public sector (centred on the 
bodies that feature boards and come under the Commonwealth Authorities and 
Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act)). For many purposes it will be both. This is a 
perspective of frameworks, principles and practices that apply across the public 
service or sector.
Governance elements at the system level are in many respects a more complex 
variant of those at the agency and public body level, and they are the subjects, 
respectively, of the next two chapters. The system level, however, is invariably 
more complicated because of horizontal and vertical questions about span 
(across the public sector) and depth (encompassing macro as well as meso and 
micro levels) with regard to questions about policy development, program 
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management and implementation and system maintenance. The political and 
administrative components need to be based on effective working relationships. 
The configuration of departments, agencies and authorities in the core public 
service and the broader public sector, and how their relations are defined, allow 
for different approaches. Questions of system capacity and capability, the values 
appropriate for public servants, compliance and performance, and how the 
public service is envisioned, are important.
The main instruments of system governance have long been part of the 
machinery of government (Weller 2007). The political executive encompasses: 
the prime minister and the PM’s private office; an active cabinet and cabinet 
committee system; and ministers and their political advisers. For the public 
service, the core organisations are the central agencies and the departments of 
state. Rounding out the system as a whole is the spectrum of other agencies and 
authorities that are located in departmental portfolios, plus interdepartmental 
committees (IDCs) and task forces. In addition, there is a long tradition of 
providing advice to government on the management of the public service by 
way of a collective mechanism that brings together the expertise of departmental 
secretaries. Originally known as the Management Advisory Board, its most 
recent incarnation is the Management Advisory Committee. The latest version 
for providing a forum for discussing Australian Public Service (APS) issues is 
the Secretaries Board. At the level of intergovernmental relationships, there are 
the ministerial and official meetings of the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG).
As the key organisations in this public sector, the central agencies have as 
their mandate whole-of-government and systemic responsibilities that cross 
the public service: the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) 
for policy, The Treasury for economic policy, the Department of Finance and 
Deregulation (Finance) for financial management, and the Australian Public 
Service Commission (APSC) on human capital (table 4.1). Each organisation has 
distinctive and complementary roles and is presided over by the ultimate source 
of power and policy direction in the machinery of government, PM&C. 
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Table 4 .1: Roles of central agencies
Agency Roles
Department of the 
Prime Minister and 
Cabinet
Policy advice to the prime minister and the cabinet; and
driving policy development and innovation and ensuring delivery 
of high-priority initiatives across the APS, in pursuit of the 
government’s objectives .
Treasury Economic policy; 
effective government spending and taxation arrangements: advice 
on budget policy issues, trends in Commonwealth revenue and 
major fiscal and financial aggregates, major expenditure programs, 
taxation policy, retirement income, Commonwealth–state financial 
policy;
the central policy agency with a whole-of-economy perspective 
addresses issues ranging from macroeconomic policy settings to 
microeconomic reform, climate change to social policy, tax policy 
and international agreements and forums; 
program delivery role supporting markets and business; and
providing commonwealth payments to state and territory 
governments .
Department of Finance 
and Deregulation
Assisting government across a range of policy areas to ensure 
its outcomes are met, particularly expenditure and financial 
management, deregulation reform and government operations;
supporting delivery of government Budget;
management of domestic property portfolio and key asset sales; 
and




Promotes good practice in strengthening the capability of the 
APS workforce to meet the evolving needs of citizens and the 
government; 
supports leadership and learning and development in the APS; and




The most important reorganisation of the machinery of government occurred 
in 1987, as a key element of the then Labor government's new micro-economic 
reform agenda. The restructuring focused on line departments that played an 
important economic role. The resulting mergers of these areas produced ‘mega’ 
departments that combined distinctive fields such as foreign affairs and trade, 
and education, employment and training. The overall departmental system was 
changed as 28 areas were reduced to 18 portfolio departments, which covered all 
areas of government and reflected the two-tiered ministry of portfolio ministers 
who form the cabinet and the outer ministry (in 2011, 22 and 8 respectively). 
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The basic structure that exists today dates from that time, although recent 
governments have modified the 1987 conception, and the current number of 
departments varies between 18–20 (Halligan 1987; Brooke 1993).
The relationship between the political 
executive and the public service
The significance of political control in the Australian approach to public 
management needs to be emphasised, even though much of the story about 
extending the political executive’s influence predates this current period. The 
consistent pattern has been for the political executive, in the drive for a more 
responsive public service, to challenge elements of the traditional system. Three 
types of change have been important: the strengthening of ministerial influence 
and resources, particularly through the extensive use of ministerial advisors; 
the weakening of the public servant’s position through the reduction in the 
breadth and exclusivity of the public service’s senior roles; and, changes to the 
appointment and tenure of senior public servants who lead agencies (Halligan 
2001). 
The role and character of the public service was transformed as a result of 
change and reform during the last three decades (chapter 2). In the era of the 
‘mandarins’, prior to the mid 1980s, the expanding bureaucracy occupied a 
strong position. Its position came to be questioned, which resulted in reforms 
being made to traditional features, under Labor governments (1983–96). This 
was followed, during the initial terms of John Howard’s Coalition government 
(1996–2007), by a phase of diminishing influence within government, and of 
the bureaucracy becoming more subservient to the private sector. Under new 
public service leadership in the 2000s, a more reflective approach emerged — 
if one that was sometimes sidetracked by issues concerning the relationship 
between politicians and public servants. The Labor government of Kevin Rudd 
(2007–10) sought to address aspects of that relationship, while intensifying 
control over the bureaucracy and increasing demands for efficient performance.
Traditional values about the independence of the public service in providing 
advice to ministers prevailed until the notion of responsiveness made an 
appearance in the 1970s, and the position of public servants was challenged 
because politicians came to see permanent officials to be too influential. 
Responsiveness was eventually built into standard APS principles (MacDermott 
2008). There was a succession of challenges to the relationship that focussed on 
the role of the public service on the one hand and the behaviour and resources 
of the political executive on the other. Over time, the trend has been towards 
strengthening the political executive. This has been punctuated, however, 
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by debates about issues that slowed the rate of change, constrained political 
pressures on the public service, and produced clarifications of aspects of the 
relationship. These points of challenge have included debate about loss of 
permanency for departmental secretaries (1980s), the rise and roles of advisers 
(1980s–2000s), turnover of secretaries (1996), and the demands of a new 
government on public service (2009). The dynamics of change have progressively 
redefined the relationship, yet administrative tradition remains influential.
Senior appointments
The debate about the loss of tenure of heads of departments has been intense, 
with changes to the standing of departmental secretaries proceeding since the 
mid 1980s. These changes have caused an evolution from permanent positions, 
to ones that are governed by contracts and, more recently, to positions that are 
scrutinised by performance review and made competitive by pay scales.
The first formal change (1984) to tenure redesignated the permanent head as 
the departmental secretary on a fixed term. In 1994, the fixed-term statutory 
appointment of secretaries was introduced. The issue then centred on the 
effect on Westminster principles of applying contracts across the senior public 
service. This became a reality as senior executives were increasingly placed on 
individual employment agreements. In a further stage (since 1996), performance 
review was introduced for secretaries. This device in itself was unexceptional, 
although it could be employed (as it was, at times, under the Howard government) 
as a scrutiny device that reinforced the vulnerability of senior public servants.
The other aspect of continuity was the association of turnover with loss of 
tenure. Increasing turnover of secretaries in the 1990s assumed significance 
because loss of position now meant termination of employment. The turnover 
associated with changes of government was significant because it represented 
the ultimate departure from convention. The Coalition government disposed 
of six secretaries in 1996 without explanation. Even more telling was the 
readiness of successive governments to dispense with their chief adviser (e.g. 
the secretary of PM&C). Since 1993, three secretaries of PM&C have resigned 
with a change of prime minister, and it became accepted that the incumbent 
would not necessarily continue with a new government. A partial exception 
was Terry Moran in 2010, who remained at the behest of the new prime minister 
during the Labor government’s first term, but only for a year.
The Rudd government promised to preserve the tradition of permanence, and 
was able to make changes at the top without incurring public debate about 
the process. Five new departmental secretaries were appointed 20 months after 
the 2007 election (in a process that involved shuffling 11 senior executives) as 
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the government sought to place appropriate officials in significant positions. 
Performance bonuses were removed because they were thought to have a 
negative impact on performance. 
While the occasional appointment has been challenged as having a political 
motivation, and other individuals can be argued to have arrived at their 
appointment on the basis of connections to, or experience of working 
with politicians, overall, professional public servants have dominated the 
bureaucracy, even if their domain has been eroded by the rising influence of 
political  advisers. Yet, concerns about the short-term focus of politicians has 
produced a new formulation of the secretaries’ role in terms of stewardship 
(discussed in chapter 5).
Political advisers
Political advisers have been a particular source of contention between the 
government and the bureaucracy. The Labor government of Bob Hawke (1983–
1991) installed a new set of political mechanisms at the cabinet and ministerial 
levels (Campbell and Halligan 1993), strengthening political direction to give 
more prominence to collective responsibility and its priorities. It also proposed a 
political tier within the senior public service, but eventually compromised with 
a new position, the ministerial consultant. The minister’s office was expanded as 
an alternative to overt politicisation, and political appointments were increasingly 
interposed between the bureaucracy and politicians. Ministerial staff took over 
roles that were previously undertaken by public servants, and could be routinely 
involved in departmental processes. The ministerial adviser became an established 
part of government (Halligan and Power 1992; Dunn 1997).
Questions about political–bureaucratic relationships followed on from earlier 
debates about the role of ministerial advisers, particularly in the aftermath of 
the ‘children overboard’ affair (Weller 2002; Maley 2000, 2010).1 The Senate 
Finance and Public Administration References Committee (2003) inquiry into the 
conduct, management and accountability of ministerial staff received evidence 
about difficulties in relationships between advisers and public servants, the 
need to clarify roles and responsibilities and the dangers of politicisation. The 
extensive contact between public servants and the political executive (ministers 
and their staff) was recorded by the APSC survey of APS staff, leading the public 
service commissioner to suggest the need to document the role of ministerial 
advisers through a code of conduct (APSC 2006).
1 The children overboard issue in 2001 centred on whether asylum seekers had thrown children overboard, 
as alleged by government ministers in the context of an imminent federal election.
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With the growing influence of ministerial advisers, the nexus between the 
political executive and senior officials became frayed, and public debate 
continued about the character of the relationship. The press accepted some 
degree of ‘politicisation’ as a given, one focus being the impact of ministerial 
advisers on public servants (Barker 2007), and other observers noted the lack 
of accountability attributable to advisers when they became involved in major 
public policy issues (Walter 2006). The lack of a governance framework under 
which advisers could be directed to operate was also noted (Tiernan 2007). At 
the same time, the role and contribution of advisers in augmenting the resources 
of the minister and dealing with partisan questions has long been recognised.
As part of its accountability and integrity agenda, the Rudd government 
recognised the effect of the increasing numbers and roles of ministerial staff 
on the relationship between ministers and public servants, and the lack of 
consideration that had been given to formalising their responsibilities. A code 
of conduct for ministerial staff, introduced in 2008, stipulated that ministerial 
staff were not empowered to direct APS employees who were not subject to 
them. Political advisers were now expected to be accountable where they had a 
policy role, although doubts remained about their conduct (e.g. Moran 2011).
Central steering and coordination
As governing has become more complex, challenging (Head 2010) and subject 
to multiple influences, central steering and coordination have taken precedence. 
Central steering covers several functions and mechanisms, the choice of roles 
being shaped by context (e.g. system of government and administrative 
tradition), leadership style and environmental challenges (Halligan 2011c). As 
governments, both in Australia and internationally, have moved away from 
disaggregated public sectors and have sought to reassert central control in 
order to improve performance, coordination has returned to prominence. The 
tension between the de-centering and re-centering of governance is a perennial 
issue (chapter 3), but what emerges from the changing dynamics at the centre 
depends on the mix and the country context. 
Of the Anglo-Saxon countries, Australia has placed emphasis on maintaining a 
strong prime minister’s department and enhancing the resources of the political 
executive. While several models have been evident during the reform era (table 
4.2), which correspond in part to the reform stages that were outlined in chapter 
2, the long-term trend has been towards strengthening central steering, and 
that system has been pushed to new levels when political leadership has been 
more strategic, intergovernmental or performance focused.
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The main dimensions of central coordination are generally strategic direction, 
priority setting, coordination and driving the implementation of change and 
policy although, in practice, those dimensions are not all significant at the one 
time. Steering within a governance perspective may be primarily one of ‘setting 
priorities and defining goals’ whereas, under new public management (NPM) it 
may mainly be ‘an interorganisational strategy aimed at unleashing productive 
elements of the public service’ (Peters and Pierre 1998: 231). A broader view is 
that the state is both less in charge and more focused on being a societal player 
within a governance framework (a society-centric view), but a state-centric 
position continues to be relevant to national government like that prevailing in 
Australia (chapter 1). 
Coordination falls within steering (Dahlström, Peters and Pierre 2011). Following 
one scheme for analysing levels of ‘coordination’ generically (Metcalfe 1994), 
steering might cover activities such as government strategy and establishing 
central priorities, whereas coordination within steering would include the 
search for agreement and avoidance of divergences among departments.
Although a perennial consideration in system design, as the vacuum at the 
centre widened, coordination has featured more in reform agendas (Peters 2006; 
Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest 2010) and, some would argue, has acquired 
fresh characteristics. A traditional conception of coordination envisages parties 
taking each other into account in a process of harmoniously or reciprocally 
linking activities and decisions (Kernaghan and Siegel 1987). Coordination may 
once have been regarded as more remedial and reactive, such as responding to 
disasters and communications problems, but traditional approaches were not 
solely retrospective, even though there is more emphasis now on the prospective. 
Another conception addresses procedural and policy/functional coordination 
that is centred on central agencies (Painter 1987). 
Horizontal government approaches, which have been developed in the last 
decade in order to promote interagency collaboration and cooperation, reflect 
both old and new forms of organising for connecting distinct parts of the public 
sector. Such approaches represent a break with conventional notions for dealing 
with complex policy problems in Anglophone countries. Within these concepts 
and applications, there are a range of meanings that vary between managing 
horizontal relationships (operating more at the interagency level) to broader 
formulations that envisage integration of government operations (Verhoest and 
Bouckaert 2005). 
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Models of coordination
The several approaches to studying the centre have different emphases. An 
executive leadership or core executive emphasises the role of the political 
executive (e.g. Campbell and Halligan 1993). The literature on the ‘steering state’ 
covers a range of positions that share a division between steering functions and 
implementation, although how this separation occurs varies widely in practice. 
A variation on this theme is the hollowing out of the state (Frederickson and 
Frederickson 2006), which focuses on delivery beyond the centre. Moving closer 
to the core, the question of the state’s capacity has received attention, including 
the relationship with coordination (Painter and Pierre 2005; Verhoest and 
Bouckaert 2005). The specialised field of central agencies is under-researched, 
but Lindquist (2001) has distinguished the strong centre in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, based on central institutions and high capacity for coordination, 
from the smaller and less influential centres that exist within European systems.
Five models are differentiated (Halligan 2006) for considering central coordinating 
strategies that are based on (1) whether relationships are concentrated in the core 
of central government or encompass third parties (such as state governments 
and non-government providers); and (2) the mix of political and administrative 
machinery that is used. Each coordinating strategy has different implications 
for the effectiveness of governance (table 4.2, compare table 2.2), and various 
instruments are relevant to specific relationships, such as conditional grants 
and performance management, and more generally the use of political levers for 
directing the public service.
Table 4 .2: Coordinating strategies
Characterisation Central agencies Political executive
Integrated hierarchical Transactional control Traditional relationships, reliance on public service
Prototype ‘steering’ 
and ‘rowing’ Strategic and selective steering
Assertion of political executive,




Downgraded steering role, 




Rebalancing steering at levels 
of political executive, central 
agencies and departments
Prime ministerial control, political 
and performance management 
and control
Strategic governance Strategic assertion horizontally and vertically
Strategic priorities and 
planning prime minister . COAG 
mechanisms
Public Sector Governance in Australia
90
The integrated hierarchical model is grounded in traditional public administration 
that steered through laws and regulations, hierarchy, and control over the details 
of financial and personnel transactions. The prototype steering model departs 
from this transactional basis by differentiating strategic policy from operational 
and delivery matters. The emphasis is on the redefinition of the centre to 
enhance directive capacity and political focusing, with decentralisation being 
a secondary consideration. A balanced steering and rowing arrangement is one 
possible outcome, but it may also be a stepping-stone to a stronger ‘steering 
state’ conception, as discussed next. 
The devolved model is assumed to be a product of reform design, either 
management and/or market driven, and represents a strong commitment to 
decentralisation and selective steering at best. It needs to be distinguished 
from systems internationally that lack a strong centre; weak centres appear to 
either reflect state traditions, divided central agencies or cultural and political 
factors that are less determinate (e.g. Lindquist 2004 on Canada). The dominant 
principle is competition, whereas, the more integrated conception discussed 
below features collaboration. The main mode of control is ‘hands off’ under 
NPM that is reliant on contracts, and ‘hands on’ where performance is central 
(Newman 2002).
The fourth model, integrated governance, combines the attributes of a strategic 
centre with active line departments. In terms of governance, it unites elements 
of modern governance and state-centric approaches (Richards and Smith 2006). 
This is a demanding option that benefits from the directive role of the political 
executive and relies on a system of performance management. The final model, 
strategic governance, emphasises strategic planning and priority setting at the 
centre and is likely to be driven by the prime minister and his or her department 
and by incorporating capable ministers in key areas. Intergovernmental relations 
have centrality for driving major policy agenda collaboratively but subject to 
performance requirements. Compared to the previous model this one ratchets 
up the intensity of the pursuit of strategically defined priorities. The ‘steering 
state’ dimension may still be present but the ‘rowers’ need to be knitted in to 
the centre more directly.
These models have been tried successively over recent decades. A combination 
of internal and external sources of change facilitated the emergence of new 
approaches, which was first apparent with major reform in the 1980s (Campbell 
and Halligan 1993). The intensity of the Australian shift to devolution and the 
subsequent reassertion of the centre resulted from both system shortcomings 
and environmental uncertainty.
The general pathway for central steering, over 20 years, has displayed features 
of each of the models. The integrated hierarchical, the dominant approach of the 
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post-war years, relied on the archetypal mechanisms of traditional coordination 
— the interdepartmental committee and central agency control of transactions. 
It was succeeded by the prototype steering model, under which an explicit 
solution was prescribed by the managerial culture of the 1980s. Central agency 
intervention was to be minimised, which meant that traditional controls over 
line departments were relinquished: ‘They were to assume strategic directions 
allowing line departments to make specific resource decisions. The central 
agency stance should be more that of catalyst and intermittent coordinator’ 
(Campbell and Halligan 1993: 43).
This was followed by an exploration of the devolved model (Zifcak 1994) that 
increasingly assumed NPM features. A strong commitment to market principles 
was associated with the neoliberal policies of the Coalition government in the 
1990s. Within a philosophy that emphasised the private sector, choice for 
consumers and purchasers, and the use of market mechanisms, action was taken 
to transfer responsibilities, to privatise, and to conceptualise the public service 
as a business operating in a competitive environment that was to be judged 
by its performance. Departmental activities were reviewed using an approach 
that incorporated competitive tendering and contracting, purchaser-provider 
arrangements, and business process re-engineering. Market testing of agencies 
sought to improve internal capacity by benchmarking and outsourcing aspects of 
corporate services. The resulting disestablishment of monolithic multifunctional 
departments, and reliance on third parties for service provision, produced 
increasingly siloed agencies and a fragmented system. Under this devolved 
public management model, the agency was the focus, individual contracts 
provided the basis for employing senior public servants, and a disaggregated 
public service was the result. 
The impact on central agencies of the application of management and market 
principles was resounding. The old Public Service Board was supplanted by a 
modest commission (Campbell and Halligan 1993). Finance acquired a ‘strategic’ 
role (Wanna and Bartos 2003), but its diminished role in the second wave of 
market reform (the second half of the 1990s) meant that debate centred on 
whether it would survive organisationally (one option being to re-integrate it 
with Treasury). PM&C confined active intervention to where it was required, 
and was no longer providing leadership for the public service. In Lindquist’s 
(2001) terms, Australia moved from a strong centre to a smaller centre, with a 
corresponding reduction in capacity, coherence and control of coordination. At 
this stage it had moved to the devolved end of the spectrum that was comparable 
in some respects with the system operating in New Zealand, which was generally 
regarded as the outlier in terms of central steering. 
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Steering through integrated and strategic governance
There was movement again within the public management reform cycle in the 
2000s: from an intense neoliberal reform agenda in the first five years of the 
Coalition government, reflection on the results of that agenda and a changing 
international environment produced shifts, refinements and revaluation of the 
worth of the public service functioning under new central agency leadership 
that suited different agendas. The integrated governance model emerged as a 
more comprehensive approach that displayed features of the earlier models.
Several themes were recurrent: delivery and implementation, performance, 
coherence and whole-of-government, and responsiveness to government policy. 
This model shifted the focus to some extent from the vertical towards the 
horizontal and a greater concern with cross-agency programs and relationships 
within central government. At the same time, there was a reinforcement of and 
extension to vertical relationships. The whole-of-government agenda also had 
a centralising element, in that central agencies were driving policy directions 
or principles, either systemically or across several agencies. The result was the 
tempering of devolution through strategic steering and management from the 
centre and a rebalancing of the positions of centre and line agencies. 
The Howard government tightened its control of the centre through 
management of the appointment processes within the public service, public 
boards and parliamentary positions (e.g. a political appointee headed the 
cabinet secretariat). The political control aspect also underlay each dimension 
of change: improved financial information on a program basis for ministers, 
strategic coordination under cabinet, controlling major policy agendas, 
organisational integration through abolition of bodies and features of autonomy, 
and monitoring the implementation of government policy down to the delivery 
level. The rebalancing produced, according to Hamburger (2007: 210):
a network of central coordinating mechanisms in place of the direct 
central control and institutionally based central agencies [and a system] 
in which political control of administration is coordinated by a Prime 
Minister whose head-of-government role exists within a strong culture 
of collective involvement of other ministers through the Cabinet.
The overall result was significant potential for policy and program control and 
integration using the conventional machinery of cabinet, central agencies and 
departments. 
There were five dimensions to the integrated governance strategy, which 
operated at several levels, as discussed below.
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Central steering of departments through the resurrected central 
agency
The overriding trend in the 1990s — to devolve responsibilities to agencies 
— remained a feature, but it was modified in two respects involving central 
agencies. This occurred first through the enlarged role of PM&C because of 
its revitalised role in policy coordination and other major agenda in the early 
2000s, as discussed below.
Secondly, there were more prominent roles for the other central agencies in 
espousing and enforcing principles, and monitoring and guiding in the areas 
of budgeting, performance, human resources and values. Finance’s role and 
capacity to oversee financial management and information was enhanced, with a 
greater focus on departmental programs, a renewed emphasis on cash accounting 
and an expansion of staff capacity, in a shrunken department, to provide the 
necessary advice for government. The APSC invested in improvements to its 
capacity for monitoring and evaluation, particularly through an annual report, 
‘State of the Service’, that surveyed employees and agencies and scrutinised 
public service human resources, values and practice.
Central steering of performance through monitoring down to 
program delivery 
A core principle of the 1980s was to require departments to manage as well as 
to provide policy advice. Under the market agenda of NPM, outsourcing, agents 
and specialised agencies were favoured for service delivery (e.g. Centrelink). 
The language of the mid 2000s was refined to enforce effective delivery as well 
as policy advice, with the latter defined in terms of outcomes.
Implementation had often been the neglected end of the policy spectrum. Under 
the market agenda, outsourcing, agents and specialised agencies were favoured 
for service delivery. The internal constraints on implementation were reviewed 
by the government as a result of public perceptions of the performance of 
delivery agencies, particularly those where ministers had direct responsibility. 
In late 2003, PM&C was responsible for an Australian Cabinet Implementation 
Unit, which was established to seek effectiveness in program delivery by 
ensuring government policies and services were delivered in a timely fashion 
and on a responsive basis. It was depicted as a partnership with agencies in 
producing systematic reform to the implementation of government policies, and 
ensuring effective delivery. 
The authority of cabinet was drawn on as a 'gateway' and a ‘checkpoint'. New 
proposals required appropriate details regarding implementation and cabinet 
submissions that were seen to have a risk element in their delivery were required 
to address a delivery framework including milestones, impacts and governance. 
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Policy proposals that were adopted required formal implementation plans with 
progress reported to the prime minister and cabinet against milestones  that 
were set out in 'traffic light' format. Around 200 policy implementations were 
monitored under the Howard government. The 'traffic light' report to the prime 
minister and cabinet was regarded as a powerful incentive for organisational 
learning for public servants. Cultural change was promoted around a project 
management approach that employed a methodology designed to codify and 
think through the connections between policy objectives, inputs, outputs and 
outcomes (Shergold 2004b; Wanna 2006).
Ministerial departments and portfolios
The third important dimension of the model involved the swing back to a more 
comprehensive ministerial department and ministerial steering of portfolios. 
The targeting of the broader public sector was derived from election agenda and 
led to the review of corporate governance of statutory authorities and office-
holders. An agenda was developed, because of the extent of non-departmental 
organisations, for ministerial departments to have tighter and more direct 
control over public agencies, and their governance (see discussion of Review 
of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (Uhrig 
review) in chapters 5 and 8). 
The language of the mid 2000s enforced effective delivery as well as policy 
advice with the latter defined in terms of outcomes (Shergold 2004b). 
Departmentalisation was expressed through absorbing statutory authorities 
and reclaiming control of agencies with hybrid boards that did not accord with 
a particular corporate (and therefore private sector) governance prescription, 
as expressed by the Uhrig review (2003) (chapter 2, this volume). The medium 
term result was a reduction in the number of agencies in the outer public 
sector (114 to 84 between 2003 and 2012) and an expansion in the number 
of agencies that were placed within the core public service (84 to 111). The 
key example of agencification, Centrelink, was also affected. Established in 
1997 as an independent statutory authority that was responsible for delivering 
welfare benefits, Centrelink accounted for about 30 per cent of Commonwealth 
expenditure. This position, however, changed from 2004 under the integrating 
governance agenda and Centrelink came to be increasingly integrated within 
the Human Services Department (chapter 5 and Halligan 2008b).
Steering across the public service: Whole-of-government and 
horizontal management
Australia was slower to adopt a systematic approach to whole-of-government 
issues than the other Anglophone countries of Canada and the United Kingdom, 
which pursued these issues in the 1990s while Australia was focused on 
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management reform. The environment created by these reforms emphasised 
devolution of responsibility to agency heads and each agency pursuing its own 
business and policy agenda. The need to temper devolution with a broader, 
whole-of-government perspective came to permeate much government activity 
(cf Verhoest and Bouckaert 2005 for how such a trajectory was worked through 
elsewhere). The shift was expressed in three ways.
At the political level, the prime minister committed to a series of whole-of-
government priorities for new policy-making that included national security, 
defence and counter-terrorism and other generally defined priorities such as 
sustainable environment, rural and regional affairs and work and family life 
(Howard 2002; Shergold 2004a). These priorities were pursued through a range 
of traditional coordinating and new whole-of-government processes including 
changes to cabinet processes that were aimed at strengthening its strategic 
leadership role. 
The priorities were also followed through a range of coordinating or whole-
of-government processes, including: cabinet and ministerial processes (e.g. 
Ministerial Oversight Committee on Energy); COAG and other Commonwealth–
state arrangements (e.g. sustainable water management); interdepartmental 
taskforces, as discussed above (e.g. work and family life); integrated service 
delivery (e.g. stronger regions); and lead agency approaches. An example was 
the COAG agreement to develop a National Water Initiative to increase the 
productivity and efficiency of water use, sustain rural and urban communities, 
and to ensure the health of river and groundwater systems.
The organisational response to the external environment that was experienced by 
Australia in the 2000s was to build coordinating units within current structures 
centred on PM&C. The whole-of-government approach to national coordination 
covered strategic and operational levels: a National Security Committee of 
Cabinet, a National Counter-Terrorism Committee (for intergovernmental 
coordination), and a National Security Division for coordinating and applying 
whole-of-government principles to border protection, counter-terrorism, 
defence, intelligence, law enforcement and security. 
Thirdly, the agenda was given impetus through a report, Connecting Government: 
Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges, by the 
Management Advisory Committee (comprising departmental secretaries, the 
primary vehicle at that time for examining and setting reform agenda: MAC 2004), 
which indicated how to address issues about whole-of-government processes 
and structures, cultures, managing information, budgetary frameworks. 
Whole-of-government was defined as denoting ‘agencies working across 
portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government 
response to particular issues’ (MAC 2004: 1). Despite this specific definition, 
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the boundaries were not readily drawn for coordination was also viewed in 
terms of coordinating departments (i.e. central agencies), integration (reducing 
the number of departments) and cooperative federalism (MAC 2004: 6 –7). 
Approaches to coordination could operate formally and informally, ranging 
from policy development through program management to service delivery. 
There was an underlying rationalist conception suggesting that difficult policy 
problems and management questions could be laid out, solutions designed and 
challenges managed leading to improved problem solving, service delivery and 
performance. 
The medium term impact of horizontal coordination in Australia was mixed. 
The level of horizontal management activity expanded within the public service 
through a mixture of central agency push and shove using task forces, a reliance 
on traditional IDCs for some purposes, and some new interactive mechanisms. 
An official verdict reported some success but ‘overall implementation of the 
Connecting Government report has been disappointing and the report does not 
appear to have had a fundamental impact on the approach that the APS takes 
to its work’ (APSC 2007d: 247; Halligan, Buick and O’Flynn 2011; O’Flynn et al 
2011). However, whole-of-government continues to be an imperative (Sedgwick 
2010b; Metcalfe 2011), and is reflected in the aspirations for shared outcomes 
that were outlined in Ahead of the Game: Blueprint for the Reform of Australian 
Government Administration (AGRAGA 2010).
Performance management systems
The fifth dimension addresses the role of performance, which had become a 
central and constant theme for Australian leaders. The former head of the public 
service, Peter Shergold, declared that ‘The next challenge is to ensure that the 
performance of the APS — as a coherent whole — is lifted’, and used the concept 
of the ‘performing state’ for a system ‘that is continuously open to, and reading 
its environment, and learning and changing in response: a state "inherently in 
transition"' (Shergold 2004b: 6). A consistent theme of Prime Minister Rudd was 
for improving performance (e.g. Rudd 2009b), and the Advisory Group on the 
Reform of Australian Government Administration regarded high performance 
as a criterion for the agendas in Ahead of the Game. These ideals and aspirations 
remain to be realised. 
Australia’s performance management has moved through stages (Halligan 
2003b; McKay 2003), and continues to evolve hesitantly. In the first stage, the 
elements of performance management were developed within a centralised 
approach featuring Finance. The strengths of this process were institutionalised 
performance management elements and the requirement for formal evaluations. 
The weaknesses were the reliance on evaluations that were mandatory (and 
imposed top-down by a central agency) and the quality of program objectives 
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and performance information. There were questions, also, about what program 
budgeting represented (Wanna, Kelly and Forster 2000), because a program 
framework was used as an instrument for managing and reporting on programs, 
but this did not lead to budgeting by programs that were linked to appropriations.
The second stage was based on the outcomes/output framework, devolution 
to agencies, principles instead of formal requirements, and an emphasis on 
performance information. The strengths of this approach lay in systemic review 
by central agencies, departments’ ownership of outcomes, and management 
being modified by the influence of explicit results achieved. The weaknesses 
included insufficient information for parliamentary needs and for sound 
management, inconsistent departmental support for good evaluation, and the 
subjectivity of performance assessment. These limitations produced continuing 
reassessment of aspects of performance management practices such as the types 
of information provided. 
The budget framework that was introduced in 1999 changed financial management 
and reporting by applying budgeting on a full accrual basis; implementation of 
outputs and outcomes reporting; and extended agency devolution to inter alia 
budget estimates and financial management. Departments and agencies were 
now expected to identify their outcomes and outputs and be held accountable 
for them. Agency heads were clearly assigned responsibility and accountability 
for performance. Agencies were required to identify explicit outcomes, outputs 
and performance measures. Reporting now occurred through budget plans 
(portfolio budget statements) and financial year results (annual reports). Major 
benefits of the new framework were to be an improved information base, better 
incentives to be efficient, greater precision about public value and, for the first 
time, the linking of outputs to outcomes.
However, the limitations of the framework in practice — the need for information 
on implementation and operations as well as results  — produced reincorporation 
of departmental programs, a renewed emphasis on cash accounting, the Cabinet 
Implementation Unit and other changes including improvements to cash 
management, budgeting and program reporting and financial information 
systems. This meant, of course, enhancing Finance’s role and capacity to oversee 
financial management and information, and provide the necessary advice for 
government.
The question of engaging ministers in the new system proved to be problematic 
as performance judgments ultimately involved them and there had been 
considerable investment in seeking improvements to the information provided 
through performance management. A number of the expected benefits did not 
accrue from the combination of a highly centralised budgetary process and 
highly devolved agencies. Most importantly ministers experienced difficulties 
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with the lack of information on programs, the level at which they made 
decisions, which had been dropped under the new framework. At that time, 
however, Finance no longer collected program data on a systematic basis (Watt 
2003), and what was available was not published. There was also parliamentary 
criticism of the lack of information available about the Commonwealth’s position. 
This paucity of information was regarded as a result of financial management 
information systems that were accrual based, in contrast to those of traditional 
cash transactions.
Finance’s Budget Estimates and Framework Review, to evaluate system 
effectiveness and responsiveness in meeting government needs, reported on 
the scope for streamlining the financial framework, improving information 
management systems, and enhancing the quality of financial information that 
was being provided to the government and its central agency. These measures 
enhanced Finance’s role and capacity to oversee financial management and 
information, and a greater focus was placed on departmental programs, a 
renewed emphasis on cash accounting and an expansion of staff capacity, in 
a shrunken department, to provide the necessary advice for government. The 
reported changes included improvements to budgeting and program reporting 
and financial information systems (Watt 2003; DFA 2004). Program information 
was reintroduced surreptitiously (in so far as the details of its reintroduction 
were not public) by 2003.
A change of government produced an agenda to improve budget transparency, 
termed Operation Sunlight (Tanner 2008; Hawke and Wanna 2010). The 
diagnosis of the existing outcomes and outputs framework was savage. The 
government’s response to the limitations of its performance management 
framework has been to seek improvements to it. Rather than discard outcomes 
as a focus, they remain, with augmented features, to several dimensions of the 
framework. Programs have been revived for portfolio budget statements and, 
along with outcomes, form the basis for reporting. Performance was reinforced 
and extended by this initiative, and there was greater interest in targets and 
league tables, and service delivery focused on outcomes. Yet, a series of studies, 
mainly by the ANAO, have raised questions about the efficacy of aspects of the 
existing performance management system and the need for significant renewal 
(Bouckaert and Halligan 2008; ANAO 2011; Hawke 2012).
The Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review (CFAR) has provided an 
authoritative diagnosis of the position that includes insufficient integration of 
the components of the resource management cycle, lack of coherence in the 
performance management process, the role of outcomes in appropriations, and 
weaknesses in performance monitoring and evaluation (DFD 2012b).
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Reformulating steering under Rudd through strategic 
governance
What differentiates strategic governance from integrated governance? Strategic 
governance places greater emphasis on strategy, targeted performance and the 
design of governance nationally and federally. This difference was indicated by 
the style and actions of Rudd in the role of prime minister. Rudd’s leadership 
approach was close to a ‘priorities and planning style’, which was defined by 
Campbell (1988: 59) as occurring when first ministers were ‘in a strong political 
position and choose to pursue an ambitious, creative, and comprehensive 
legislative program’. This style favoured central agencies and their role in 
‘assembling coherent policies and programs’.
The government explored new ways for engaging the public (e.g. the Australia 
2020 Summit of 1000 delegates, and community cabinets) and produced a five-
point agenda (Australian Government 2008). A key aspect was the reform of 
governing through improved external engagement, building accountability 
and integrity, and modernising the federation. The focus on accountability and 
transparency addressed the question of respect for government institutions and 
‘public confidence in the integrity of ministers, their staff and senior officials’ 
(Australian Government 2008: 73). 
A new phase in intergovernmental relations was initiated in 2009 with the 
intention of strengthening vertical relationships within the federation. The 
COAG reform agenda was at the forefront of the government’s modernisation and 
policy agenda. At the interface between levels, the Australian Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Federal Financial Relations was designed to improve the well 
being of Australians through collaborative working arrangements and enhanced 
public accountability covering outcomes achieved and outputs delivered. The 
arrangement provides for public accountability at the Commonwealth level 
with state-level flexibility regarding delivery and indicators (APSC 2010b). 
Central steering was reformulated under Rudd through a strategic governance 
approach that placed greater emphasis on strategy, targeted performance and 
the design of governance nationally and federally. In his first two years, Rudd’s 
‘priorities and planning style’ reflected his political pre-eminence and the 
pursuit of an ambitious reform program that was centred on central agencies’ 
roles in developing policies and programs. A major organisational audit of 
PM&C indicated that it was ‘heavily focused on the day-to-day activities of 
government, and that [its] capacity to provide strategic policy advice could be 
improved’ (PM&C 2008a: 3). A Strategy and Delivery Division was established 
to advance administrative priorities that were more strategic, long term and 
proactive. The overall objective was a strong department for supporting the 
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prime minister’s reform agenda for the nation with monitoring of progress 
assuming significance. The emphasis under Rudd has not been maintained by 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard.
Governance styles and issues
Challenges to governance
How the centre perceives governance challenges depends in part on governing 
style and whether governments are either seeking to anticipate problems before 
they become full-fledged issues or are merely responding as the need arises. 
While simultaneous invention is possible, the articulation of problems often 
reflects the general influence of both a global community and the specific 
circulation of ideas in the Anglophone realm (Halligan 2007a). In these days 
of assertive political executives, the definition of challenges is more often 
lead by the government, but the vagaries of public debate and the politics of 
governance mean that control of the agenda can be tenuous, particularly where 
clear direction and effective implementation are wanting. The political appetite 
for tackling different challenges is affected by a range of factors, including 
the source and nature of the challenges, the cross-jurisdictional and other 
complexities of the challenges, and the selection and coordination of different 
implementation strategies.
External challenges 
External challenges have usually been fiscal in nature and economic factors 
(e.g. international competitiveness) have remained a driver, although nothing 
compares to the global financial crisis of 2008. Otherwise, the most important 
external threat during the 2000s was the issue of security and terrorism, which 
dominated both the domestic and international landscape (apart from the long-
term impact of 9/11, there were terrorist attacks in Bali and the commitment of 
forces to Iraq), and had lasting effects on public management and the community. 
The then secretary of PM&C observed that the threat of global terrorism 
and the emerging challenges of counter-terrorism, protection of borders and 
domestic security had transformed Australian life and identity. ‘Those issues, 
typically “non-routine”, will test bureaucratic structures. Ensuring effective 
coordination of intelligence, analysis and strategic policy responses will test 
public administration’ (PM&C 2003). The security question was still resonating 
in late 2008 when Rudd (2008) presented the first national security report to 
parliament as a coherent statement of the challenges and a comprehensive 
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approach to them. The impact of internationalisation was demonstrated most 
dramatically by how the issue of climate change helped to derail the Rudd 
government, and continues to challenge the Gillard government.
Complex policy problems that cross boundaries 
A number of whole-of-government priorities for new policy-making were 
adopted by Howard (2002), which included national security, defence and 
counter terrorism and other generally defined priorities such as sustainable 
environment, rural and regional affairs and work and family life. The Rudd 
government maintained and extended this emphasis covering some similar 
ground (e.g. national security) and new and more specific fields (climate change 
and productivity). Yet the question of how to handle the contending interests 
in the Murray-Darling basin, which emerged under Howard, also confronts the 
Gillard government. 
Implementing government policies and priorities 
Implementation of government policy was an issue at the beginning of the 
reform era as a result of political concern with public service independence, 
which produced a sustained process of redistributing power between politicians 
and public servants (Halligan 2001). Despite the use of different instruments, 
political control and performance continued to be an issue for governments, 
with the concern in the 2000s being that political priorities were not being 
sufficiently reflected in policy directions, and were not being followed through 
in program implementation and delivery.
Juggling and balancing relationships across the reform era
There are indications that, over time, the processes of change in the reform era 
have produced a return to several traditional verities. There are several strands 
to this argument.
First, the policy role of the senior public service experienced progressive attrition 
from the traditional position of centrality. With the rise of managerialism there 
was a reaction against the emphasis on policy work and the lack of management 
skills. At the same time, ministers increasingly relied on alternative sources 
of advice and their staff both advised and provided conduits for extra-
government proposals. Over time, the policy capacity of the ministerial office 
was strengthened and the public servant’s role became more limited. As well, 
external advice was routinely relied on and an atmosphere that encouraged 
contestable advice meant more competition than before. The overall effect was to 
transform the public service’s policy role from a near monopoly to a competitor 
for government’s attention.
Public Sector Governance in Australia
102
Secondly, the traditional public service’s identity derived from being clearly 
demarcated from its environment, particularly the private and political 
spheres, and being relatively closed. From the 1980s, these boundaries were 
systematically eroded. The assault on the senior public service was directed at the 
traditional career system. The political executive’s influence could be expanded 
by transforming the officials' position through abolition of permanency and the 
introduction of a senior executive service that offered management flexibility 
and external entry. The shift of the public sector towards private sector practice, 
which had been apparent for over a decade, acquired centrality under Howard’s 
first conservative government of the reform era. Agencies were required to 
identify contestable functions that could be transferred to the private sector, 
unless the public sector added greater value.
A further dimension was the coherence and identity of the public service. On 
the one hand management devolution and then the workplace agenda required 
agencies to be responsible for employment and other matters. The balkanisation 
of the public service was recognised as one possible consequence of a strong 
agency focus. On the other hand, there was a lack of countervailing mechanisms 
for fostering public service integration and identity.
At the same time, the concept of an apolitical public service was maintained 
throughout the reform era by successive governments. Even the leader of a 
government at times unsympathetic to the public service declared commitment 
to a ‘non-partisan and professional public service’ (Howard 1998b). If the 
rhetoric was consistent, the parallel language and action provided the guide 
to changing government thinking about the bureaucracy. While requiring this 
highly responsive system, governments continued to assert the integrity and 
apolitical character of the public service, and the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) 
enshrined this central value.
Although overt political appointments were not much used in Australia, the 
Hawke government’s desire for greater control was substantially realised. The 
combination of strong political direction and changes to the employment 
basis and insularity of the senior public service redistributed power between 
ministers and public servants and produced greater responsiveness. Careers at 
the most senior levels were no longer guaranteed. The promotion of a climate of 
insecurity for senior officials during the Howard government’s first two terms 
moved beyond ‘new government’ behaviour. One diagnosis was ‘personalisation’ 
based on a narrow conception of politicisation — one linking appointments and 
use of the public service for party ends (Weller and Young 2001). In a broader 
sense that includes other dimensions of politicisation, the system might be 
pronounced as politicised (Mulgan 1998).
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The weakened relationship between politicians and public servants surfaced 
as the 2007 election approached. There was private discussion among senior 
officials about the short-term focus of politicians, and eventually strident public 
comment about ad-hoc decision-making by the government in an election year. 
The press continued to accept some degree of ‘politicisation’ as a given (e.g. 
Grattan 2007 on how public servants have been constrained under the Howard 
government), and the debate surfaced again in the exchange that followed the 
then public service commissioner, Andrew Podger’s (2007) reflections on the 
handling of senior appointments, which produced a defence of the record from 
Shergold (2007b).
A telling public disclosure was the declaration of a key central agency, Treasury, 
that it was ignored by the government in key policy fields. The secretary of 
the Treasury, Ken Henry (2007: 13–14), observed that the election year would 
‘test our mettle as apolitical public servants … Our capacity to ensure that our 
work is “responsible”, and not just “responsive”, will be put to the test. How 
successful we are will impact on our integrity as public servants and our long-
term effectiveness’.
The strength of an administrative tradition grounded in Westminster has been 
apparent where governments have overstepped the limits of acceptability 
(Labor’s back peddling on political appointees in 1983–84, the backlash to the 
purge of secretaries by the Coalition in 1996, and the response to the role of 
political advisers in the mid-2000s). System correction was again apparent with 
Rudd’s current and evolving agenda (Halligan 2010b), but the effect of the Rudd 
agenda was a double-edged sword. It reinforced traditional values, a professional 
public service and accountability and transparency; while cutting the size of 
the service and making heavy demands on public servants, including a renewal 
of the emphasis on performance. The trade-off then was that the consolidation 
of the public service and reaffirmation of Westminster principles meant higher 
expectations for a modernised public service. 
Four dimensions of the Labor government’s agenda can be noted (Halligan 2010b). 
First, integrity and accountability comprised two elements: the government’s 
view of the future public service and reinvigorating the Westminster tradition 
(independent and professional public service, merit-based selection, continuity 
of employment, and removal of performance pay). The Office of the Special 
Minister of State was used to pull together and strengthen a range of integrity 
and governance responsibilities under one minister: the public service, codes 
of conduct, privacy and various procedures for handling transparency and 
accountability. 
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Secondly, there was the interest in ‘One APS’. A lament across the service 
has been the limitations of a devolved agency structure for conditions of 
employment. The public service head, Terry Moran (2009), asserted that ‘the 
APS is not a collection of separate institutions. It is a mutually reinforcing and 
cohesive whole’. The prime minister echoed these themes by arguing for a 
stronger collective identity, a greater sense of cohesion and esprit de corps, 
and the need to address constraints on mobility and the disincentives public 
servants encounter in moves between departments (Rudd 2009a; AGRAGA 
2010). 
Thirdly, the public service was being consolidated in conjunction with the 
demise of outsourcing. The Rudd Government sought to reduce dependence on 
external consultancies although the pattern has been variable. Legal services 
were being brought more in house, and the government was reversing a 
reliance on outsourcing of information communications technology to ‘correct 
imbalances’. 
Finally, although the institution of the public service has potentially been 
strengthened by attention to political and private sector relationships and 
traditions, there were elevated expectations for performance and for improved 
innovative policy capacity. The perceived deficit in capacity was a factor 
leading to the review headed by the secretary of PM&C, and Ahead of the Game 
(AGRAGA 2009, 2010; see also chapter 2).
Governance failures and solutions
Governance issues have arisen from the fallout from aspects of new public 
management, weaknesses with corporate governance and strategic focus, 
and public crises over oversight and implementation. Features of new 
public management — such as disaggregation, devolution, outsourcing, and 
multiple services providers — supported specialisation but also encouraged 
fragmentation and reinforced vertical structures. There was also official concern 
with opaque governance. ‘Good governance depends upon transparency of 
authority, accountability and disclosure’ (Shergold 2004b). 
Nevertheless, two extraordinary cases that occurred during the Howard 
government’s fourth term revealed fundamental weaknesses in the internal 
operations of a major department and lack of oversight of a privatised body 
with public policy roles. The first case was one of internal governance failure 
involving the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA), 
and is discussed in the next chapter.
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The second case concerned oversight of privatised public policy, and several 
governance issues that arose. The Australian Wheat Board (AWB) paid kickbacks 
to the Iraqi government in the form of a transport surcharge. The Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) claimed to have been unaware of the nature of 
the AWBs actions. Both DFAT and the Wheat Export Authority (WEA), a statutory 
body responsible for monitoring AWB, were unable to demand documents from 
the AWB, inhibiting their capacity to confirm or certify the AWB’s claims. The 
AWB was found to have faked several of the documents that it had provided to 
DFAT (which were then forwarded to the United Nations (UN)) (Cole 2006). Two 
governance issues stood out: the unwillingness of senior officials and ministers 
to acknowledge awareness or responsibility (including the prime minister’s 
failure to require ministers to accept ministerial responsibility); and the limited 
capacity of DFAT and the WEA to oversee the actions of the AWB (chapter 6). 
Neither could demand documents from AWB nor could they force it to cooperate 
with the UN investigation. Given AWB’s role in representing Australian farmers 
there appeared to be serious gaps in the regulatory framework (see also the 
discussion in chapter 6 and Botterill and McNaughton 2008), and the corporate 
governance issues that arose from making payments in breach of United Nations 
sanctions (Cole 2006: liii, lix).
A deterioration in governance relationships occurred in the fourth term of the 
Howard government. Tensions between politicians and their public service 
advisers increased as party government became disengaged from the public 
service and pragmatic decision-making became a feature of an election year. 
Howard’s mode of governing registered discontent at senior levels within the 
public service with private discussion among senior officials about the policy 
process (Henry 2007) and the lack of strategic focus of politicians. The head 
of the Treasury observed that the government bypassed his key agency even 
though it had developed frameworks for considering climate change and water 
reform. ‘All of us would wish that we had been listened to more attentively 
over the past several years in both of these areas. There is no doubt that policy 
outcomes would have been far superior had our views been more influential. 
That is not just my view; I know that it is increasingly widely shared around 
this town’ (Henry 2007: 6). More generally within the nation, the government 
was widely castigated for decision-making that was capricious, populist, short-
term and ad hoc (Halligan 2008a). 
Equally disturbing for public governance was the apparent loss of impetus as the first-
term Rudd Government similarly experienced an annus horribilis as it compromised 
its agenda in the run up to the 2010 election, and the prime minister forsook policy 
and planning for short-term pragmatism. The turning point was provided by the 
very public implementation failure with two programs: the Home Insulation Program 
and the Building the Education Revolution Scheme (chapter 5).
Public Sector Governance in Australia
106
Conclusion
System governance raises several sets of questions that go to the heart of 
government. Several different models for coordinating the system have been 
outlined. However, the effectiveness of central systems ultimately depends 
on both the political leadership and the capacity of the system to respond. If 
leaders’ aspirations exceed the capacity of the system — apparent under the 
heightened demands of Rudd — this will invariably lead to shortfalls in capacity 
and associated dysfunctions. In contrast, Prime Minister Gillard’s leadership in 
response to the demands of system governance remain elusive. 
The art of system governance requires the mastery of complex vertical 
interrelationships at several levels within central government and nationally, 
the growing horizontal dimensions, and the reconciling of pressures from 
politicians and the environment. If modernisation of the system is undervalued 
and capability development miscalculated, a mismatch is also the result. 
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5 . Departmental Governance
The department of state forms the core unit of the machinery of government at 
Commonwealth and state government levels. As ministerial departments, they 
play a central role in supporting the minister and communicating, directing and 
coordinating within a functional sphere of activity. For this reason, governance 
in and around the department has several dimensions. Departmental governance 
addresses how they handle their internal operations and external relationships.
The roles and operations of departments of state were historically derived 
from the notion of the ministerial department and government machinery that 
was good at forming and communicating policy advice; providing a range of 
administrative routines and activities such as program implementation; and 
which operated within understood boundaries with regard to hierarchy and 
standardisation. The parameters of the traditional model were relaxed, however, 
in the reform era and it became accepted that more flexible bureaucracy and 
adaptive solutions, and the use of third parties, were required within a public 
management focus (see chapter 2). With reform and the emergence of new ideas 
and challenges, including the more explicit engagement with corporate and 
public governance, departmental governance has been revisited over time and 
the core principles refined and mainstreamed.
This consideration of departmental governance examines both the place of the 
department and its internal and external dimensions. It draws on interviews 
with departmental secretaries (appendix 1), and case studies. The cases that 
are referred to reflect the cycle of governance issues that came to the fore over 
the last decade, including whole-of-government approaches (chapter 4), the 
evolving approaches to agency and portfolio relationships (Centrelink and 
the Department of Human Services), and outright governance failure that was 
revealed through public inquiries (e.g. the then Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs (DIMA)).
Governance of the department of state
Departmental governance is shaped by legislative requirements as to the roles 
and responsibilities of agency heads and other matters, such as reporting. Such 
governance depends also on the nature of the department and its responsibilities; 
a secretary’s leadership style will play a role in the development of this culture. 
The immediate public service environment, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, is highly significant for the role of the department. The priorities of 
government, the political salience of issues and the propensity of ministers to 
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intervene are relevant in the short term, but good departmental leadership and 
governance, supported by the emerging significance of stewardship, is expected 
to carry the agency through changing times.
There are both mandatory requirements and permissive expectations that shape 
departmental governance. The first are contained in various legislation, regulations 
and conventions. The second cover guidelines for good governance that may have 
general application, but which are likely to require adaptation to different agency 
contexts. These include internal structures, accountability instruments and 
various systems for handling risk and performance (e.g. APSC 2007c).
The general meaning, and several official conceptions, of governance have 
been raised in chapters 1 and 2. Here, the emphasis is on the departmental 
relevance of those meanings and conceptions. The Australian National Audit 
Office (ANAO) and Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) (2006: 
13) prefer governance to be defined as ‘the set of responsibilities and practices, 
policies and procedures, exercised by an agency’s executive’. At the same 
time, PM&C also employs the term corporate governance in the Requirements 
for Annual Reports for Departments, Executive Agencies and FMA Act Bodies 
(2011: 17) to mean ‘the process by which agencies are directed and controlled. 
It is generally understood to encompass authority, accountability, stewardship, 
leadership, direction and control’. Further, three of the corporate governance 
items specified are derived from an indicative list that the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) uses for reporting. A ‘Statement of main corporate governance 
practices in place’ is a mandatory requirement for a departmental annual report, 
although the specified structures and processes are merely suggested.1 Similarly, 
the auditor-general and the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) appear 
to be comfortable using the terms governance, corporate governance and good 
governance interchangeably (McPhee 2008a: 4; APSC 2010a: 102–03).
It is not surprising, therefore, that those secretaries who were interviewed for 
this project (see chapter 3) did not adopt a uniform view of corporate governance 
reporting. While these official views exist, it is clear that (Tucker 2010: 124–25): 
No approach to corporate governance in the public sector is mandated. 
Rather a system has been allowed to develop without central prescription 
… [S]ecretaries have been left to their own devices as to how to develop 
and apply corporate governance in their departments. As a result no 
centrally sanctioned view of corporate governance has emerged, and no 
uniform departmental reporting regime has been applied. 
1 The traditional country model for Australia, and the United Kingdom, also accords centrality to the term as 
in the code of practice, Corporate Governance in Central Government Departments (Her Majesty’s Treasury 2005).
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Because many secretaries had been accustomed to operating under the devolved 
departmental system, they did not necessarily support central responsibility for 
directing corporate governance.
Department of state
The department of state is recognised in the Australian Constitution, and forms 
the core of the machinery of government and the basis of portfolio governance. 
The current 19 departments of state (a 20th department, Veteran’s Affairs, is 
located within the Department of Defence portfolio) are also the centrepiece of 
portfolio governance. 
Departments vary in functions, size and complexity. Two main organising features 
are whether a department’s functions are primarily cross-agency or not; and whether 
the department specialises in one role or combines several (policy, program delivery, 
regulation). In the first case, it is either a line department or central agency, although 
several combine features of both. Departments normally have a significant policy focus, 
but they may not have notable service delivery responsibilities. The complications in 
the mix of features are illustrated by one secretary’s observation that his department, 
and its corporate governance requirements, differed from others because it was an 
old-fashioned corporate organisation and lacked a big administrative program. It was 
complex rather than large, the majority of its work being about policy with only an 
element of service delivery.
The departmental secretary
The secretary holds a key position as head of the department of state,2 which 
is the cornerstone of Westminster bureaucratic systems (see also chapter 1). 
Extensive delegations to the secretary strengthen the position and organisation. 
The secretary’s role is quite explicit under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) 
(PS Act), the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) (FMA 
Act) and other legislation. The secretary administers the department under the 
minister and is responsible for its management. The main roles of secretaries are 
(AGRAGA 2010: 47):
•	 principal official policy advisor to the minister;
•	 manager, ensuring delivery of government programs and collaboration to 
achieve whole-of-government outcomes within their portfolio;
•	 leader with a stewardship role within their department; and
•	 Australian Public Service (APS)-wide stewardship, discharged in partnership 
with other secretaries and the APS Commissioner.
2 In some departments, the position of secretary is referred to as the chief executive officer.
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The responsibilities of departmental secretaries include complying with the FMA 
Act, the PS Act and portfolio-specific directions and legislation (which includes 
‘efficient, effective and ethical use’ of resources under the FMA Act (section 44). 
Secretaries are expected to maintain clear intra-portfolio communication, the 
method of which should be negotiated with heads of agencies, and to engage 
with stakeholders, particularly regarding departmental core activities. There 
is also an expectation of familiarity with key project management, human 
capital and information and communication technology (ICT) systems, and a 
commitment to the appropriate implementation and maintenance of systems 
(AGRAGA 2010: 47; see also the Public Service Amendment Bill 2012).
Secretaries may be specialists who head a single department (such as Attorney-
General’s or Treasury) or generalists who head several departments over the 
course of their career (Smith 2010). In late 2011, only four women held the 
position of secretary. 
Governance conceptions of secretaries
Corporate governance has at least two dimensions, one addressing performance 
of the organisation, the other conformance to legal requirements and 
accountability (Edwards and Clough 2005). As indicated below, in interviews, 
secretaries adopted different starting points in response to questions regarding 
their understanding of corporate governance: compliance, responsiveness/
instrumentalist, and cultural. There were also internal and external dimensions. 
Overall, compliance was more salient than performance in conceptions of 
governance.
In interviews that were conducted during the period of John Howard’s Coalition 
government (1996–2007), secretaries focused on compliance and custodianship 
as being central to corporate governance. This was variously expressed as:
•	 the combination of structures and processes to ensure appropriate 
custodianship and advice within the context of an organisation;
•	 implementing a process that protects public money and makes heads of 
departments accountable for advice and decision making; and
•	 governance as a system and framework of controls and measures that provides 
a true and fair reflection in the financial statement. In signing off the annual 
report to the minister and parliament there is need for confidence in the 
accuracy and fairness of the outcomes described and the range of indicators 
and ethical details provided about departmental operations.
The notion of a governance as a framework that focused on internal governance 
of organisations was expressed as important:
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•	 governance as the framework for establishing various mechanisms for 
decision making, including the Audit Committee. This goes beyond having 
mechanisms in place to answer questions on issues such as membership and 
timing; and
•	 a framework to guide activities. It is a set of arrangements to shape what the 
department and its officers do in carrying out government policy. Relevant to 
this is the Finance Governance Arrangements document that was written in 
terms of the outcomes of good governance that were proposed by the Review 
of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (Uhrig 
review).
Accountability roles were seen to be most apparent in arrangements for defining 
specific accountabilities and responsibilities for implementing government 
policy and administering legislation. These cover public accountability, lines of 
reporting, and responsibilities for financial management and staff management.
In interviews, two secretaries adopted distinctive positions, taking culture and 
responsiveness as their respective starting points. Corporate governance was 
acknowledged as being about ‘the systems and the structure and the culture, 
which you establish in a deliberate way to discharge your responsibilities 
including your accountability but also your responsibilities to administer and 
to deliver’. Governance, however, ‘obviously forms around structures but I 
generally don’t like to start with structures’. Corporate governance starts with: 
‘softer concepts, including the culture of the place and the ethics and proprieties 
… about how things should be done’. This is followed by the systems and the 
structures that comprise governance in the development of a collegiate culture.
The starting point of the second position was as the government’s instrument: 
‘Corporate governance is 1) being responsive to the objectives of the government 
of the day, and 2) having systems and processes in place to meet those objectives. 
Part of that is the APS Values and appropriate ethics, and part of it is meeting 
cost-effectiveness and productivity objectives’.
In secretaries’ formulations of corporate governance, then, there were both 
common elements and also distinctive variations that suggested differences in 
leadership styles. This partly centred on how they viewed compliance — as a 
foremost consideration or not — and also their framing of governance in terms 
of both hard and soft elements.
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Internal management and governance
As mentioned above, structures and processes are suggested, but not specifically 
prescribed, in Requirements for Annual Reports (PM&C 2011). Departments 
normally have between three and six committees that have some relevance to 
corporate governance, although departmental practices vary widely. 
All departments have some variation on an executive management committee, 
board or group (see also the discussion in chapter 3). These are invariably 
advisory committees, although a secretary may give them more latitude to 
contribute to departmental processes. There appear to be two models, at least 
on paper. A decision-making conception was present with a small number of 
departments: for example, ‘to provide key policy and management decision 
making’; ‘the executive committee made decisions on departmental policy, 
financial and operational issues’; and ‘the senior decision-making body in the 
department is the executive committee’. In line with the provisions of the FMA 
Act, advising the secretary is, however, the dominant approach. Examples of 
this approach include:
•	 advice to the secretary on overall direction, priorities, management and 
performance;
•	 oversight of corporate governance, accountability, operational effectiveness 
and monitoring of the financial performance of the department and its 
programs;
•	 provision of corporate leadership and strategic direction, setting of goals for 
the department and management of its overall performance; and
•	 a system that devolves ultimately to the secretary’s accountability with some 
structures that advise and assist with decision making.
A secretary’s explanation of how an intermediate structure worked was:
The executive board here is a creation of mine — there isn’t a legal 
requirement to have one. It’s something I’ve decided to have to help the 
chances that the decisions I make have some buy-in. It’s an opportunity 
for me to get counsel from senior people. At the end of the day I’m 
accountable. Formally it’s advisory but I don’t really run it that way — it’s 
a collegial practice. But I don’t think they [the board members] are under 
any illusion — they are helping me to discharge my accountabilities. But 
I do like to have full support.
Similarly, all departments have an audit committee, sometimes with the term 
‘risk’ included in the title. It is now well-established practice to make external 
appointments to these committees. Beyond these committees, however, there 
is no consistency in the number or type of committees a department engages, 
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including the secretary’s leadership group, departmental operations executive, 
audit, and ICT committees. In addition to the core executive committee, a 
broader advisory group may be used.
There is evidence from State of Service reports for APS agencies (a term that is 
broader than departments) that communication was ineffective between senior 
leaders and other employees (only 35 per cent agreed it was effective) (APSC 2008: 
208, also 2007d). The APSC expressed concern about the lack of improvement 
because the area had been cited in recent reports as requiring attention whereas, 
for 2008, there were ‘continuing lower levels of dissatisfaction being recorded in 
the area of senior leaders, and in some instances higher levels of dissatisfaction’ 
(2008: 110). Although agencies reported that policies and procedures existed 
for ensuring information was available, many staff disagreed that was the case. 
With the exception of meetings, ‘departments relied on passive mechanisms 
to distribute their corporate governance information. This typically consisted 
of placing the information, along with large amounts of other administrative 
information, on a departmental Intranet site’ (Tucker 2010: 141). Although 
communication on corporate governance occurred below the secretary, this was 
mixed and focused on senior executives. ‘Staff below SES are largely left to 
their own devices to find information and while this is for the most part readily 
available and accessible, staff do not afford this activity a high priority because 
they perceive it less important than dealing with what they believe to be more 
pressing tasks’ (Tucker 2010: 142).
Governance was more problematic in dispersed and large departments. One 
secretary posed the challenge of developing a good governance culture and the 
acceptance of governance down and through a large organisation of 2000–3000 
staff across a dozen or more locations. The secretary of a large and amorphous 
agency perceived it to contain several governance systems over which it had not 
been possible to establish firm direction.
Portfolio governance
Portfolio organisation and management has developed following the 1987 
changes to cabinet and the departmental structure (Brooke 1993; Podger 2009: 
90). A distinction was drawn between cabinet ministers and junior ministers 
in the overall ministry, and was reflected in each portfolio (i.e. each had a 
portfolio minister and one or more junior ministers). The department provided 
the centrepiece of the portfolio that comprised other authorities and agencies. 
Budgeting and prioritising were now more clearly focused at the portfolio level, 
however, the level of coordination and integration varies between portfolios 
(Podger 2009).
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Portfolios come in different configurations and sizes. Some have significant 
authorities under the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 
(Cth) (CAC Act) (e.g. Broadband, Communication and the Digital Economy 
holds authority for the Australian Broadcasting Commission, Australia Post 
and Special Broadcasting Service), while others have responsibility for major 
agencies that are subject to the FMA Act (e.g. Human Services is responsible for 
Centrelink and Medicare; the Treasury portfolio contains 15 agencies including 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Australian 
Taxation Office, Commonwealth Grants Commission and the Productivity 
Commission). Several others, however, have relatively few portfolio demands.







Source: Based on Finance categories: DFD 2009.
The resurrection of a more comprehensive ministerial department and the core 
public service followed the Uhrig review (2003, and discussed in chapter 2) into 
the corporate governance of statutory authorities and office-holders. The post-
Uhrig review agenda was, in response to the proliferation of non-departmental 
organisations and questions about their governance, for ministerial departments 
to have tighter and more direct control over public agencies (chapter 9). The 
array of Commonwealth public bodies had been comprehensively mapped and 
typed by the Department of Finance and Administration (DFA 2005d). With 
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departments of state employing only 22 per cent of public sector staff, most 
worked in approximately 180 agencies, many with statutory independence. The 
official concern was with different legislative bases, constitutions (boards or not) 
and opaque governance. For effective implementation, it was evident that there 
needed to be clarity of purpose, powers and relationships between ministers, 
public servants and boards. ‘Good governance depends upon transparency 
of authority, accountability and disclosure. There should be no doubts, no 
ambiguities’ (Shergold 2004b).
One means of achieving the recommended control was to revert to 
departmentalisation. This was expressed through absorbing statutory authorities 
and reclaiming control of agencies with hybrid boards that did not accord with 
a particular corporate (and therefore private sector) governance prescription.3
Centrelink and portfolio change
The case of Centrelink covers questions about the advantages of departmental 
versus agency delivery, how to handle relationships between departments and 
agencies, and levels of autonomy and integration. All three are susceptible to 
changing fashions and agenda. The original concept for Centrelink was of an 
agency that would merge two networks for social security and unemployment 
that were acquired from the departments that went on to become the agency’s 
two major clients.4 The mandate became that of a one-stop-shop delivery agency 
designed to provide services to purchasing departments, but with the potential 
to serve other departments as well (Halligan 2008b).
The agency was located within the core public service and within the Family and 
Community Services (FaCS) portfolio, but was a separate entity from the FaCS 
Department with its own legislation, accounting and reporting requirements. 
In contrast to the standard departmental model, Centrelink was responsible to 
the Minister for Family and Community Services through an appointed board 
of directors, which gave strategic direction and set the overall objectives and 
business rules. The client departments were the purchasers of services that 
were detailed in negotiated agreements with the agency. Each client — usually 
a policy department — negotiated a purchase price for specified services that 
Centrelink agreed to undertake. From the point of view of the primary purchaser, 
3 Similar agendas for rationalising non-departmental organisations have been apparent in other Anglo-
Saxon systems (Christensen and Laegreid 2006).
4 Centrelink was formally established in mid 1997. The agency acquired from the Department of Social 
Security the delivery of government services to recipients of social welfare benefits and services. The 
Department of Social Security’s other responsibilities were transferred to a new Department of Family and 
Community Services. By 2005–06, Centrelink accounted for $63.5 billion, or about 31 per cent of total 
Commonwealth expenditure, and employed close to 27,000 staff who were spread across over 1000 service 
delivery points throughout Australia.  
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FaCS, the only direct formal relationship with Centrelink was established by 
the agreement, which detailed the services, funding arrangements, performance 
outcomes and reporting mechanisms.
The broader reform agenda of integrated governance that came into play in the 
2000s, as a result of the Uhrig review into the corporate governance of statutory 
authorities and office-holders (see chapter 4, this volume), included resurrecting 
a more comprehensive ministerial department through absorbing bodies or 
extending controls. The review included two delivery agencies: the Health 
Insurance Commission and Centrelink. The Uhrig review’s (2003) prescriptions 
of either a Board template or an executive management template had direct 
implications for boards that fitted neither. 
The impact of the integrated governance agenda on Centrelink was 
comprehensive, as all dimensions were impacted: the relationship to 
ministerial direction, stronger ministerial departments in relation to policy 
leadership and control over public bodies, enhanced central agency capacity 
for monitoring service delivery and implementation, and the clarification of 
what constituted appropriate corporate governance for agencies like Centrelink 
with an advisory board. Two agendas were operating: one addressed agency 
governance and ministerial accountability and tempering the high levels of 
devolution in the public service. There were also Centrelink-specific matters 
that addressed governance issues, such as the operation of a purchaser–provider 
relationship within the same portfolio; governance by board and minister; and 
interdepartmental tensions (Halligan 2008b). 
The position of Centrelink changed from 2004 when it was subsumed within 
a new parent department, and its board was disbanded. The creation of the 
Department of Human Services within the Finance portfolio was the most 
significant post-Uhrig review structural change. As a small agency, Human 
Services was structured to have responsibility for strategically directing, 
coordinating and brokering improvements to service delivery for six agencies 
operating under direct ministerial control and one advisory board.5 The 
rationale was to improve the delivery of services within a whole-of-government 
approach that involved better collaboration and performance, and to strengthen 
the vertical (ministerial and departmental control) and horizontal dimensions 
(delivery network across agencies). The CEO of Centrelink, and five other 
agencies retained responsibility for day-to-day operations, but Human Services 
now provided ‘assurance to the minister on cross-agency issues, the quality of 
outcomes, and the achievements of the government’s objectives’ (Department of 
Human Services 2005: 13). 
5 Six agencies delivered services and payments that accounted for over $90 billion and also included the 
Child Support Agency, Health Services Australia and Medicare Australia.
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Centrelink (along with Medicare Australia) was subsequently moved towards 
formal integration in the Department of Human Services. Centrelink retained its 
identity (as expressed through the brand and business lines) and a distinct role 
as expressed through the chief executive. The back-office functions of Centrelink 
and Medicare were combined: finance, human resources, ICT platforms, 
procurement and property management. The rationale was both efficiency and 
seamless service delivery, facilitating co-location of offices and one entry point. 
The official position on the integration, according to the minister (Plibersek 
2011) is that it forms: ‘part of the Government’s Service Delivery Reform agenda 
to make it easier for Australians to get the services they need in a way that 
suits their circumstances. Service Delivery Reform will see … more one-stop-
shops, more self service options for customers and more intensive support for 
the people who need it most’. The official position echoed that for Centrelink in 
its heyday as a somewhat autonomous delivery agency. 
Looking at the longer term, the tendency of the Commonwealth to prefer the 
ministerial department is apparent. Accordingly, the cycle over 15 years has 
moved from integrated department to multi-purpose delivery agency to an 
integrated department. The circular process was complete in mid 2011 when 
Centrelink became integrated within the Department of Human Services. 
External accountability and relationships
The main external relationships of departments are depicted in Figure 5.2. 
A distinction needs to be drawn between those departments that are part 
of government, those that are based in the broader machinery (oversight 
agencies) and those that are located outside (citizens and groups in society). 
The relationships with the political executive and parliament (under oversight 
agencies) are of particular importance for formal reporting and accountability. 
Central agencies were discussed in chapter 4. Relationships with other APS 
agencies are covered under collaborative governance, below.
Accountability relationships
The public service environment has altered in distinctive ways across the last 
three decades, with major implications for departmental accountability. It has 
changed first from the traditional focus on inputs and process to a management 
environment that emphasises outputs and results, and then to a market 
environment emphasising competitive elements (e.g. contestability), choice, 
outsourcing and contracts. This produced the greater emphasis on outcomes 
as well as outputs. Associated with each major change in the environment has 
been an extension of accountability responsibilities from the traditional core 
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(i.e. ministerial responsibility and the departmental hierarchy) that featured 
ministerial responsibility to cover successively new modes of external scrutiny 
(e.g. through new administrative law), accountability management, and 
more recently market accountability, performance accountability and shared 
accountability within governance and collaborative contexts (chapter 1).










A further dynamic in the different accountability relationships is the tension 
between the internal and external domains that are defined in terms of different 
accountability mechanisms (Campbell and Halligan 1993). Accountability that is 
internal and formal is the immediate environment of the public agency, and has 
both managerial and political dimensions that are hierarchical in character. External 
mechanisms have the capacity to operate independently of the government — 
parliament, the audit office, the appeals tribunal and the court — and press for 
more exacting public reporting and accountability. Much of the activity around 
public accountability issues reflects containment and control within the political/
bureaucratic hierarchy up to the accountable minister, or tensions between 
internal and external agenda and pressures. Over time, the layers of accountability 
have multiplied (Halligan and Sadleir 2011; Mulgan 2003).
Departmental secretaries report to their minister on a regular basis and annually, 
as per their performance agreement. For parliament (and the public) Portfolio 
Budget Statements (PBS) provide details of the proposed allocation of resources 
to government outcomes. They are an important means by which the political 
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executive and its departments and agencies are held accountable to parliament. 
The departmental annual report informs parliament and the public about 
performance against the outcomes and programs.
A secretary may take the demands of the role in his or her stride, but three 
factors may, at times, weigh heavily on individual performance. The first is the 
tradition of rigorous accountability with the heavy demands of reporting and 
the high level of scrutiny. The second is the interface with the centre where 
ambiguity in the relationship with the prime minister’s office and PM&C 
can produce disputes because of different perspectives and ways in which 
individuals serve the same prime minister. The third derives from the pressures 
that may arise in a relationship with a minister where different conceptions 
emerge about the location of boundary between their roles and the extent to 
which it is reasonable to exercise political influence (see cases in Tiernan and 
Weller 2010: 146–47).
Accountability in the Department of Defence
The case of Defence brings into relief central questions of accountability. The 
department is large, with multifarious components, but it also has the complexity 
of the diarchy, consisting of the department secretary and the chief of the 
defence force reporting to the Minister of Defence, superimposed. The seemingly 
intractable governance problems of a conglomerate department like Defence 
have been left unresolved for years, but continue to become more pressing. The 
structure of the diarchy is cascaded down the organisation. Defence, however, 
has continued to be ‘a single organisation of many parts. Each part has its own 
culture and history from which it draws capability … The continuing legacy of 
Defence’s origins in five departments and separate services has left defence with 
complex accountability systems.’ With the increasing demand for improved 
performance within tight budgetary conditions the accountability arrangements 
have come under greater stress (Department of Defence 2010: 11.1, 11.4).
Defence is candid about these failures damaging government and its performance, 
and the need therefore ‘to redesign its accountability system to strengthen its 
capacity to drive better performance’ (Department of Defence 2010: 11.5). The 
department has been the subject of an unpublished report to the department 
about how to undertake improvements because it was unable to assure the 
minister that the condition of accountability was not having a deleterious effect 
on the organisation (Parnell and Dodd 2010: 9).
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Collaboration across departments (and beyond)
Questions of accountability, responsibility and effectiveness also arise in the 
handling of new forms of collaboration. The whole-of-government movement, 
which is discussed in chapter 4, has evolved into the language of collaborative 
governance (O’Flynn and Wanna 2008; APSC 2009c; Blackman et al 2010). The 
spectrum of arrangements ranges from policy design through to the management 
and integration of service delivery (e.g. APSC 2009c: 119). 
The effectiveness of different approaches to collaboration depends both on the 
complexity of the policy or program task and the way it can be configured. In 
practice, there has been a wide spectrum of experiments ranging from crisis 
management through to the challenges of coordinating the administration of 
Indigenous programs and services (chapter 6 and Gray and Sanders 2006). A 
number of critical enablers and major barriers to effective whole-of-government 
operationalisation have been identified. In practice, significant tensions and 
paradoxes can arise from attempts to work across boundaries (O’Flynn et al 2011).
Of the several mechanisms of collaboration, the interdepartmental committee 
(IDC) was a central component of traditional machinery, numbering as many as 
180 IDCs in the 1970s, mainly between departments with responsibilities ranging 
from routine administration, adjudication to policy. The policy IDCs (normally 
between 30 and 50), displayed two significant characteristics: operating as a 
collection of delegates who defended the interests of their department and tended 
to search for a consensus outcome (Painter and Carey 1979). IDCs have retained a 
recognised presence in the 2000s, and their traditional roles are recognised, but 
they are no longer the only mode of cross-departmental coordination for program 
design, review and management; new structural innovations are emerging for 
strengthening collective and cross-portfolio coordination (MAC 2004).
Task forces originally rose to prominence as a means of avoiding the defects of 
IDCs and as short-term vehicles for giving focus to government agendas. The 
task force became ‘semi-formalised as a device to develop new policy or to deal 
with significant, urgent issues’ (MAC 2004: 29). Whereas, once, task forces were 
distinguished informally from other cross-agency structures, the understanding 
was entrenched of the task force as ‘a discrete, time-and-purpose limited unit 
responsible for producing a result in its own right’. Their capacity for operating 
independently from policy departments was strengthened by PM&C being, in 
many cases, assigned administrative responsibility for them (Hamburger 2007). 
The traditional mechanisms — the cabinet (of ministers) and the central agencies 
— are of course prominent in coordination. Task forces became relatively 
institutionalised and addressed significant issues but, according to APSC figures, 
they only involved a relatively small proportion of senior executive service/
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executive level public servants (14 per cent). Joint teams (regarded as longer 
lasting structures that blend functions across portfolios) accounted for 16 per 
cent. Membership of interdepartmental committees continued to be the most 
significant activity (29 per cent) (APSC 2007d: 230).
There are important questions about accountability and effective reporting 
where a number of departments and agencies are collaborating under horizontal 
governance (chapter 1), and more so when third parties are involved. Tucker 
(2010) examines the case of illegal fishing in Australian waters, which involved 
10 agencies with different roles and objectives, each of which was focused on 
reporting to their minister. The sharing of accountability is now on the reform 
agenda (AGRAGA 2010) (see chapter 10, this volume), and may redefine some 
relationships where the arrangement extends beyond devices for satisfying 
compliance.
External focus
Consultation with external stakeholders — participatory governance — is 
reported as increasing, with program delivery more often the subject of such 
consultation. Senior and mid-level executives had substantial interaction with 
industry and contractors/consultants, but modest experience of consultation 
with communities and citizens (APSC 2010a: 57). Major delivery agencies 
make extensive use of citizen feedback (i.e. satisfaction surveys) (APSC 2009c: 
128–34). Ahead of the Game: Blueprint for the Reform of Australian Government 
Administration places great emphasis on relating to citizens and recommends a 
coordinated approach to surveying attitudes (AGRAGA 2010) (see chapter 6, this 
volume). The head of the public service has concluded that ‘Many departments 
are currently not very outwardly focused’ (Moran 2010a: 11).
Oversight agencies and parliament
The external bodies of oversight and review — parliament, ombudsman, 
audit and administrative appeals — operate outside the direct control of 
government, and therefore contribute important and often public judgments 
about departmental governance. The ANAO produces regular performance and 
financial statement audits and guidelines that shape directly and indirectly 
much of what departments do. 
The Commonwealth parliament exercises its oversight role most explicitly 
through its committee system. Three basic types of committee — scrutiny, 
investigation and legislation — produced 3220 reports over three decades 
(Halligan, Miller and Power 2007). There are regular instances of parliamentary 
committees having some form of policy impact through the much more 
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commonplace activities of scrutiny and review. Officials in the executive branch 
continuously adjust their plans when they know in advance that these plans and 
the proposals that derive from them are going to be subjected to close committee 
examination. These intra-governmental scrutiny mechanisms can be contrasted 
with scrutiny of business through the market and corporate regulators — thus 
reinforcing that accountability is important but manifestly different across the 
public and private sectors.
Issues in public governance
The main issues of public governance can be divided into those that derive 
from the conduct of relationships within organisations and those with external 
actors. Internal issues arise from communication and collaboration problems 
between parts of the organisation (e.g. divisions and branches; or up and down 
the hierarchy). The lack of attention to ‘soft’ questions as opposed to the ‘hard’ 
types is a source of weakness in corporate governance (chapter 1). 
The external influence on issues commonly stems from poor relationships with 
the minister and/or the ministerial office. The neglect of other stakeholders is 
also a source of difficulties. According to the APS commissioner’s interpretation 
(Sedgwick 2010a: xvi): 
History suggests that various components of the APS will experience 
stress for which they are unprepared at different times— either because 
the organisational culture has become too fixed (as was arguably the 
case earlier this decade in the then Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs …), or because they were dealing 
with the unexpected (arguably the case in the more recent incidents 
of Motor Dealer Financing Arrangements — OzCar and the Home 
Insulation Program).
Issues with accountability and reporting arise quite often and may be addressed 
through rationalising the governance of different types of agency and authorities, 
as discussed in chapter 4, or as instanced by the cases of Defence and Centrelink, 
discussed above and, DIMA, discussed below. 
A feature of issues with accountability, which frequently acquire public 
prominence and are then subject to an official review, is that they encompass 
a number of distinct elements that have the cumulative effect of producing a 
breakdown in governance (compare international corporate governance failures 
where multiple corporate governance issues were significant in cases such as the 
collapse of Enron Corporation: McPhee 2008: 16). The DIMA and procurement 
cases illustrate this complexity.
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Internal governance failure in DIMA
The case of DIMA demonstrates a range of governance issues — in particular 
a focus on structure and legal compliance rather than the appropriateness of 
decisions — and the vulnerability of governance where a complex set of factors 
comes into play.
It is rare for departments of state to fail. Policy failure is depicted as ubiquitous 
(Bovens and ‘t Hart 1996) with a range of programs, projects and public works, 
and the odd systemic failure is evident in government departments (Gregory 
1998), but more usually of a specialised nature. The DIMA experienced an 
internal breakdown of basic operating procedures, culture and leadership in 
the mid 2000s.6 The department had acquired a high profile because of the 
government focus on keeping illegal immigrants out and locating and deporting 
those that were already in Australia. The failure of governance in DIMA was 
revealed through a succession of inquiries into the handling of the detention 
of citizens. The then head of the public service, Peter Shergold, is reported 
as describing ‘the cases as the worse thing that has happened in the public 
service in recent years’ and blaming the failures on public service deficiencies. 
He is quoted as saying that in addition to failures in ICT systems and record 
keeping: ‘It was a failure of public administration … it was failure in some ways 
of executive leadership’ (ABC 2006).
The first investigation was the Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Immigration 
Detention of Cornelia Rau (Palmer 2005), which arose out of the illegal detention 
and deportation of an Australian citizen. The second involved the unlawful 
detention and removal from Australia of another citizen, Vivian Alvarez 
(Commonwealth Ombudsman 2005). Palmer reported an astounding range of 
weaknesses, flaws, and disconnects within an overall managerial approach that 
emphasised process and had an ‘assumptive culture’ (2005: x, 164–68).
In light of the Rau and Alvarez affairs, the government referred 247 immigration 
matters to the Commonwealth Ombudsman for investigation. The ombudsman, 
in several individual and one synoptic reports (2007), examined how and where 
the department made mistakes, discussed 10 lessons of public administration, 
including maintaining quality records, adequate controls on exercise of coercive 
powers, active management of difficult cases, removing obstacles to inter-agency 
exchange of information, managing complexity in decision making, checking 
for warning signs of bigger problems and control of administrative drift.
In order to account for the layers of complexity in the DIMA case, an interpretative 
framework covers four perspectives that include corporate governance and 
6 For a fuller treatment of the case, see Tony Tucker’s (2010) analysis.
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closely related dimensions: the rule of law, new public management (NPM), 
political management and public governance (Halligan and Tucker 2008). Only 
the governance aspects can be examined here.
DIMA’s roles of simultaneously encouraging and discouraging the entry of 
people to Australia attracted diverse staff to the organisation. The gatekeeper 
role, especially in compliance areas, appealed to law-enforcement professionals 
who frequently held strong views about protecting Australia. They needed 
leadership that carefully balanced the gatekeeper role with the actual views 
of government. This required corporate governance arrangements that engaged 
the organisation’s owners (i.e. the minister) to ensure that the correct outcomes 
were pursued. It was the corporate governance leadership arrangements that set 
the tone for the culture of the department (Halligan and Tucker 2008). 
Corporate governance arrangements were designed inter alia to insulate public 
agencies from failure and, in DIMA’s case, they might have worked if both 
structural (i.e. formal) and behavioural (or informal) elements had been taken 
into account. However, Palmer (2005: x) found that the department’s approach 
to implementing complex detention policy was ‘process rich’ and ‘outcomes 
poor’. In Tucker’s interviews, it emerged that staff perceptions of corporate 
governance ‘reflected the mechanistic, process-driven nature of its operations’, 
and a focus on structural elements — e.g. compliance with law — rather 
than behavioural issues of ‘correct’ decision making (Tucker 2010: 170). The 
resulting culture in the compliance and detention areas produced decisions, 
according to Tucker, ‘that were lawful, but not necessarily fair’. How lawfulness 
was defined was mainly up to the staff. However, Palmer (2005: ix), concluded 
that DIMA staff in these areas had the authority ‘to exercise exceptional, even 
extraordinary, powers. That they should be permitted and expected to do so 
without adequate training, without proper management and oversight, with 
poor information systems, and with no genuine quality assurance and restraint 
on the exercise of these powers is of concern’. He was unable to comprehend 
how these arrangements were allowed to continue over several years.
Senior executives reflected DIMA ambivalence towards corporate governance. 
One viewed corporate governance as a process control, reinforcing the traditional 
public service structures and largely unchanged from what existed prior to 
NPM: ‘The rhetoric is new but … we spend a lot more time talking about it than 
getting on and doing it’. Another, expressed a more rounded understanding of 
corporate governance, but thought that the arrangements needed improvement 
because they weren’t ‘visible enough … Why aren’t issues on corporate 
governance being distributed to staff? There is no buy-in’ (quoted in Tucker 
2010: 174). Departmental attitudes suggested that corporate governance was 
considered a passing fad from which DIMA would take what it needed, and 
leave the rest. A senior respondent observed that he was not interested in public 
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administration: ‘[I’m] interested in results for government, results for clients, 
improving the way we do our work. We are a bread and butter department. I’m 
not too fussed about APSC and ANAO models. They are useful to some if they 
have the time … We use it when appropriate’ (quoted in Tucker 2010: 173). 
Following government action to restructure the department, all senior staff were 
replaced. By 2007, the new secretary reported that the department was back 
on track under new leadership (Metcalfe 2007). The DIMA case had broader 
implications for other departments (see the APSC 2007a, 2007c response), 
and produced a major reform agenda to correct the litany of deficiencies in 
departmental governance.
Procurement and program governance
Among the numerous issues of public policy that were prominent in 2010, the 
Green Loans Program and the Home Insulation Program (HIP) were accorded 
extensive scrutiny through a series of inquiries that included commissioned 
reports, ANAO and parliamentary committee reviews, and a departmental 
response covering both programs.
The Green Loans Program derived from a Labor government election commitment 
and was launched with the purpose of assisting families with installing solar, 
water saving and energy efficient products. It entailed offering householders 
a free home sustainability assessment and, on the basis of an action plan for 
reducing energy and water use, an interest-free ‘green loan’ of up to $10,000. The 
then Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (DEWHA) 
was the responsible agency. A range of services was procured in designing and 
rolling out the program between 2008 and 2009 (Faulkner 2010).
By late 2009, concerns had arisen about the program, and four reviews 
were eventually conducted, including ones by the Senate’s Environment, 
Communications and the Arts References Committee (yet to present its final report) 
and the ANAO (2010). The Faulkner inquiry (2010: 3) reported an extensive 
lack of compliance with procurement guidelines and regulations, weaknesses 
in the contracting process and shortcomings in program arrangements. The 
key factors that contributed to poor procurement practices and outcomes were 
multiple. The first was the absence of effective program leadership. This was 
attributed in part to high turnover at branch-head level (and, to a lesser extent, 
other executive positions), and the inadequate levels of monitoring, supervising 
and advising of program staff by senior managers and leaders in the department. 
Ultimate responsibility lay with senior leadership in the department.
Secondly, there was a failure to establish a ‘Program Centred Governance 
Model’. Without such a governance model, insufficient attention was given 
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to program management and, consequently, there was a lack of definition of 
accountability. There was also a lack of engagement with corporate functions 
in the department during design and implementation of the program. Other 
issues were insufficient resourcing and skills within the loans team and the 
appropriate use of expertise during the program design phase. The final issue 
was the inadequate communication between the program team, on the one hand, 
and the department’s executive, central corporate services, and the ministers’ 
office on the other (Faulkner 2010: 4, 34–42). 
The ANAO (2010: 18) concluded that the primary reason for administration 
problems with the Green Loans Program was the: 
absence of effective governance by DEWHA during the program’s 
design and early implementation. DEWHA had no previous experience 
in designing and delivering [such] a program ... As a multi-faceted 
‘greenfields’ program with a fixed budget and variable (and untested) 
demand, the Green Loans program required greater oversight than the 
department’s business-as-usual activities. 
The Home Insulation Program (HIP) was designed to improve the energy 
efficiency of homes, to generate economic stimulus and to provide support 
for jobs and small business. It was part of an Energy Efficient Homes Package 
within the Nation Building and Jobs Plan, which was the Rudd government’s 
response to the global financial crisis (Hawke 2010). It was the subject of a 
review by Allan Hawke, which included the provision of ‘high level insights 
into the effectiveness of program governance’, and covered responsibilities 
of relevant agencies and states and territories. The report commented that 
complex relationships existed, particularly between governments. ‘Unlike other 
components of the Nation Building and Jobs Plan, the HIP had no established 
pathway for national delivery. Oversight and reporting arrangements were part 
of those designed for delivery of the Nation Building and Jobs Plan, which had 
some unique features’ (Hawke 2010: 11). 
The ANAO concluded its review with the factors affecting the success of 
program’s implementation (ANAO 2010: 175):
if it receives strong executive-level support, and there is a sound 
governance framework in place to oversight progress and respond … to 
any unexpected variations in performance. Governance arrangements 
need to be tailored to the requirements of the program with clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities, including decision-making responsibilities. 
This is important for allowing appropriate mobilisation of resources and 
addressing emerging problems in a timely and effective manner.
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It goes on to observe that ‘effective governance arrangements will incorporate 
a clear reporting framework that provides for accurate, reliable and relevant 
information to key stakeholders to assist decision-making on strategic priorities’. 
The reporting requirements need to reflect the program risks in relation to the 
administrative demands from data collection and analysis, and the targeting of 
audit and compliance (ANAO 2010: 175).
Directions for departmental governance in the 
2010s
Departmental governance post-Ahead of the Game
The broad significance for the public service of Ahead of the Game has been 
discussed in chapter 2. For departments also, there are indications that they 
may face a new environment comprising characteristics that are either emerging 
or increasingly prominent in ideas and practice internationally. They have in 
common both a more open system and greater, if selective, oversight. The overall 
impact of transparency, open government, partnering and citizen engagement 
and feedback means new dimensions of responsiveness and collaboration are 
required.
A second theme is the new forms of oversight that are apparent here and in 
other Anglophone countries: reviews of departments, the role of external 
appointments and incipient use of boards for agencies. Ahead of the Game 
has already committed to capability reviews based on, but different from, the 
approach adopted in the United Kingdom. They are expected to include external 
participants from outside the public service. There are, of course, precedents 
for drawing on external experts in corporate governance, such as their use on 
departmental audit committees and reviews of aspects of governance.
As yet, there has been no inclination to move down the UK path of corporate 
boards that include independent non-executive members. These boards have 
been mandatory since 2005, although the concept dates from the 1990s, and 
have variable performance and weakly defined roles, according to a recent 
survey by the Institute for Government (Wilks 2007, 2008; Parker et al 2010). 
Yet, more generally, the notion of boards including external members has been 
surfacing in Australia (e.g. that proposed for the Australian Taxation Office: 
AAP 2011).
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Secretaries’ and ministers’ roles and the place of 
stewardship
The relationship between secretaries and ministers has at times been fraught 
with issues about boundaries. Ministerial styles vary widely. Under Westminster 
tenets, there has been a tendency for successive governments to claim ownership 
of the public service. This can have significant implications for transitions 
between government when tensions arise with a public service perceived by 
new political leadership to have been too close to its predecessors. A significant 
clarification of the secretary’s role is the stewardship function that has been 
previously recognised (e.g. ANAO 2003c) but not accorded prominence. 
According to AGRAGA (2010), the APS-wide stewardship is a core role of the 
secretary, and one that is ‘discharged in partnership with other secretaries and 
the APS Commissioner’.
Politicians’ lack of strategic focus and ‘short-termism’, which was evident during 
the fourth term of the Howard government, indicated that an alternative was 
needed to relying heavily on political direction. The stewardship role is designed 
for the public service to have ‘the capacity to serve successive governments. A 
stewardship capability must exist regardless of the style of any one minister or 
government’. Stewardship covers ‘financial sustainability’ and efficient resource 
management, as well as ‘less tangible factors such as maintaining the trust 
placed in the APS and building a culture of innovation and integrity in policy 
advice’ (AGRAGA 2010: 5).
The secretary’s role has generally been regarded as having several well-
understood components that cover policy advice to the minister, administration 
and/or management, and these have now been specified in legislation. The 
‘public interest’ element has also been given explicit recognition (Halligan 
2011a; PSAB 2012).
Conclusion
Departmental governance has been evolving and is now better understood by 
the senior public service. At the same time, the departmental environment is 
more demanding and policy complexity is greater. Different levels of governance 
also come into play. The trend towards horizontal governance (see chapters 1, 3 
and 7) expands the number of actors that have to be factored in to departmental 
governance. The Ahead of the Game reform agenda also has extensive implications 
for departmental governance.
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Important questions continue to exist about the relative autonomy of 
departments from central agencies, and of agencies from portfolio departments. 
There are continuing pressures from the centre for a better balancing of devolved 
department responsibilities and central agency influence (see chapter 4 for 
historical swings in relationships). While the central agencies have regained 
some of the roles that they lost in the 1990s, departments like Finance envisage 
that further redefinition is required, and the strengthened role of the APSC is 
also significant. These tendencies have implications for the interface between 
departmental and system governance (chapter 4).
Despite the close attention given to governance improvement during the 
last decade, significant cases of failure have continued to arise, particularly 
where several internal and external factors intersect. There are questions to 
be asked about how this occurs despite extensive governance learning and 
standard setting, and whether the challenges, complexities and risks of modern 
departmental governance make this inevitable. More generally, the ongoing 
cycle of renewal ensures that every decade or so there is a shift in governance 
approaches, and this can be of great significance for how departments operate.
The functional principle on which most departments are founded continues to 
provide the most effective basis for the delivery of government priorities and 
public services. Yet, much of the clamour for change involves opening up the 
departmental silo to new forms of engagement. How the different imperatives 
are reconciled will provide a continuing challenge for departmental governance.

131
6 . Board Governance in Authorities 
and Companies
As seen in chapter 4, governance across the public sector ‘system’ as a whole 
encompasses both departmental governance (chapter 5) and the governance of 
authorities and companies. The governance of these authorities and companies is 
the subject of this chapter. Although Commonwealth authorities and companies 
are an important arm of central government, their governance is founded upon 
the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cth) (CAC Act) rather 
than the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) (FMA Act). As 
a result, they are more likely than other public sector bodies to be influenced 
by principles of corporate law and governance drawn from the private sector. 
Importantly, the CAC Act’s treatment of directors is modelled on equivalent 
provisions of the Corporations Act 2001, transposed to the public sector context 
and modified accordingly. These foundations give rise to the unique features 
of public sector boards, and to some of the tensions that were considered in 
chapter 3.
Perhaps the most distinctive and significant feature of CAC bodies is the 
decision-making board that governs them. In terms of vertical positioning, 
within the horizontal and vertical planes considered in chapter 1, the ultimate 
responsibility of the body and its board to central government is established 
in several ways. Commonwealth authorities must be established for a ‘public 
purpose’ and companies are effectively ‘owned’ by government shareholders. 
Appointments to the board are generally made by responsible ministers, and 
the board is required to take account of government policy and meet a number 
of reporting requirements. 
Despite these governmental controls however, CAC boards have been conceived 
as autonomous corporate boards, chiefly with a view to meeting government 
operational and commercial ends that might ultimately include privatisation 
through sale on the market. This gives rise to the idea that CAC bodies and 
their boards might also enjoy a degree of autonomy and independence from 
government that is absent in central and line agencies. The corporate features 
of CAC boards, particularly the potential to add external board members, also 
suggest that they have a valuable role in bridging the gap between government 
and outsiders to build important associations and partnerships. In addition, 
they suggest the importance of these bodies in fulfilling the key elements for a 
stronger Australian Public Service, which were foreseen in Ahead of the Game: 
Blueprint for the Reform of Australian Government Administration (AGRAGA 
2010: 16; chapter 2, this volume). 
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As noted in chapter 3, providing ‘strong leadership and strategic direction’ 
(AGRAGA 2010: 20) will require continuing central control of authorities and 
companies while also building ‘essential’ horizontal strategic policy advice, 
which is founded upon collaboration between agencies and external groups such 
as academia, business and the broader community. Authorities and companies 
are likely to play a significant role in meeting and balancing these two objectives. 
Balancing vertical control and horizontal collaboration in these circumstances 
requires particular attention to the governance of CAC bodies and suggests the 
potential for developing a unique conception of corporate governance within 
the boards of these public sector bodies. 
The roles of the board and management
Deep questions of political, economic and legal ideology inform assessments 
of appropriate corporate governance models for both the private and public 
sectors, especially in modelling from one sectoral context to the other (chapters 
2 and 3). Accordingly, in the contemporary context of governmental policies of 
corporatisation and privatisation, there is an important question about ‘whether 
the private sector company model, and its associated governance mechanisms, is 
a theoretically viable governance structure for the commercial activities of the 
executive government and whether this model is able to deliver the efficiency 
and accountability benefits its adoption assumed’ (Grantham 2005: 181).
The importance of Grantham’s question is highlighted in current debates in 
corporate law concerning the allocation of power within the corporation and 
the roles to be played by directors, particularly in guiding and monitoring 
management. The issue of what can reasonably be expected of the directors of 
a large public company, particularly the non-executive directors, has received 
consideration recently in a series of ASIC enforcement proceedings against the 
directors of the James Hardie, Centro, and Fortescue Metals companies. Expert 
commentary on these cases points to an emerging gap in Australian law between 
a conception of boardroom responsibility grounded in prudential oversight of 
management and one grounded in ultimate responsibility of the board, even for 
critical aspects of operational management (Austin 2010, 2011).
In addition, these cases reopen debates about the extent to which directors can 
lawfully delegate their responsibilities and rely upon the information and advice 
of others, including that provided by senior management. These issues are also 
live under the equivalent provisions of the CAC Act. Indeed, clarification of the 
responsibilities of boards within government departments is an issue that has 
been raised again in CFAR’s Discussion Paper (DFD 2012b: 41). So, the impetus 
for reform of the legislative architecture for board governance can arise in both 
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public and private sector contexts, with commonalities as well as contrasts in 
their underlying difficulties, as exemplified by the CFAR and these landmark 
ASIC cases respectively.
In the context of the consideration of public sector boards in this book, such cases 
and legislation remind us of the very different considerations that are applicable 
to the allocation of powers and responsibilities between the board and executive 
management in a private corporation, compared to those applicable in a public 
sector authority or company. In the private corporation, the potential liability 
of directors rests upon maintaining the clarity of their roles and interactions 
vis-à-vis management in particular. This remains a vital division of roles and 
responsibilities, despite the clearer recognition of the legal liabilities of senior 
executive management since the recommendations of HIH report (HIH Royal 
Commission 2003: Vol 1: 116; 130). 
In Commonwealth authorities and companies, however, the allocation of power 
is greatly complicated by the role of the minister in appointing directors to the 
board and the unclear lines of communication that may subsist between the 
minister, the chief executive and the chair. It is also complicated by the overlay 
of public service values and standards that bear upon those who manage and 
staff organisations regulated by the CAC Act. Moreover, boards under the CAC 
Act are legally obliged to decide and act in the best interests of their organisation, 
but within a whole-of-government setting in which their organisation also plays 
a part in serving the broader public interest.
These complications obscure largely unresolved questions as to the roles and 
responsibilities of ministers and boards in the relationships between those 
exercising powers in public sector authorities and companies. They help to 
explain the real difficulties that are now likely to be encountered in attributing 
legal liabilities to each in appropriate cases, and they suggest the reasons why 
difficulties will be experienced in considering whether ASIC should bring 
legal action against the directors of such bodies, as distinct from the finance 
minister authorising them. CFAR’s Discussion Paper raises the difficult question 
of maintaining enhanced portfolio arrangements and the control of the centre 
while also accommodating more flexible structures, (DFD 2012b: 32-36). These 
remain important considerations in the ongoing agenda for reform. 
The legal framework for authorities and companies
As has been outlined in chapter 3, the CAC Act regulates the reporting 
requirements of Commonwealth authorities and the conduct of the directors 
and officers of such bodies. Significant authorities under the CAC Act include 
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and The Australian National 
University (Kalokerinos 2007: 14). An authority is a body corporate which has 
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been incorporated for a public purpose (s 5 and subs 7(1)(a)) and is able to hold 
money on its own account. This public purpose sets the distinctive public sector 
context within which directors’ duties in corporate law (such as the duty to act 
for ‘proper’ purposes) are now assessed under the CAC Act. In defining the 
legal duties of the directors of authorities and companies, the CAC Act adopts 
almost identical language to that adopted for private companies governed by 
the Corporations Act itself. It adopts, for example, the same key concepts of 
‘good faith’ and ‘care and diligence’ in the assessment of directors’ primary legal 
liabilities. 
The reporting obligations of authorities are set out in Part 3 of the CAC Act. In 
this respect, the directors must prepare an annual report (s 9). The responsible 
minister is to be notified of significant events (s 15) and both the responsible 
minister and finance minister are to be kept informed of their progress (s 16). In 
the case of a government business enterprise (GBE), the body must also provide 
a corporate plan (s 17). It is the requirement that authorities report to ministers 
that emphasises their public responsibilities, as distinct from the responsibilities 
of a private company. It is this reporting requirement that also helps explain 
why the boards of such bodies will adopt government policy as their starting 
point in exercising their authority as a board. 
By contrast with authorities, a Commonwealth company is a company 
incorporated under the Corporations Act in which the Australian government 
holds a controlling interest (other than through interposed Commonwealth 
entities). Since a Commonwealth company is incorporated under the Act, the 
legal responsibilities that are applicable to the directors and officers of all private 
corporations apply equally to the directors and officers of Commonwealth 
companies. Accordingly, the directors of Commonwealth companies, like the 
directors of authorities, owe equivalent legal duties of care and diligence, as 
well as duties of good faith. They also owe civil duties to the company not to 
misuse their position, or information obtained in the course of performing their 
duties. Directors who breach their duties of good faith, or misuse their position 
or information, can be seen to have breached civil obligations and committed 
criminal offences. 
Although lying closer than authorities to privately incorporated companies 
in their form, the same influence of the government over Commonwealth 
companies remains evident. The CAC Act specifically requires such companies 
to comply with the general policies of government once the minister notifies the 
directors of such policies (s 43). As for authorities, the CAC Act provides the 
essential levers for governmental control. It imposes reporting obligations upon 
Commonwealth companies, which include the requirement of an annual report, 
and the same reporting obligations that apply to authorities. 
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The adoption of the same legal liabilities and responsibilities that are applicable to 
the board and individual directors of corporations governed by the Corporations 
Act, imports the essential features of private corporate law and practice into 
the governance of boards of CAC bodies. It has also imported elements of the 
codes of practice, performance indicators and market judgments, at work in the 
private sector, to corporate boards within the public sector. The process has 
been reinforced through directors sitting on boards in both sectors bringing 
their experience to new roles on public sector boards. At the same time, the 
statutory requirements that companies adopt government policy and report 
(like authorities) to responsible ministers continue to add a distinctive public 
sector dimension to the governance of these boards. 
The distinctive features of the corporate CAC board are critical to understanding 
the governance of the board in practice and the importance of this to the 
conceptions of corporate, public and public sector governance that are outlined 
in chapter 1. These same features influence individual directors in balancing 
their public and private responsibilities and the dynamics of decision-making 
within the board. Individual directors may, for example, acquire power within 
the board through their appointment by the minister to whom their board is 
ultimately responsible. In chairing the meeting and reaching collective decisions, 
the chair may be constrained by an awareness of this (Edwards, Nicoll and Seth-
Purdie 2003: 40). These considerations for the autonomy and governance of the 
board are unique to boards of public sector authorities and companies.
The use of corporate bodies in the public sector
The use of corporate bodies within the public sector has been associated 
with the growth of new public management and its accompanying phases of 
privatisation, commercialisation, the outsourcing of government operations 
and efficiency drives in the public sector. Along with these developments, 
such bodies have been seen as convenient vehicles for providing a degree of 
operational and commercial independence from central government. 
Following the release of the Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory 
Authorities and Office Holders (Uhrig review) in 2003, however, there has been 
some retreat from the utilisation of authorities and corporations in the public 
sector (chapter 2), with many essential governmental functions having been 
returned to departments and central agencies. Both the Uhrig review, and 
the governance arrangements that were subsequently published by the then 
Department of Finance and Administration (Finance) in 2005, suggest that there 
may be less reason today than in the past for establishing corporate entities 
under the CAC Act (DFA 2005b). The creation of new CAC bodies is considered 
separately in chapter 8. 
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The 2009 List of Australian Government Bodies and Governance Relationships, 
published by Finance, reflected a reduction of 17 Commonwealth authorities 
that were then reporting under the CAC Act, this number falling from 81 in 
2004 to 64 in 2009 (DFD 2009: xxiv–v). By February 2012, the number of 
Commonwealth authorities reporting under the CAC Act had fallen further to 62 
(DFD 2012a) while, between 2004 and 2012, there was a roughly corresponding 
increase in the number of prescribed agencies reporting under the FMA Act from 
64 to 87 (DFD 2012a). Although Finance also reports a significant reduction in 
the number of departmental bodies such as joint Commonwealth–state bodies, 
international bodies and advisory bodies, the overall reduction in the number of 
authorities and departmental bodies appears consistent with the strengthening 
and streamlining of central government.
The two Uhrig review templates, which were considered in chapter 2 (i.e. 
the ‘board’ and ‘executive management’ templates) provided an important 
stimulus for the reduction in Commonwealth authorities. They continued, for 
some time, to influence the post-Uhrig review governance arrangements and 
policy guidelines that were formulated for the formation of CAC bodies, which 
were subsequently adopted and published by Finance (DFA 2005b). The board 
template reflects an independent board, more akin to that of the board of a 
private sector company. This template also reflected the government’s view at 
the time that a statutory authority ought to be one in which it was appropriate 
for the board to have the necessary authority and power to appoint and remove 
the chief executive, to determine strategic direction and set corporate plans, 
to supervise management and hold management accountable for performance 
(Uhrig 2003: 27).
As a test of the independence of a public sector body, this formulation largely 
duplicates the legal authority and autonomy that is enjoyed by the board 
of a private corporation. It re-states an underlying assumption of board 
independence in both the Corporations Act and the CAC Act that may have 
been obscured in the widespread adoption of boards within FMA Act-reporting 
bodies as well as CAC bodies. 
In their application to public sector boards, the Uhrig review templates 
emphasise the authority of the corporate-style board and its constitution 
operating in a setting quite removed from its origins in private corporate law. In 
the longer term, the Uhrig review templates may be seen to have begun shaping 
boards with a distinctive public sector character. This distinctive character 
derives primarily from the clearly defined governmental purpose of the body 
and an emphasis upon the particular skills, expertise and experience that is 
needed to fulfil that purpose. At the same time, even the Uhrig review templates 
are not immune from subsequent review and reform of governance architecture, 
as exemplified by the Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review (CFAR).
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Finance’s governance arrangements 
Following the Uhrig review, Finance published its Governance Arrangements 
for Australian Government Bodies (DFA 2005b). These arrangements greatly 
extended the earlier Australian National Audit Office guidelines which had 
set stronger policy foundations for the governance of CAC bodies by way of 
an advisory or governance board. The arrangements that were proposed by 
Finance generally favoured departmental control and FMA Act supervision 
rather than the establishment of a corporation or independent entity with a 
governance board. Given the corporate features of authorities and companies, 
the arrangements proposed by Finance and the requirements of the Uhrig 
review board template encounter difficulties in their application in practice. 
Finance’s governance arrangements help to clarify the policy to be applied in 
establishing and regulating the creation of corporate bodies in the future. Their 
importance in this regard is considered in chapter 8. For the purposes of this 
chapter, however, the governance arrangements also suggest the factors that 
influence the governance of a body and whether a body should operate under 
the FMA Act or the CAC Act. These factors are said to be the purposes and 
functions of the body, its financial sector classification, whether a governing 
board would be effective, the appropriate employee coverage and the level of 
independence of the body (DFA 2005b: 32).
The Finance arrangements tend to identify the circumstances in which the 
board template should not be applicable, rather than those in which it should. 
One reflection of this, for example, is said to be that a governing board is ‘not 
an appropriate governance structure for an FMA Act agency’ (DFA 2005b: 
38). To some extent, this leaning may reflect the concerns of John Howard’s 
Coalition government (1996–2007) when commissioning the Uhrig review for 
clarifying the role of those business regulatory authorities, which was the 
foundation subject of the review. Continuing to identify the essential features 
of the board template in the public sector, however, remains an important task 
in distinguishing these boards from the advisory and management boards that 
are used widely in FMA Act-reporting bodies.
While the governance arrangements favour a CAC body for undertaking a 
commercial enterprise, the CAC body is not otherwise generally favoured. The 
arrangements consider the independence of a body to be more the product of 
the terms of the enabling act, reflecting its essential purpose, than a question of 
its regulation under the FMA or CAC acts. They also tend to favour the use of a 
statutory authority under the CAC Act, rather than a company although, overall, 
the most significant reduction between 2004 and 2009 recorded in Finance’s List 
of Government Bodies, occurred in statutory authorities, with many of these 
being converted to statutory agencies (DFA 2005d; DFD 2009). 
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Those departments which appear most inclined to utilise the legal form of the 
company are the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital 
Economy (DBCDE), the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), and 
Finance itself. The reasons for these departments utilising companies appear to 
be predominantly the extent of their commercial operations. Unsurprisingly, for 
example, the many CAC companies established within the portfolio of DBCDE 
are commercial subsidiaries of Australia Post and the ABC. The reasons for 
utilising such companies rest largely upon their commercial and administrative 
suitability and their ‘fitness for form’ (rather than their need for independence). 
In this respect, the Uhrig review board template has focused attention upon the 
critical decisions to be made by the board of particular bodies and the essential 
governance required of such a board. 
For a time, in its application of the Uhrig review in practice, Finance appeared to 
consider the ‘interaction’ of a new body with existing bodies and the ‘synergies 
between bodies’ in assessing suitable governance structures for bodies (DFA 
2005b: 33). This suggested the importance of administrative suitability and 
convenience as distinct from departmental control and ‘fitness for form’ as 
governance indicators. Upon this measure, important elements were the status 
of other bodies with which the subject body interacted closely and the cost of 
maintaining an independent body and a governing board. Such an approach 
echoed the early Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Principles of Corporate Governance, which emphasised the ‘relations’ between 
different decision-making groups as well as the structures and processes for 
decision-making (OECD 1999; 2004a). Indeed, the title of Finance’s List of 
Government Bodies and Governance Relationships now suggests the importance 
of relationships in determining the features of a body’s governance.
The relationships between bodies do provide a helpful administrative guide 
within government. They also represent, however, a shift in focus from the 
Uhrig review board template, which focuses more upon the essential purposes 
of the body, as expressed in the enabling act, when seeking to articulate the 
essential features of the governance board.
GBEs: CAC bodies with corporate autonomy 
At one end of the spectrum of CAC bodies lie government business enterprises 
(GBEs), which in some instances are earmarked by the government for 
later privatisation. In this context, a GBE is a Commonwealth authority or 
Commonwealth company as defined by the CAC Act and prescribed as a GBE 
under the CAC Act regulations. Finance’s 2011 Commonwealth Government 
Business Enterprise Governance and Oversight Guidelines (DFD 2011b) provide 
guidance for the governance of GBEs. They are particularly instructive as to the 
essentially different perspectives that prevail in the public and private sectors, 
even in the case of those CAC bodies that are designated as GBEs. 
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A consideration of the governance of GBEs provides valuable insights into the 
different factors involved in the governance of CAC bodies more generally. In the 
first place, the conduct of the directors of wholly owned company GBEs is governed 
by the Corporations Act, while the conduct of the directors of authority GBEs is 
governed by the CAC Act (DFD 2011: 10). Secondly, in the case of GBEs that are 
not wholly owned Commonwealth companies, the GBE guidelines are to apply ‘to 
the maximum extent possible, consistent with minimising the risk of a potential 
oppression action by minority shareholders under s 232 of the Corporations Act’.
The ultimate control by ministerial shareholders of the strategic direction of both 
company and authority GBEs, (and the accountability of both to the minister 
shareholders) is achieved through an agreed statement of corporate intent that is 
reached with the directors, and statutory reporting requirements. The hallmarks 
of the public sector also remain evident in the three key interests of the minister 
shareholders, as stated in the GBE guidelines, namely: the performance and 
financial returns of the GBE, the reporting and accountability arrangements 
necessary to facilitate the active oversight of the GBE by the Commonwealth and 
the Commonwealth action needed to provide the strategic direction of its GBEs, in 
cases where it prefers a different direction from the one proposed.
For many years, successive Australian governments have been able to rely upon the 
privatisation of large public sector enterprises to relieve budget pressures. The most 
recent of such privatisations has been the sale of telecommunications organisation 
Telstra by the Howard government. Such GBEs represent the end result of years of 
investment and subsidisation by governments and taxpayers. They are CAC bodies 
that have reached the highest state of corporate development, enabling privatisation 
where appropriate through sale on the market. Presently, there are seven prescribed 
GBEs namely: ASC Pty Ltd; the Australian Government Solicitor; the Australian 
Postal Corporation; the Australian Rail Track Corporation Ltd; Defence Housing 
Australia; Medibank Private Limited and, the latest addition, the NBN Limited. 
There are also a further five entities which, although not prescribed, receive advice 
from the Government Businesses Advice Branch. 
Upon their sale and privatisation, GBEs become corporations much like any other 
public corporations listed on the market. As such, they are equally subject to the 
general law, as nearly as is possible, as are individual citizens. Their officers are 
subject to the legal duties imposed upon all directors under the Corporations Act, 
to regulation by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), and 
to regulation by the Australian Securities Exchange listing rules and Principles of 
Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council 2010). In addition, they are subject to the judgments of the 
market itself. Painting this picture of the post-privatisation world of the GBE 
serves to remind us of the very substantial differences that exist in reality between 
corporate governance as conceived in the public and private sectors.
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One difficult question Australia may need to consider more closely in the future 
is whether fattening the public sector calf for sale on the private market will 
always be possible. This is because GBEs have often evolved from the need for 
government to provide essential services and infrastructure — communications, 
transport and postal services being the obvious examples. Often, the high 
establishment and maintenance costs, and the national significance of these 
services, have earmarked them for provision by government rather than the 
private sector. However, partnerships between governments and the private 
providers of infrastructure and essential services (or the investment managers 
who now finance these services) have grown more sophisticated and the 
government is assuming a more direct role in establishing the investment funds 
(such as the Future Fund and nation-building funds) that are now required to 
finance major public developments. In these circumstances, the need for fully 
government-financed enterprises may be reduced over time.
There are also dangers in government embracing a closer relationship with 
private providers and financiers. As governments become more reliant upon 
large private corporations and financial investors to provide infrastructure and 
major services, departmental control of essential infrastructure becomes more 
problematic. In 2006, for example, the different expectations of the government 
and the market were clearly revealed during the highly political process for 
the privatisation of Telstra and the Telstra 3 sale. At this time, both the board 
of Telstra and the market supported Sol Trujillo, the then chief executive of 
Telstra, in rejecting government-nominated members on the Telstra board. 
The government, on the other hand, saw such nominations as vital to the 
representation on the board of regional users of Telstra facilities. These users of 
Telstra’s services were, at the time, publicly and politically important, although 
economically insignificant. In the final result, the government used its power 
of appointment to appoint Geoff Cousins — a director who the government felt 
would represent these interests — to the Telstra board. 
Another supervening danger that looms in government–private sector 
relationships is the more active role now required of government in responding 
to the threats of transnational business. In an era of global markets, governmental 
control and sovereignty will increasingly rest upon difficult questions of 
corporate ownership and control associated with international competition 
and investment flows. In the 2006 bid for Qantas by Airline Partners Australia 
(APA), for example, the interests and motives of the private equity partners 
and hedge funds, upon which the success of the bid ultimately depended, 
remained unclear. Several of the private equity partners in the proposed bid 
have since collapsed. The temporary grounding of the entire Qantas fleet both 
domestically and internationally in late 2011 in the wake of industrial action by 
Qantas management and unions illustrates, in part, a corporate response to the 
pressures of global competitiveness. 
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Although Qantas is a private corporation, cases such as this suggest the problems 
that may be encountered in ensuring the continuity of core Australian industry 
and services, in the face of uncertain private foreign ownership of major public 
corporations, post-privatisation. Cases such as this also have implications for 
governments seeking to maintain a guiding hand in the governance of the 
boards of GBEs, post-privatisation.
The governance of CAC bodies in practice
At the other end of the spectrum, lie a number of important authorities and 
companies, governed by the CAC Act, which are utilised for service delivery 
and other government purposes. For these bodies, the emphasis may now be 
less upon their commercial and corporate independence, and more upon their 
capacity to integrate the vertical and horizontal elements that are inherent in 
providing both ‘strong leadership and strategic direction’ (AGRAGA 2010: 20). 
The corporate form of these bodies and their boards equips them particularly 
well within government for enhancing collaboration between agencies and with 
external groups, but renders them more difficult to control and direct within 
central government. This illustrates some of the institutional tensions that were 
canvassed in chapter 3.
The role of the board 
At the time of the Uhrig review, and in its aftermath, those officials who were 
interviewed by the authors in 2005–07, whose agencies reported under the CAC 
Act, were often clearly conscious of where their board might ultimately be placed 
for the purposes of applying the Uhrig review board templates and regulation 
by the CAC Act or the FMA Act. In the governance arrangements published 
subsequently by Finance, one indicator of the governance arrangements most 
suitable for a body was the level of independence of the body (DFA 2005b: 32). 
In formulating the principles to apply in governing the boards of authorities 
and companies as independent commercial entities in the public sector, both 
the CAC Act and the Uhrig review drew heavily upon principles of private 
corporate law. 
Furthermore, those reporting under the CAC Act at this time expressed some 
sense of disillusionment, reflecting their belief that there was no longer quite 
the same rationale, as once there may have been, for establishing CAC bodies as a 
business or commercial ‘arm’ of government. They referred to the ‘great’ boards 
they had established and to the care they had taken in finding members with 
the skills required to set up such boards. They often expressed ‘disappointment’ 
that these boards seemed to have made a less significant contribution in practice 
than they might have expected, rather than concern for uncertainty in their 
relationship with relevant portfolio departments and core agencies.
Public Sector Governance in Australia
142
Many interviewees referred to the poor representation of core government 
agencies on the boards of CAC bodies, and to their lack of access to relevant 
governmental and policy information. As to departmental representation on CAC 
bodies, the evidence referred to in chapter 9 suggests that, while some secretaries 
consider representation on CAC bodies a part of their role, others reporting 
under the FMA Act held concerns for this. Senior public service representation 
on bodies outside their departmental structure can raise additional concerns 
about membership of the body, independence and conflict of interest (chapter 3). 
The Uhrig review saw the legal status of a body established as a CAC body 
in terms of the authority, autonomy and capacity of its board. This test tends 
to emphasise the rationale of the enabling legislation in establishing the body 
and the essential purpose of the body. At the time of the Uhrig review, the 
‘independence’ of the board was not seen to establish a particularly strong 
rationale for establishing or maintaining CAC bodies in the Commonwealth 
public sector. Rather, the independence of the board from government was seen 
to be achieved in other ways by experienced people, without the need for an 
independent body and decision-making board.
The board’s level of independence 
The reporting and other requirements that are imposed on authorities and 
companies in the CAC Act suggest that the independence of the board proves 
difficult to achieve in practice. At the time of the Uhrig review, three elements 
were commonly seen to undermine the independence and capacity of the board 
in CAC bodies. These were the minister’s appointment of the chair and board 
members, the minister’s dealing directly in practice with the chief executive 
as well as the chair, and the appointment and consultation processes generally, 
all of which tend to ensure that the influence and expectations of the minister 
condition the judgments of the board.
One telling feature was the ready acknowledgment of participants in the authors’ 
research that in even the most ‘independent’ of CAC bodies the ‘business 
judgment’ exercised by the board is significantly circumscribed by the demands 
of government policy. Both the autonomy of the board, and the dynamics of 
board decision-making, are potentially undermined by this supervening 
influence and unwarranted ministerial intervention. While the process for the 
appointment of board members (chapter 9) may involve the relevant minister, the 
prime minister, the governor-general and the Commonwealth Executive Council 
(with assistance provided by cabinet, the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet and other relevant departments), the relevant ministers are expected 
to make appointments on the basis of merit, and to take into account the skills, 
qualifications and experience of prospective directors (PM&C 2009a). 
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Although boards may or may not be involved in identifying the skills and 
experience required when vacancies arise, the boards of some CAC bodies do, in 
practice, present the minister with clear indications of the skills and experience 
needed on their board and potential candidates. Such an approach appears more 
likely to meet with a closer consideration by the minister of the needs of the 
board, and better outcomes, than an approach in which candidates were simply 
proposed to the minister.
At the time of the Uhrig review, directors of authorities and companies were 
generally keen to assert their independence of government. Directors rated 
their independence somewhere between ‘totally’ independent to ‘mainly’ 
independent or ‘heading towards’ independence. For example, one chair stated: 
‘We are totally independent. This is because we have built in representation 
from both sides of politics. We can’t be a rubber stamp for the minister without 
the other side of government knowing all about it’. 
Significant factors mentioned, or implicit in, responses at the time suggested that 
the board may be less independent in reality. The fact that board independence does 
not extend to the board’s independence of the minister and government was often 
taken for granted. For example, a CAC chairman said: ‘We are totally independent … 
absolutely independent. This is despite the fact that the board members are all mates 
with the PM’. This conclusion is reinforced by chief executives, who tend to be more 
equivocal about any perceived independence of the board. 
For many of the same reasons that the board of a CAC body in the public sector 
lacks the authority and independence of a board in a private corporation, it 
also tends to lack many of the dynamics of collective decision-making that 
are apparent in a private corporate board. These dynamics are significantly 
influenced by the minister’s general hand in the appointment of board members 
and by the fact that the discharge of the functions and roles expected of the 
chair, the chief executive and other independent board members are likely to be 
fundamentally different in the public sector. 
Business judgment in the public sector board
In Australia, the concept of a ‘business judgment rule’ was borrowed from 
American corporate law and redeveloped throughout the 1990s to provide a 
clearer defence for the directors of private corporations in seeking to discharge 
their legal duty to act with care and diligence. So long as the director makes a 
genuine and rational business judgment in the interests of the corporation, the 
defence may be open to them. However, the concept of ‘business judgment’ and 
the availability of the same defence to the officers of authorities and companies 
under the CAC Act invite closer consideration of precisely what the directors’ 
business judgment might mean in the public sector context.
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The overarching public purpose of the board and the board’s adherence to 
relevant government policy are both taken for granted in practice. Directors 
believe that they must manage the affairs of the company only within the relatively 
narrow scope for their judgment that these policy constraints permit. This fact 
reminds us of the significant difficulties that arise in practice in transferring the 
statutory duties of the directors of a private company to the directors of a public 
sector body. The boards of Commonwealth companies are not responsible to 
shareholders in a general meeting, despite the fact that they are incorporated 
under the Corporations Act. The authority of the board of a private corporation 
is much wider and is constrained only by the relatively limited powers of the 
shareholders in general meeting, by any limitations expressed in the company’s 
constitution and by the law itself.
These constraints upon the exercise of their power are clearly understood by 
the directors of authorities and companies. Some evidence of this was seen 
in the authors’ interviews with CAC body representatives. For example, the 
chair of one authority commented: ‘It’s how we do business. Our board sees its 
independent business judgment as its expertise on the organisation’s business. 
The government director often remains silent on the actual business. But, of 
course, the board is incredibly sensitive to the government’s requirements/
policy’. Similarly, the chair of a GBE put it this way: ‘We are totally independent, 
very independent. We are at arms-length from government. We are also sensitive 
to government’s wishes however. Our corporate plan specifies what we do and it 
wouldn’t cross our mind to buck government policies’.
One important gloss upon the influence of government, as it is exerted on the 
boards of CAC bodies, is found in the rare occasions on which the CAC body 
might assist the minister in the formation of policy (see also Edwards, Nicoll 
and Seth-Purdie 2003). The chair of one CAC body in this position said: ‘We 
develop a policy for the institution and give this to the minister. There are no 
government guidelines as to the sorts of things we can do. The government can 
set policy and direction within a framework of serving the people. A good chair 
and board can lead the government’.
Board concern for government acting as shareholder 
and customer
Another difficulty for the boards of CAC bodies arises when they must deal 
with government acting in different roles and capacities — particularly as 
shareholder, regulator and customer. In these circumstances, a charter setting 
out the expectations of both the government and CAC body was seen to be 
useful. Different examples of the importance attached to clarifying the body’s 
relationship with government arose in the course of the authors’ interviews. 
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For example, one representative of an authority said: ‘There is an issue with 
government sometimes being a shareholder and sometimes a customer. So, 
I’ve changed my view a bit from simply referring people to the Act. I agree 
that a charter that spells out roles etc. could be useful, particularly in the face 
of possible ministerial change’. Another said: ‘We have a reasonably formal 
approach. The government is a customer, so we need a customer service strategy 
as well as a strategic plan and corporate plan. This is what we’ll do in the future. 
Government policy is reflected in the corporate plan and the 5-year strategic 
plan, which are given to the minister’. 
Although tending to require several different contractual foundations for the 
relationship between government and CAC bodies, these statements do reflect 
the various relationships that are now arising in practice and the need to clarify 
the different roles required of both government and CAC bodies when acting in 
different capacities.
Directors’ views of corporate and board performance 
The responses of participants reflected different approaches in their assessment 
of board performance. In their approaches, participants often referred to 
their ‘informal’ and ‘subjective’ assessments of performance, as well as self-
assessment mechanisms. Greater effort appeared to be being made to align 
performance more with corporate and strategic plans. For example, the chief 
executive of one CAC body said: ‘In future, we will align corporate strategy and 
corporate performance’. The director of another body said: ‘We have a complete 
performance management framework. This is tied to our business plan and 
ultimately to our strategic plan’. Finally, the chair of a CAC body stated: ‘We 
have started a process of self-assessment of the board as a whole. This has been 
instituted to line up the organisation’s performance with board performance’.
As might be expected, these responses indicate that assessments of corporate 
and board performance in CAC bodies are tied closely to the business and 
strategic plans of the body, rather than to metric market measures (as in the 
private sector), and that performance assessments are supported by the self-
assessments of board members.
A focus on skills and experience rather than 
‘independence’
Several developments, which are associated with the need for greater 
collaboration between the public and private sectors, suggest the potential 
value in the augmented capacity of boards within departments and agencies. 
These developments invite consideration of the difficult conceptual question 
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of whether it may be possible in the future to design a board within FMA Act-
reporting bodies which brings together very senior and diverse people from 
the private sector to provide collaborative and collective expert advice to the 
chief executive. As boards become more specialised, it may be found difficult to 
maintain the authority of the chief executive and central governmental control. 
The board of Infrastructure Australia, for example, was established in 2008, 
following the election of the Kevin Rudd’s Labor government (2007–10), in order 
to coordinate and prioritise various strands of private expertise and experience 
for the benefit of public capital expenditure. In this exercise, overall control 
and responsibility for the public interest resides with the chief executive and 
the minister, although the equal representation of very senior public and 
private interests on the advisory board appears to herald new dimensions of the 
public–private partnership within government. For these reasons, the board of 
Infrastructure Australia is considered in greater detail below.
The Uhrig review suggested that establishing clear purposes and clear 
individual authority will be essential to the success of organisations. Of course, 
the challenge in establishing boards for a particular purpose and their role lies 
in defining what that purpose and role should be. The more that governments 
attempt to define the purpose and authority of these bodies and their boards, 
the less scope there may be for genuine ‘decision-making’ by the board. Board 
members sitting on CAC bodies are arguably constrained in this way already, 
by their need to consider government policy at every point in their decision-
making. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which an approach seeking to 
maintain governmental control also denies the potential value of a more broadly 
constituted decision-making board. The more the role and authority of the board 
is limited and refined, the more this potential may be denied. Some of these 
questions appear to have been raised from time to time in making appointments 
to certain boards such as, for example, in making appointments to the board of 
the Reserve Bank of Australia (chapter 8). 
Improving the capacity of the public sector board
It has been suggested in this chapter that, of all the reasons for establishing a 
CAC board, perhaps the most compelling are that the board potentially offers a 
greater real capacity than individual departmental secretaries or chief executives 
in complex decision-making, a greater capacity to serve the public sector in 
vertical and horizontal integration, and a greater capacity to build partnerships 
and collaboration between government and outsiders. 
This augmented capacity in decision-making appears to have been suggested in 
Ahead of the Game, which proposes maintaining ‘strong leadership and strategic 
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direction’ as a key objective (AGRAGA 2010: 20). Achieving this objective 
will require not only maintaining central control but also building ‘essential’ 
horizontal strategic policy advice, founded upon collaboration between agencies 
and external groups such as academia, business and the broader community. 
Authorities and companies are likely to play a significant role in meeting and 
balancing these two objectives. Situations may arise (for example, those in 
which boards are required to represent competing state interests) when board 
decisions must reflect the extended range of experience and expertise upon the 
board. In these circumstances there may need to be compromises made and 
the collective capacity and responsibility of the board provides significant 
additional capacity. 
It also seems that the declining need for CAC Act-reporting bodies may be 
a product of the changing shape of the public–private relationship itself. 
Wettenhall and others have already noted at length the many and varied forms 
that the public–private partnership has taken, and the related difficulties that 
now arise in settling a typology for and protecting the public interest (Wettenhall 
2003). Mention has already been made of Infrastructure Australia, a board 
considered in more detail below, which may hold significant decision-making 
power in practice, yet operates within the control of the chief executive of the 
Department of Infrastructure and Transport and its minister. Appointments to 
such a board by the minister might be used to establish a ‘tailored’ advisory or 
executive board in a way that is not generally possible in the private corporate 
board. In the authors’ research, CAC body interviewees often considered the 
skills and qualifications of board appointees a more significant issue than their 
independence. If this is so, then the exercise may be one of building the board 
that is best tailored for the purposes of government. 
Of course, it takes courage on the part of ministers in making the right 
appointments to boards, without merely representing sectional interests, and a 
sophisticated understanding of government policy on the part of appointees. One 
common view expressed to the authors by experienced CAC body representatives 
was that the set of skills required on the board might be routinely put to the 
minister (as it often was) with the strong request that appointments be made 
to provide those skills. In such an approach, the board remains responsible for 
setting the threshold criteria needed for board membership to achieve the body’s 
overall purpose, while leaving it to the minister to appoint specific people. The 
issue here is, however, the extent to which the minister considers and acts upon 
the board recommendation.
This rather ideal approach seems to acknowledge the reality of the minister’s 
strong hand and active involvement in specific appointments, while also 
clarifying the responsibilities of the board and minister in the process. The 
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board is required to consider (and decide upon) the skills it requires and the 
minister is required to consider more clearly the suitable candidates within the 
range of the stated criteria. 
Infrastructure Australia and public-private 
partnerships
In January 2008, Rudd announced the establishment of Infrastructure Australia. 
The new statutory Government and Business Advisory Council constitutes 12 
members who are drawn from industry and government. Five members come 
from the private sector, one of whom is the body’s chair (Sir Rod Eddington‘s 
appointment as the chair of Infrastructure Australia was subsequently announced 
in February 2008). Three members are appointed by the Commonwealth, another 
three by the states and territories, and one by local government.
It is clear that the board of this advisory body represents a different focus 
from that in the past, by providing the active agent for public–private 
partnerships. The purpose of the board of Infrastructure Australia has been to 
identify a steady stream, or ‘pipeline’, of projects to encourage private sector 
investment. The Government and Business Advisory Council advises the Office 
of Infrastructure Co-ordination within the Department of Infrastructure and 
Transport. This office provides policy recommendations through the Council of 
Australian Governments. More particularly, Infrastructure Australia has three 
key objectives: first, to conduct audits of nationally significant infrastructure, 
in particular water, transport, communications and energy; secondly, to draw up 
an infrastructure priority list involving billions of dollars of planned projects; 
and thirdly, to advise government investor and infrastructure developers on 
regulatory reform that is aimed at increasing the speed of projects.
The government retains effective control of Infrastructure Australia and the new 
board is essentially advisory in its capacity. The scale and importance of the 
new board, however, mark it for closer consideration. The idea itself is not new 
and derives in part from the extensive use of the Future Fund (chapter 8). Ideas 
for use of the Future Fund have ranged from university infrastructure funding, 
under the Howard government, to new suggestions such as a future fund for the 
financing of issues related to Indigenous Australians, and a sustainable fund for 
the arts, which was proposed at the 2008 Australia 2020 Summit. What is new, 
however, is the significance of this board in its representation of public and 
private interests within a single board in a core government agency.
The informal and social association of private and public representatives 
upon the board replaces the contractual association that might in the past 
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have been forged through negotiated agreement between government and 
a private provider. What is gained from this closer, more direct association 
within the board is greater flexibility. What may be lost is the clarity of legal 
responsibilities in a contractual relationship. It is true that the board remains 
advisory in function, but its size and significance are likely to mean that people 
of power and influence in the private sector will be appointed, and the line that 
is drawn between the board’s advisory role and its de facto decision-making 
power blurred. The intermingling of public and private interests within a board 
such as this may also mean that real questions of conflict of interest for the 
board’s members may arise.
While the purpose of the Infrastructure Australia board remains as presently 
stated, that is to undertake an infrastructure audit and identify infrastructure 
priorities, the advisory character of the board may be maintained. As serious 
financial decisions are made in the future, however, many critical questions as 
to how a decision-making board is to operate within core governmental agencies 
will be raised more pointedly. The issue has not really been addressed on this 
scale before within one single, government-controlled board.
It should be remembered that these plans for Infrastructure Australia may rest 
ultimately upon governments effectively harnessing for critical public purposes 
the estimated A$1.1 trillion that is currently in Australian superannuation 
funds. The management and governance of these private funds is itself emerging 
as a significant and challenging issue. A critical issue for new bodies such as 
Infrastructure Australia will be satisfying the market for corporate capital 
and private sector fund-managers that investment in particular projects is 
worthwhile and profitable for private trustees and investors. Whether private 
companies and private financiers see the same benefits as governments in 
the projects prioritised by the Infrastructure Australia board may prove an 
interesting question.
Conclusion
Enthusiasm for independent corporate entities may be waning in the public 
sector. Nevertheless, a review of the experience of corporatisation in the 
Australian public sector suggests the need for greater integration of corporate 
and commercial activity in central government, as well as the need for greater 
collaboration between central government and the private sector. Together, 
these needs highlight the potential value of CAC boards participating in 
more complex advisory, representative and management functions. In this 
respect, the fading of ‘corporate’ governance as a conceptual underpinning of 
governance generally within the sector may be accompanied by the evolution 
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of a unique form of public sector board — a board that is mindful of the needs 
of government and government policy in a rapidly changing environment for 
public sector governance.
Since the Uhrig review, there has been a retreat from the active use of 
Commonwealth authorities and corporations within the public sector, except 
in the case of the clearest commercial enterprises preparing for privatisation. 
The blurring of the line between governmental and commercial functions adds 
a further complexity. The legacy of the era of corporatisation and the adoption 
of corporate-style or ‘governance’ boards, however, has been to suggest the 
value of such boards within the public sector as a lynchpin for the vertical and 
horizontal integration of central and outer government. In so doing, it has also 
suggested the potential of such boards, in collaboration or partnership with 
outsiders, to enhance the capacity of decisions that are made by departmental 
secretaries and the chief executives.
At the same time, the use of boards in the management of CAC bodies continues 
to sit uneasily with the ultimate legal authority and accountability of the 
secretary or chief executive, so that balancing strong central leadership and 
external collaborations to enhance strategic direction remains a challenge. The 
choice between boards and other governing mechanisms in interjurisdictional 
and cross-sectoral contexts provides an interesting challenge in marrying 
organisational independence, governmental accountability and the public good, 
as signalled by the reforms flagged in Ahead of the Game and the CFAR. In 
the longer term, these more recent developments in the governance of boards 
in the public sector may be re-shaping the institutional relationship between 
government and the private sector as well as the character of public–private 
partnerships.
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7 . Participatory Governance
Previous chapters in this volume have dealt with horizontal aspects of 
governance but largely as they occur within government. As indicated in 
chapter 1, however, compared to 10 or 15 years ago, the move toward horizontal 
governance arrangements that involves non-government organisations and 
citizens has accelerated. Collaborative behaviours involving many more 
networked-type arrangements are increasingly observed in a post-new public 
management (NPM) environment (e.g. OECD 2009a); this was a major theme of 
the Advisory Group on the Reform of Australian Government Administration’s 
(AGRAGA) review Ahead of the Game: Blueprint for the Reform of Australian 
Government Administration (AGRAGA 2010). The Advisory Group’s foreword 
to Ahead of the Game stated as one of its reform priorities: ‘forging a stronger 
relationship with citizens through better delivery of services and through 
greater involvement of citizens in their government’ (2010: v).
For Jocelyne Bourgon, any new theory of public sector governance should start 
with the ideal of democratic citizenship (2007a). It follows, she says, that there is 
a need to: build collaborative relationships with citizens and groups of citizens, 
encourage shared responsibilities, disseminate information to better inform 
discussions, and seek opportunities to involve citizens in government activities. 
Included here would be allowing citizens to reframe issues that have been set 
for discussion (Lenihan 2009) and even the rather radical situation (for some 
within central government) of letting non-government players initiate agendas 
(Bond et al 2007; Lovan, Murray and Shaffer 2004). This point connects to the 
broader debate about deliberative democracy that is highlighted in chapter 1.
This chapter, therefore, focuses on governance in the public sector with a 
particular emphasis on the various arrangements under which citizens and 
organisations outside of government can be involved in public decision-
making processes. It is confined to issues that are considered of relevance at 
the Commonwealth level of government, although a few state examples are 
included.
The first part of this chapter examines a framework, the aim of which is to 
identify the possible purposes and levels of participation, who should be 
involved, the methods of doing so and, at what stage in the policy cycle it can 
be done. Governments can involve citizens in a range of ways, from simply 
providing information to the public, through to delegated control to citizens 
(Arnstein 1969). As indicated below, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) has usefully identified three possible levels at which 
governments can involve citizens in the policy process: providing information, 
consulting and ‘active participation’ (OECD 2001a; OECD 2003a). 
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The second part of the chapter focuses more on circumstances where 
governments need to actively engage individuals and organisations in policy 
processes — ‘active participation’ in the OECD’s terminology — and deals with 
some challenges and implementation hurdles that are faced by the public sector, 
if participatory governance is to be progressed effectively, in involving citizens 
and non-government organisations in the decision-making process. The final 
section offers some concluding observations and suggestions for change, which 
make use of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Trials — an attempt 
by COAG to engage Indigenous Australian citizens in the decision-making 
process for policy on issues related to their lives. This case study powerfully 
illustrates the critical challenges to effective participatory governance.
Participatory governance frameworks
Many elements need to be considered in involving non-government players, 
including citizens, in public sector decision-making. First, there are different 
levels of involvement — from simply providing information to citizens and 
relevant groups, to the other extreme of empowering them with actual control 
over the final decision. Second, there are many options about who to involve. 
Third, there are different mechanisms for involving stakeholders, which relate 
to the different levels of involvement. Finally, both the level of involvement 
and the method used can vary at different stages in the policy cycle. Many 
frameworks are to be found in the literature on some, if not all of these elements 
(e.g. Walters, Aydelotte and Miller 2000; Bishop and Davis 2002; Edwards 2003; 
Bryson, Crosby and Stone 2006; Fung 2006; IAPP 2007), however, there is no 
single approach. The level and method of involvement, who to involve, how to 
do that and when, depend critically on the purpose of the participation, where: 
‘Participation is shaped by the policy problem at hand, the techniques and 
resources available and, ultimately, a political judgment about the importance 
of the issue and the need for public involvement.’ (Bishop and Davis 2002: 21).
Successful involvement, therefore, requires a good fit between the purpose, 
timing within the policy cycle, choice of stakeholders and mechanism (NIG 2004: 
12). Fundamentally, whatever the purpose and therefore level of involvement 
chosen, successful involvement will require open and skilful relationships to 
build and maintain levels of trust (see below). Again, whatever the purpose, 
as is the case with involvement of non-government players generally, a risk-
management approach is of value to assist in working out the consequences 
of involvement: not just the benefits, but also the costs in terms of time and 
resources and, ultimately, what impact can be expected on the desired outcome.
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What is the purpose of involvement?
Using either a descriptive or normative perspective, various authors have 
addressed the purpose and levels of involvement in the policy process by 
governments with non-government players. The best known of these is 
Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’ that has eight levels: manipulation, therapy, 
informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power and citizen 
control (Arnstein 1969). More recent schemes have fewer levels, such as that of 
the International Association for Public Participation (IAPP), which presents 
five different purposes of citizen involvement with increasing levels of public 
impact, to: inform, consult, involve, collaborate and empower (IAPP 2007).
The OECD has a simpler framework for participation, which can be expanded as 
required. OECD publications (OECD 2001a: 23; OECD 2003a: 13–14) refer to three 
possible levels of participation of non-government players with government: 
through government providing information; government consulting; and 
government providing the means for ‘active participation’ (OECD 2003a:13):
•	 When information alone is provided, it is a one-way relationship, with the 
government effectively keeping the public or relevant stakeholders informed: 
‘It covers both “passive” access to information upon demand by citizens and 
“active” measures by government to disseminate information to citizens.’
•	 When it consults, it is a two-way relationship with the government that goes 
beyond the provision of information to listening to the public and gaining 
feedback from them on issues that are chosen by government and, hopefully, 
also providing feedback on how public input affects decisions.
•	 If active participation occurs, then it ‘is a relationship based on partnership’. 
It would be expected that government would work with the public to 
not only provide feedback on how their input affected decisions, but 
also develop options reflecting their concerns. As the OECD states, this 
process ‘acknowledges equal standing for citizens in setting the agenda, 
proposing policy options and shaping the policy dialogue’ but adds that 
‘the responsibility for the final decision or policy formulation rests with 
government’.
The third category of active participation could include the option of government 
either delegating authority to others in decision-making, or actually handing 
over decision-making to give others joint decision-making powers or even 
‘control’ (Bryson 2004). Active participation of outside players, therefore, 
means more than a process by which governments seek to engage the public 
or organisations on their terms; it is a process of engaging with stakeholders 
and citizens, which may include a player outside of government initiating the 
engagement.
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The OECD reports that, while there has been an increased prevalence of both 
information provided by government to citizens and opportunities for feedback and 
consultation, initiatives involving active participation are rare ‘and the few instances 
observed are restricted to a very few OECD member countries’ (2003a: 15).
Who to include?
The options around who is to be involved with governments in the process of 
policy development range from the broadest, involving the public at large to 
the narrowest, where the policy process is confined to an elite group of senior 
bureaucrats, which is perhaps widened at times, to include experts. Fung provides 
many possible ways of selecting participants. The first is to permit self-selection 
from the general population, but this could lead to under-representation of key 
groups. A second method is to recruit participants selectively from subgroups 
who are less likely to otherwise be engaged (e.g. senior citizens). Other methods 
are to select randomly (e.g. citizen juries); engage ‘lay stakeholders’ (e.g. school 
councils); and involve professional stakeholders. Fung describes these five 
groups as ‘mini-publics’. Other ways could be to involve professional politicians 
and expert administrators (Fung 2006: 66f). 
How narrow or broad the involvement should be (as well as when and how it 
will take place) will depend on several factors, including a judgment about the 
likely value added (e.g. the participation of certain key stakeholders holding 
information that is not otherwise available) as well as the likely consequences if 
a group is not involved in relation to attaining desired objectives and successful 
implementation (Bryson 2004: 27). Greater involvement would be expected 
where it is important to get decisions accepted, than if it is the quality of the 
decision that is more important (Lovan, Murray and Shaffer 2004: 17). 
The question of who to involve interrelates with the question of what 
mechanisms to use in participatory processes — different groups of citizens will 
prefer different forms of involvement, as the next section shows.
What mechanisms to use?
Using the OECD categorisation, Table 7.1 provides examples of appropriate 
consultation instruments for the information, consultation and active 
participation levels of involvement. So for example, if the purpose of involvement 
of citizens or stakeholders were to provide information to the public, then online 
websites or an education program would be appropriate. If the desire were to 
have active participation by those affected by a decision, a policy action team 
or a citizen’s jury would be more appropriate. In the relatively rare cases where 
a government hands over a decision to a group of citizens, then deliberative 
polling or some form of delegation of decision-making would be appropriate.
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The mechanisms of involvement not only need to be related to the purpose 
of involvement but also aligned with the capacities and interests of particular 
groups — for example, the young and the old or minority cultural groups 
may have very different preferences about how to input into government 
decision-making processes, than say, business or environmental groups. Remote 
Indigenous communities can be expected to prefer face-to-face meetings rather 
than use information and communication technology (ICT) in a consultation 
process.
Table 7 .1: Purpose of involvement and appropriate instrument
Information Consultation Active participation
Online websites Web-based Open-space technology
Education and awareness programs Discussion groups Advisory committees
Newsletters Public hearings Negotiation tables
Telephone hotline Polls Policy action teams
Community meetings Survey research Citizen panels/juries
Shop fronts One-to-one interviews Deliberative polling
Media stories Road shows Delegation
Source: Various, including Queensland Government (2010).
An issue that is hardly covered in relevant literature is what is the appropriate 
reaction from government when citizens wish to initiate a participatory process? 
If a group of citizens/experts or others wants to initiate a policy dialogue with 
government representatives, what should be the role of the public servant in 
this dialogue? Obviously, guidelines would be needed, particularly to manage 
a situation in which active citizen participation cannot be avoided in order to 
resolve complex policy issues. 
Of increasing importance over the last few years has been the use of online 
channels of involvement of citizens. This technology has added considerably 
to the possibilities of tailoring methods of participation to the needs of those 
intended to be involved (OECD 2001a; OECD 2003b: 50; Chen 2007; AGRAGA 
2010: 17). Governments, therefore, are commonly favouring providing 
information to citizens online and increasingly using the internet as a mechanism 
for consultation. Active participation online, however, is not yet common and 
is complex for governments to manage: ‘e-participation’ creates a real challenge 
technologically if governments want to retain ultimate control (UN 2003: 85ff; 
OECD 2009a: 70). As already mentioned, online dialogue between public 
servants and the public is an example of a difficult issue for governments to 
confront in creating opportunities for participation.
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Ahead of the Game recognises that Australians increasingly prefer the internet 
to other methods of contacting government. In discussing ‘engagement with 
citizens’, however, the review confusingly conflates consultation with citizens 
with engaging citizens online, which also unduly emphasises involving citizens 
in design and delivery through the use of ICT over other forms of engagement 
(AGRAGA 2010:17). There is no doubt that, unlike 10 or so years ago, current 
governments have no choice but to consider how best to use online mechanisms, 
and for whom, when pursuing ‘active participation’ with its citizens. As the 
OECD has stated, decisions about whether or not to use ICT mechanisms and 
how, need to be integrated into the broader decision processes around the 
purpose, the particular needs of those to be involved and the time when it is to 
occur in the policy process (OECD 2003b: 85f). 
The first significant step has been taken in the direction of ‘e-participation’ with 
the Australian Government agreeing with its Government 2.0 Taskforce, which 
expects ‘technology to increase citizen engagement and collaboration in making 
policy and providing service’ and achieving ‘a more consultative, participatory 
and transparent government’ (Australian Government 2010: 3). It would be 
worthwhile assessing, in a year or so, the impact of the new technology on the 
extent of citizen collaboration.
When in the policy process?
The literature on participatory policy issues has tended to neglect the fact that 
the purpose and form of participation may vary according to the stage at which 
policy is being developed. This is particularly so when decisions are made as 
to who is to be involved, and how, at the early stage of defining the nature of 
the problem or setting the agenda: if the problem is misdiagnosed, time and 
resources can be wasted and ineffective outcomes could emerge (see Walters, 
Aydelotte and Miller 2000: 357). Bryson makes the interesting point about 
the relationship between the early stage at which the problem is defined and 
possible solutions: it may be hard to get relevant stakeholders to participate in 
assisting in problem definition if they do not also see a way to resolve it, and 
contribute to that process (2004: 25). 
When it comes to making decisions, non-government organisations or groups 
of citizens can be dismissed as having no role — they can be regarded as non-
representative and unqualified for a role in policy development at this stage. 
Those who advocate active citizenship, however, would dispute this: ‘active 
citizenship can play a very important role in the decision-making phase: 
convincing people, channelling consensus, revealing the nature of general 
interest on an issue, and so on’ (Moro 2003: 145). Decisions can be shared with 
citizens, even if they do not agree with them.
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There can also be a role for citizens in the implementation stage: ‘Their role in the 
planning phase can consist above all in taking into account obstacles that stand 
in the way of implementation and that are not visible to other agents’. They 
can also ‘test’ tools and parts of policies. When policies are to be implemented, 
citizens can be brought into a coordinated partnership with government to assist 
in ensuring success (e.g. collecting and sharing good practices) (Moro 2003:145). 
Finally, in the evaluation phase, citizens can provide valuable feedback about 
what works, for whom and why. Important accountability issues can arise at 
this point, as discussed below.
Active participation: Issues and challenges 
So far, this chapter has identified various levels of citizen involvement in 
government decision-making processes, from simply receiving relevant 
information through to actively participating in those decisions. It has been 
argued that a risk management framework needs to be adopted to work out 
what type of involvement would best match the issue, who to involve, the 
mechanisms of involvement and when it should take place through the various 
stages of developing policies. 
Involving citizens and non-government organisations more broadly in 
government decision-making is sometimes referred to as ‘participatory 
governance’ (Edwards 2002: 52; Lovan, Murray and Shaffer 2004; Bond et al 
2007; Osmani 2007; Edwards 2008). The essence of participatory governance 
is to provide non-government actors, both individuals and organisations, with 
a means to genuinely and actively be part of the process of developing policy. 
In terms of Table 7.1, active participation would include both collaboration 
and empowerment. In an article on participatory governance, Osmani (2007:1), 
defines ‘effective’ participation as where:
all the relevant stakeholders take part in decision-making processes and 
are also able to influence the decisions in the sense that at the end of the 
decision-making process all parties feel that their views and interests 
have been given due consideration even if they are not always able to 
have their way.
The term ‘community engagement’ is very similar, and commonly used to 
include active engagement around delivery issues on the ground. 
The topic of participatory governance was not high on governments’ agendas 
a decade ago. So, why has the subject generated interest now? There are four 
possible explanations for the emergence of a focus outside of government 
toward citizens (Edwards 2008: 8–9): declining trust of citizens in public sector 
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organisations, along with rising expectations of being consulted; the emergence 
of many more complex policy problems that governments are unable to resolve 
on their own; the unintended consequences of ‘managerial’ type public sector 
reforms embedded in NPM (chapter 2) which downplayed the benefits of 
collaborative behaviour; and the rise in importance of ICT (see also Head 2007: 
442–43).
Whatever mechanisms are used, more participatory or inclusive processes of 
governing appear to be inevitable now, if governments are to have an enhanced 
capacity to cope with the blurring of boundaries across the government and 
non-government sectors and to facilitate good policy making (Edwards 2002: 
58). A move toward greater engagement with stakeholders and communities 
goes hand-in-hand with an enabling if not expanding role for government. 
Despite what now appear to be strong imperatives, the OECD has found 
that, while providing information to citizens or consulting with them was 
quite common across its member countries, there was far less use of ‘active 
participation’ (OECD 2009a). Key questions, therefore, are addressed in this 
chapter in an attempt to elucidate the challenges faced and some possible ways 
forward in promoting levels of participation. It is these challenges that face 
those charged with implementing the relevant recommendations in contained 
in Ahead of the Game. 
Three fundamental and interrelated challenges emerge from the relevant 
literature, which need to be tackled for successful active citizen and stakeholder 
engagement: strong leadership, building up and maintaining trusting 
relationships, and willingness to share decision-making power. These are 
discussed below. If these three fundamental factors are overcome, more practical 
implementation issues are surmountable, including reshaping accountability 
arrangements, aligning structures and processes to the issue and context, 
ensuring appropriate cultures and capabilities, and exploring effective ways of 
evaluating participatory strategies. 
Case study: COAG trials
The above challenges are illustrated here by reference to experiences arising 
from Australian government efforts to engage Indigenous citizens in decision-
making processes, with a particular focus on the COAG Trials. This is a useful 
case study of participatory governance on four levels. First, it illustrates many 
of the dimensions and elements of participatory governance that are outlined in 
this chapter. Secondly, it concerns an area of ongoing topicality and controversy 
(not least because of the Northern Territory intervention) as well as inherent 
suitability for participatory governance (given the relationships between 
Indigenous communities and their representative bodies, and different portfolio 
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responsibilities and levels of government). Thirdly, it concerns a recent initiative 
that emanated from government (and from a cross-governmental perspective) 
about Australian communities, with direct and indirect relevance to their 
governance. Finally, it is an area of study that is documented by various official 
reports and other commentary of relevance from a governance perspective.
In 2000, COAG announced its vision for a closer relationship between governments 
and Indigenous communities, including a reconciliation framework to address 
the growing social and economic needs of Indigenous Australians. In 2002, the 
COAG Trials were initiated. Eight trial sites were chosen with one in each state 
and territory.
The main aim of the COAG Trials was ‘to improve the way in which governments 
interact with each other and with communities to deliver more effective responses 
to the needs of indigenous Australians’ (COAG 2002). Several objectives were set 
for the trials, including: to ‘work with indigenous communities to build the 
capacity of people in those communities to negotiate as genuine partners with 
government’, and to ‘build the capacity of government employees to be able to 
meet the challenges of working in this new way with Indigenous communities’ 
(Morgan Disney & Associates et al 2006: 4). The trials incorporated a shared-
responsibility approach, which was intended to emphasise the concept of 
partnership between government and Indigenous communities.
In 2006, Morgan Disney & Associates conducted an official and independent 
evaluation of the trials for the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination (2006: 5). 
The failures and challenges of the trials that emerged in this official evaluation 
varied across communities. Illustrated below, they are numerous, with the 
primary causes being a lack of coordination, communication, understanding of 
culture, trust, power sharing and appropriate governance arrangements. 
Fundamental factors
Leadership
During the last 10 years, a new language has emerged from the public sector and 
its leadership about collaboration, cooperation, and collegiality and recently 
proposed citizen-centred policies. Leadership of this new agenda has been 
driven from the centre. In the context of the report Connecting Government: 
Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges (MAC 2004), 
a former head of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) said: 
‘There is increasing recognition by governments of the need to engage at the 
community level, whether community is defined as stakeholders with shared 
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interests or residents who live in a particular location. There is also a growing 
awareness that interaction has to move from consultation to collaboration’ 
(Shergold 2005a: 1).
In May 2008, the former prime minister Kevin Rudd progressed this agenda by 
talking of the need for an ‘inclusive policy process that engages with average 
Australians’ (Rudd: 2008). More recently, the previous head of PM&C, Terry 
Moran, made several statements along the same lines but using the current 
language in vogue of ‘citizen-centred’ policies and actions: ‘We must work 
tirelessly to put the citizen at the centre of our programs and policies’ (Moran 
2009: 3). The Ahead of the Game report identified what needed to be done to 
engage citizens, including making government information more accessible, 
mainly through online sites (AGRAGA 2010: 19). 
Even if there were serious commitment shown by Commonwealth public service 
leaders to this agenda, this does not necessarily mean it would be reflected further 
down the hierarchy. In recent surveys of public sector officials in Australia, the 
proportion of public servants consulting with stakeholders has shown an increase, 
although the most common forms of consultation were in relation to service delivery 
rather than policy development. Where consultation took place, it was more 
commonly undertaken with industry, rather than other non-government stakeholders 
(e.g. APSC 2009c: 123; APSC 2010a: 117). Whether this accurately reflects good 
judgment in terms of attaining desired outcomes, or whether it reflects fears that are 
associated with the difficulties of engaging with the public, is unknown. There can 
be little doubt, however, that attitudes of public officials need to be clarified and 
addressed if participatory governance is to be progressed toward reaching achievable 
outcomes. Apart from the fear of losing control by sharing decision-making power 
generally, the loss of control will be felt particularly acutely if power sharing involves 
dominant lobby groups who do not represent the community at large. There is also, 
as noted later, an inherent tension to be managed between the vertical accountability 
responsibilities of officials and the call by government for them to be more responsive 
to citizens’ needs.
Unless there is committed government leadership in encouraging effective 
participation, it is unlikely that actively engaging citizens in decision-making 
is going to have the necessary bureaucratic support to make it work. There 
is a vicious circle here. On the one hand, non-government groups with little 
power can only function well if there are enabling conditions for them to 
operate; on the other hand, the centralised process of decision-making requires 
these groups to be able to apply pressure on government. Once a process of 
participation is set in motion, however, and there is committed leadership, 
the practice of participation should help remove some of the impediments to 
successful participation (Osmani 2007: 32).
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In the context of the COAG Trials, there was much evidence of very strong 
leadership from the top and a real commitment to make these trials work, with 
secretaries of departments personally committing to having their performance 
measured in terms of results in the trial sites for which they were responsible 
(Morgan Disney & Associates et al 2006: 5). Particularly strong in his leadership 
was Peter Shergold, whose previous work experience had given him grounding 
in Indigenous issues. Attitudes at the top, however, did not translate well on 
the ground, where officials were too often seen to be unable to make a ‘quick 
decision’ and, where decisions were made elsewhere, there sometimes was not 
sufficient ownership of them (2006: 23).
Trusting relationships 
Trusting relationships are the essence of any successful collaboration. They 
have been described as both the lubricant and the glue — that is, they facilitate 
the work of collaboration and they hold the collaboration together (Bryson, 
Crosby and Stone 2006: 47–8). Trust is a vague as well as complex concept, 
however, and it can have many meanings, depending on the context (Yang 2005: 
275; Blind 2006). In the public sector context of engaging citizens, trust refers 
to interpersonal or inter-organisational behaviours where the expectations 
of each party are clear and confidence exists that what is committed to will 
be delivered. Trust exists where people have confidence in government, its 
individual agencies and its leaders (Yang 2005: 273; Blind 2006: 3).
Research indicates that citizens today have less trust in public sector organisations 
than they once did (World Economic Forum 2005; Blind 2006; Seldon 2009). Citizens 
are now not only more cynical about government but, also, generally better educated 
and able to articulate their perceptions, judgments and needs (Cavaye 2004: 87–8; 
Peters 2005: 85; Sankar 2005: 3; McCabe, Keast and Brown 2006: 5).
The World Values Survey has found that for 2005–08, Australia ranked 
below the OECD average of 38 per cent of individuals reporting high trust 
in parliament and also below the 23 per cent of individuals reporting high 
trust in their government (OECD 2009b: 16). As such, a ‘democratic deficit’ 
has been identified: voting every three or four years is no longer sufficient for 
citizens to adequately voice their views or, indeed, have a satisfactory way of 
achieving adequate engagement with government. Jim Cavaye (2004: 88) recalls 
the emergence of the One Nation Party in Australia, and its success in rallying 
the protest vote, as a wake-up call to government about the need to actively 
engage citizens. As indicated in chapter 1, it has become increasingly common 
Public Sector Governance in Australia
162
for governments to accept that purely representative democratic processes are 
not enough and need to be supplemented with meaningful citizen engagement 
between elections within a more deliberative framework.1
There is a burgeoning literature on the concept of trust but it is only relatively 
recently that this concept has been brought into public policy dialogues. This 
has occurred as governments recognise that declining trust by citizens in 
government needs to be consciously acted upon, and that citizens may need to 
be actively included in the policy process if desired results are to be achieved 
(OECD 2009b: 28). Not all countries have observed a decline in trust in their 
institutions — some Scandinavian countries such as Norway and Sweden have 
not (Uslaner 2002) and it appears that one of the key factors is the degree to 
which citizens are participants in their democratic processes. A real challenge, 
therefore, is to foster a ‘trust culture’ (Blind 2006: 15) where citizens feel that 
they have a chance to make a difference in the process of making decisions.
There is a need to understand the causal links between trust, good governance 
and engaging citizens — a relationship which, as yet, is by no means clear 
(Braithwaite and Levi 2003; Wang and Van Wart 2007; Bourgon 2007b; Victorian 
Government 2007: 8). Good governance and trust may be related but ‘there is 
something else at play, something really fundamental that goes to the core of the 
issue of trust, and relationship of trust between citizens and government that 
we have not yet either fully understood or tackled adequately’ (Bourgon 2007b). 
Bourgon suggests that it may have to do with changing citizen expectations: 
‘Our citizens are losing some of the levers, which in the past gave meaning to 
the role of citizens, the ability to have the right to have a say, the right to vote, 
the right to hold officials to account’ (2007b: 3). While the relationship between 
citizen engagement and trust is not clear, it is widely agreed that for governments 
‘there is no alternative to strengthening citizens’ trust in government. If you do 
not do it, you drive up the cost of government for everyone and promote the 
disengagement of citizens’ (OECD 2006: 2).
A recent survey by the OECD found that the main goal of governments in 
engaging citizens is to increase levels of trust (OECD 2009b: 28). A big gap 
was found, however, between the goal and the capabilities to achieve it: public 
officials are on a steep learning curve when it comes to building trust between 
governments and citizens (OECD 2003a). Even if the will is there, building 
conditions of trust, when the territory is new and the hurdles are great can be 
a significant barrier for public officials embarking on participatory governance 
processes (e.g. Alford 2002: 48–9). John Alford cites complexity of relationships 
1 There is a growing trend toward citizen involvement, not only between elections in deliberative forums 
but also in other democratically innovative ways such as ‘ongoing scrutiny and public control of decision-
makers’ — referred to as ‘monitory democracy’ (Keane 2009) and with connections to broader dimensions of 
deliberative democracy and societal governance (chapter 1).
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— for instance, intergovernmental and broader accountability complexities, as 
well as the turbulence of the government environment — as potential obstacles 
to building trust in government collaboration (Alford 2002: 48–9). The path 
forward will not be through searching for some ‘magic bullet’ but from many 
small initiatives that are implemented over a lengthy period of time (Zussman 
2007: 22).
In the evaluation of the COAG Trials, it was found that trust between government 
and community partners was higher when there was consistency between 
community committee membership and lead agency staff. Trust can take a long 
time to build up, and be quickly lost, as Diane Smith (2007: 3) relates following 
an incident that took place in West Arnhem Shire, after the Northern Territory 
Government released its media statement on taking over the administration of 
60 or so Aboriginal communities under compulsory lease: 
To say that the Bininj members of the West Arnhem Committee were 
shell-shocked would be an understatement. In one day, without any 
consultation, their collaboration with the Australian Government had 
essentially been made null and void. Their role as the proposed local 
government for the entire region was thrown into question, their work 
over the last three years ignored, and their governance roles treated with 
disdain. A week after the media release, the army, police and Australian 
Government officials entered two communities in the region.
Sharing of power
A central challenge for governments in seeking to move toward citizen-centred 
governance in the decision-making process is the devolution or sharing of 
decision-making power. 
While there is now much rhetoric around the need to increase stakeholder and 
citizen engagement in policy processes (e.g. MAC 2004), reluctance by officials 
to do so can commonly be observed (Allen 2006: 3). Lynelle Briggs and Roger 
Fisher (2006: 24) state that: ‘Full participation with stakeholders in defining 
solutions to wicked problems, requires government to cede some formal control 
over the services that it provides, and reduces the direct accountability of 
government to citizens.’ More recently, Briggs reiterated this point using 
citizen-centred language: ‘it is important to recognise that a shift in power is 
at the heart of citizen centred thinking and, as we all know, a shift in power 
is not often willingly ceded or comfortably managed’ (Briggs 2009: 4). She also 
admitted that the public service is ‘fumbling around with citizen engagement 
models’ (Briggs 2009: 6).
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The actions of state governments often demonstrate a strong desire to at least 
acknowledge the importance of citizen engagement, if not to create a conducive 
environment for citizen-led or citizen-centred governance (e.g. Boxelaar, Paine 
and Beilin 2006; Blacher and Adams 2007). However, it still stands that the 
willingness to engage, and actual engagement, are more often than not conflated, 
resulting in an inadequate representation of what actual engagement should be 
and the necessary reshuffle of power structures and power sharing between the 
players.
The Senate Select Committee on the Administration of Indigenous Affairs 
raised questions about power relationships in the context of the government –
Indigenous Shared Responsibility Agreements, which dealt with respective 
responsibilities of Indigenous communities and governments (Parliament of 
Australia 2005). Jon Altman explained to the committee that: ‘If one party 
holds the purse strings and the other party has to sign off to get what would be 
regarded … as a fairly basic facility … then I can see the Commonwealth signing 
off on a fairly small cheque on their responsibilities (Parliament of Australia 
2005: 101).
The basic issue here is one of sincerity, as well as the perception of sincerity, of 
the sharing of power between those who make decisions and those who have 
a reason to be involved in the decision-making process. This is so much easier 
said than done, especially for those within government who have been so used 
to taking responsibility for a consultation process. This process will become 
harder as the boundaries between government and other potential players, 
including citizens, become more permeable in the process of making public 
policy decisions.
Implementation challenges 
So far, this chapter has dealt with the difficulties to be overcome in moving 
beyond the rhetoric to deal in practice with the fundamental challenges facing 
governments when they seek to actively involve citizens in decision-making. 
Even with strong leadership and commitment at the top, with trust having been 
built up and effective power-sharing occurring, some practical challenges remain 
to be overcome if effective partnering arrangements with non-government 
players in the context of citizen-centred governance are to be realised. It is no 
wonder that there is so often a gap between the rhetoric of citizen engagement 
that is used by governments and the reality witnessed on the ground. 
Some of the more important implementation difficulties are:
•	 the need to reshape accountabilities where responsibilities are shared between 
government and other players;
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•	 the policy capability of and cultural environment around public servants as 
well as the capacity of non-government groups to engage with government;
•	 aligning governmental structures to the issues and context at hand; and
•	 evaluating what works (see, for example, MAC 2004; Mandell 2006; APSC 
2007a, b). 
These are discussed in turn below.
Reshaping accountabilities 
Earlier chapters have indicated that important and increasingly complex 
accountability issues are arising, either as part of the process of bringing more 
non-government players into the policy development process, or where there 
is a move from government-centred decision-making to wider involvement of 
non-government players in that process (e.g. Edwards 2002; Salamon 2002; 
Mulgan 2003; APSC 2007b).
Accountability in the public sector seeks to ensure that public sector agencies 
and their staff are responsible for collective and individual actions, and 
the decisions leading up to them (Barrett 2000: 7). This is in line with the 
Westminster concept of ministerial responsibility to parliament, which is 
discussed in chapter 1.  Many other considerations arise once responsibility for 
decision-making is shared with non-government players: can the principles of 
individual and collective responsibility (if not accountability) to the taxpayer 
through parliament hold when the boundaries between and across the sectors 
are more blurred? As the boundaries across sectors blur, there is an inevitable 
tension between traditional vertical accountability mechanisms, which are 
inherent in the Westminster system, and horizontal accountability in terms of 
responsiveness to citizens. The challenge now is to reshape governance processes 
and practices so that this inevitable tension is minimised and managed (Lovan, 
Murray and Shaffer 2004: 2; APSC 2007b: 23; Bourgon 2007a: 11ff).
A key issue here, for both government and non-government organisations, in 
achieving good process in shared decision-making is to collaborate in clearly 
defining the respective roles and responsibilities and developing accountability 
systems which encapsulate the objectives of both vertical/hierarchical and 
horizontal dimensions (Edwards 2002: 2011). Essential ingredients include: 
agreement on the expectations of all parties; balancing expectations with 
respective capacities; credible reporting arrangements; and carefully designed 
and appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (Auditor General of 
Canada 1999; DFD 2012b).
The Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) has canvassed some questions 
‘about the compatibility of the existing accountability framework and the 
capacity of the APS agencies to effectively tackle wicked problems’ (2007b: 23). 
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The report Tackling Wicked Problems: A Public Policy Perspective ponders the 
question of what type of accountability framework should be used to give enough 
flexibility for programs whose outcomes may take many years to realise. It takes the 
COAG Trials as an example, where the evaluations ‘confirm that whole of government 
and partnership approaches aimed at changing the economic, health and social 
circumstances of disadvantaged communities, in particular Indigenous communities, 
require long-term commitments of 10 to 20 years in order to be realised’ (2007b: 
23). A disturbing but common complaint reported in an audit of the COAG Trials 
was that it was difficult to work out ‘who was in charge’ (ANAO 2007: 74) and the 
trial objectives were not clearly understood or necessarily shared by communities 
(Morgan Disney & Associates et al 2006: 6).
Alignment of organisational structures
Too often, where participatory governance mechanisms are put in place, 
they are observed to be operating in the context of traditional structures and 
processes which do not necessarily align with the purpose of participatory 
governance (e.g. Alford 2002: 52; Keast et al 2004; Boxelaar, Paine and Beilin 
2006; Kettl 2009). A key implementation issue, therefore, is to redesign public 
sector institutions and practices to align more with the new participatory and 
interactive framework. Some suggestions about how this may be done are 
contained in recent Australian government reports (MAC 2004; APSC 2007b: 
18). The APSC gives prominence to supportive structures and processes:
There is a need for careful choice of the appropriate structures to support 
whole of government work. Structures and processes must be matched to the 
task — no ‘one-size-fits-all’. If there is deep contention between portfolios 
or in the community, for example, and tight time frames are involved, a 
dedicated Taskforce under strong leadership and working directly to the 
Prime Minister, a senior Minister or a Cabinet committee may produce better 
outcomes than a more standard interdepartmental committee.
Again, it is not easy to turn this rhetoric into reality. There are Australian 
examples of where there is good intent and genuine engagement at the initial 
stages of the project, only for there to be a switch back to old patterns in the later 
stages of implementation. According to Lucia Boxelaar, Mark Paine and Ruth 
Beilin (2006: 120), during the course of one Victorian Government project, non-
government participants in the team, who were initially referred to as ‘actors’, 
became known as ‘community stakeholders’ or ‘customers’ and marginalised 
from the change process. This case study points to existing practices (such as 
project management and evaluation) and structures of government as well as 
the culture that is embedded in them as factors that can obstruct participatory 
governance (Boxelaar, Paine and Beilin 2006: 122). Robyn Keast and Kerry 
Brown (2004) relate a similar Commonwealth–state experience in the case of the 
Queensland Goodna Service Integration Project.
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A lesson that emerges here is not only the need, when engaging with communities, 
for conscious alignment of administrative practices and organisational culture 
but, also, a constant monitoring of what is happening in relation to the initial 
objectives. 
A growing academic literature on Indigenous governance affairs, in Australia and 
elsewhere, points to the importance of ‘cultural match’ in ensuring successful 
policy implementation (Westbury and Dillon 2006: 8). In the COAG Trials, 
for example, attempts at a participatory approach were hindered by a divide 
between the types of processes and structures that were used by governments 
in an attempt to achieve results and ensure accountability, on the one hand, and 
traditional Indigenous governance arrangements on the other. If this disparity 
is not addressed early on in the process, with moves toward collaborative 
alignment, then all the commitment and rhetoric that can be brought to bear on 
the task will be insufficient to ensure the success of implementation. 
Culture and capabilities
Closely related to the implementation challenges that are identified above is 
fostering an appropriate culture. This was found to be particularly relevant in 
the case studies analysed in the MAC Connecting Government report (2004). It 
was also emphasised more recently by the APSC (2007a: 20).
In the APS context, high performing agencies also need to be characterised 
by a culture that encourages collaboration with other agencies and whole 
of government outcomes. Perceptions by stakeholders that an agency is 
insular and inwardly focused could be a sign of poor corporate health. 
Writing about the Australian experience of community engagement, Cavaye 
has observed many cases of practices changing, but without any change 
in assumptions: ‘There are examples of traditional thinking in community 
engagement approaches that amount to “we are from the government and we 
are going to engage you”, rather than valuing and investing in relationships and 
building true partnerships’ (2004: 94). Changing the culture within agencies 
towards valuing active participation with stakeholders and citizens will require 
strong leadership to influence the attitudes and behaviour of staff and the 
acquisition of relevant capabilities. 
The extent to which there are both the relevant skills and capacity of public 
servants to engage with non-government players in the policy process is a real 
challenge and has been acknowledged by the APSC and by officials surveyed 
by it in the APSC State of the Service reports. The 2008–09 report found that: 
‘Sixty-two per cent of employees identified the ability to “nurture internal and 
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external relationships, facilitating cooperation and partnerships” as the third 
most important capability they need to remain effective in the APS of the future’ 
(2009c: 127). 
One mechanism for building internal capability is to actively promote Better 
Practice Guides and related advice on the ‘how to’ of participatory governance. 
Heads of all Commonwealth departments have actually signed off on some 
principles and practices to guide whole-of-government initiatives, including 
increased engagement of  non-government organisations in government 
policy and service delivery (MAC 2005). But more needs to be done to ensure 
participatory governance is engrained in public service culture and monitored 
to make certain it actually takes place. An audit by the ANAO of the COAG 
Trials identified the need for government staff to be trained in ‘new ways of 
collaborative working’ (2007: 74) including ‘how to engage with respect for the 
protocols and processes in Indigenous communities’ and relevant training for all 
staff engaged in whole-of-government and place-based initiatives (ANAO 2007: 
87). 
The officially commissioned evaluations of the COAG Trials raised a series of 
relationship issues in building partnerships, including Indigenous partners 
identifying a common set of required skills for government officers including: 
‘good listening; acting in good faith; high levels of good will; willingness to 
share power; recognising and acknowledging intra-community and familial 
relationships and how these impact on leaders; understanding the pressures 
on communities; being honest and open; and being human’ (Morgan Disney & 
Associates et al 2006: 27). These are the skills that can be expected to be ones all 
public servants involved in ‘engaging’ activities will need to acquire.
An interesting question arises here in terms of the boundaries around the 
engaging activities of public officials. In answer to the question of how public 
officials should engage with citizens under an effective participatory regime, 
Lorne Sossin (2002: 89) considered that one approach was to view public officials 
as promoters of what has been termed ‘deliberative democracy’. His view is 
that citizen empowerment cannot succeed without bureaucratic support and, in 
some cases, initiative. This is not to undermine existing bureaucratic channels 
but to transform them. This approach would require giving public officers: 
‘increased discretion to form … relationships and re-conceiving the basic 
normative foundations of public administration to accommodate attachment 
rather than detachment. Under this view, values such as trust, engagement 
and self-disclosure would come to characterise bureaucratic behaviour’ (Sossin 
2002: 89–90). 
Alongside the building of internal government capability is the equally important 
task of ensuring that those who governments engage have the necessary capacity 
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to participate fully. ‘There is a difference between participation which focuses on 
opening up opportunities for involvement and the capacity building/community 
development approaches traditionally used to empower disempowered people’ 
(Involve 2005: 17). Non-government organisations also need to assure government 
that they have the capacity to be responsive to broad consumer and community 
needs (for an elaboration of this point, see Edwards 2002). 
In the COAG Trials, some government officers lacked cultural awareness and 
a general understanding of Indigenous communities and culture, as well as 
lacking relevant skills to work in a whole-of-government environment. And 
some community leaders did not have enough understanding of government 
processes and culture or the skills needed: ‘in relation to community governance, 
engagement and capacity building’. Morgan Disney & Associates et al (2006: 21) 
concluded that ‘there was not enough attention given to conversations regarding 
working differently nor to cultural awareness training of the government 
agencies engaged in the Trials’. 
Evaluating what works
To date, there has been little evidence of countries making progress in 
implementing, or even developing, appropriate evaluation frameworks of 
participatory governance (OECD 2009a). The OECD recently found that the 
‘evaluation gap identified in the 2001 report is alive and well’ and that when 
standards have been developed, performance against those standards is not 
evaluated regularly (2009a: 58). Many reasons could be advanced for this, one 
being the lack of clarity that exists about the purpose of citizen participation 
(OECD 2005a:14). Another, and perhaps related, reason is that active citizen 
participation is required most on complex as well as sensitive policy issues 
which, so far, standard program evaluation methodologies have been unable to 
cope with. The OECD also suggests that there may be a fear that transparency 
will undermine support for engaging citizens (2009a: 59).
A starting point for any evaluation, however complex the issue at hand, is to 
ask its purpose before determining the next steps (Head 2007: 450). Some of the 
questions that need to be posed in the context of participatory initiatives are 
the following. Is the purpose to be about outcomes or only processes, and how 
well were relationships developed? Is the purpose to learn and/or to generalise 
from a particular instance? Is it about auditing and compliance, or is it about 
providing some encouragement to participants (Head 2006: 14)? Or is it some 
combination of these? The OECD survey of governments found that close to half 
saw a benefit in evaluation helping to improve the management of initiatives 
and, with most governments still at the early stages of ‘embedding evaluation 
into their public engagement processes’, they were focusing more on process 
than outcomes (OECD 2009a: 59, 62).
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Another early question regards the perspective from which the evaluation is 
to occur. The government’s alone? Or is it also that of non-government actors? 
If the perspective includes the latter, was the purpose of their participation 
and their respective roles, responsibilities and accountabilities understood and 
agreed? Or did they prefer a different place, method, timing etc.? 
These and other questions are in a checklist that the OECD has developed on 
factors to take into account if evaluations of public participation in government 
decision-making are to be successful (2005a: 16–17). Critically, and as a 
prerequisite, the OECD stresses the need to encourage a culture of evaluation 
for this process to be successful and that much can be learnt from comparing 
progress across countries (2005a: 16–17). The Netherlands has a special ‘centre 
of expertise’ unit which evaluates better practice in participatory or interactive 
policy-making using a clear framework including measures of impact of citizen 
engagement (OECD 2009a: 181).
When launching the MAC Connecting Government report, Shergold saw issues 
relating to Indigenous Australians as ‘the biggest test of whether the rhetoric 
of connectivity can be marshalled into effective action’ (Gray and Sanders 2006: 
6). Since then, each COAG Trial has been evaluated independently according to 
a standard set of issues. The purpose is as much about learning as the process 
continues, as it is about outcomes (Gray and Sanders 2006: 27).
A Canadian study assessing the impact of public participation has found that 
far more important than the technical challenges in evaluation is ‘a low level 
of commitment to public participation within government policy departments 
(which) can contribute to ambivalence or even resistance toward its evaluation’ 
(Abelson and Gauvin, 2006: 30). It is very likely that the same study in Australia 
would arrive at a similar conclusion, given the similarities between the two 
systems of government.
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the concepts of governance and partnership and what 
might be needed to make participatory governance work well. The chapter has 
examined the challenges and issues arising when governments decide that they 
need to involve stakeholders and citizens as active participants in the policy 
process. The challenges covered include both those that are preconditions for 
effective participatory governance to come into effect, and also those that are of 
a more practical kind. 
Whatever level of involvement of non-government players that governments 
decide upon, it is of paramount importance that expectations on both sides are 
7 . Participatory Governance
171
well understood and aligned. If, for example, the government wishes to provide 
information only, and not actively engage with citizens throughout the policy 
process, this needs to be stated at the outset. If the government has already 
made a decision which is irrevocable, but then wants to engage the community 
within that context (e.g. on delivery issues), that also needs to be clearly stated 
and understood before communities participate in discussions on any next 
steps. The Rudd Government’s Australia 2020 Summit in 2008 is an example of 
active citizen engagement (and is used as such by the OECD (2009a: 27)) but, to 
the extent that the belated government response to the outcomes of the summit 
did not match public expectations, some trust in government would have been 
undermined despite the initial, positive steps towards engagement.
A related point is that clarity of language and intent and avoidance of rhetoric 
are of the essence in effective participatory governance. Angela McCabe, Robyn 
Keast and Kerry Brown (2006: 5), for example, have discovered how easy it 
is to use confusing language around community engagement. Incorrect and 
inappropriate use of the terminology can create inefficiencies within community 
engagement policies that may result in negative outcomes, a reduction of trust 
and/or failed community engagement potential. 
At its heart, successful engagement requires that governments manage the 
fundamental tensions; this has been identified as a theme of this book. This 
chapter has highlighted several key tensions that need to be confronted by 
the Commonwealth government into the future. The most pressing appears to 
be that between the horizontal responsibilities of government out toward non-
government organisations and citizens and the vertical accountabilities of the 
Westminster system (Briggs and Fisher 2006: 16; Fung 2009). What is to be the 
balance here? A related tension for officials is between serving democratically 
elected representatives of the people, on the one hand and, on the other, 
becoming involved in participatory democratic processes. A critical question 
for governments to confront in the twenty-first century is whether multiple 
accountabilities can be tolerated, and how far ambiguities in partnership 
arrangements will be acceptable? (Dobell and Bernier 1997: 258) How far can 
the nature of accountability arrangements change as a result of a convergence 
between public and private sectors? (Edwards and Langford 2002: 13–14; 
Barrett 2000: 62). These questions will need to be confronted by the Australian 
Government as the implementation of Ahead of the Game proceeds.
There are other tensions that need to be confronted. There is a tension between 
attempting to pursue the most efficient practices of citizen involvement with 
spending the required resources to gain trust and work collaboratively over 
what can be lengthy periods of time, with hopefully more effective outcomes 
achieved (OECD 2009b: 34). The role of government and its officials in being 
responsible for service delivery, and yet only being an ‘enabler’ of that process, 
Public Sector Governance in Australia
172
also creates tensions. This is related to the frequently observed tension between 
the responsibilities of central agencies as enablers and line agencies, which are 
more involved in implementation, including attempts to work with communities. 
Different circumstances may require considerable flexibility, so no set of rules or 
even principles might apply, unless they can be implemented flexibly. On top 
of this, there is often the need to gain broad citizen involvement, but this has 
to be handled carefully without powerful lobby groups taking over the process 
of engagement. Finally, a real tension exists between needing professionals to 
build up policy capabilities on the one hand and, on the other, needing to rely 
on officials to engage outside of government to gain broader ownership of policy 
objectives (Brans and Vancoppenolle 2005: 164). How is the Australian public 
service going to pursue enhanced policy capabilities with the limited resources 
at its disposal?
Ahead of the Game emphasises the need for more citizen engagement, but how 
much of this is rhetoric (or ‘cosmetic commitment’ to use an OECD phrase (2009a: 
33))? Will its implementation lead to ‘active participation’ by public sector 
players in relation to non-government players and citizens and, indeed, permit 
participation activities to be actually initiated by citizens? Or will ‘citizen-
centred’ actions become stuck on meeting citizen expectations on quality of 
services rather than progress to their actual engagement in policy processes?
It is unlikely that the above tensions are able to be avoided, thus careful 
management is important; managing these tensions and dualities will require 
new structures and ways of working for government (Cavaye 2004: 98): new 
skills, new capacities, new and different types of relationships and interactions. 
This chapter has attempted to answer several questions to assist in managing 
these tensions better and highlighted some issues around the type of leadership 
needed by government, the need to build up and maintain citizen trust and 
how decision-making power needs to be shared. While recognising the 
difficulties that are faced by governments in consistently pursuing participatory 
governance, it is essential that answers be found for the questions that currently 
hamper effective implementation, including: whether to share accountability 
as well as responsibility for decisions, addressing structural barriers as well as 
the challenges of changing culture and enhancing staff engagement capabilities. 
Part III. Key Issues
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8 . Creating and Regulating Public 
Sector Bodies
Many of the matters that are covered in the first two parts of this book become 
most significant when governance structures and other arrangements for public 
sector bodies are designed, implemented and reviewed. This occurs, for example, 
when new bodies are created, existing bodies are restructured, and new or 
revised governance regulatory requirements are introduced. Accordingly, the 
formulation of governance arrangements and key appointments for public sector 
bodies warrant attention from both central and organisational perspectives. 
These topics constitute the focus of chapters 8 and 9 respectively. 
The conventional spectrum of bureaucratisation, commercialisation, 
corporatisation and privatisation of government entities still leaves much room 
for a multiplicity of governance arrangements at both sectoral and organisational 
levels. The adoption of particular approaches to designing, implementing and 
reviewing corporate governance arrangements at the federal level in successive 
Commonwealth government initiatives that have been undertaken this 
century, (e.g. Uhrig 2003; DFA 2005b; AGRAGA 2010; and DFD 2012b) marks 
a break from twentieth-century practice, and also reflects changes in priorities 
and trends in public administration from one government to another. The 
implications beyond the Commonwealth public sector of such developments in 
governance architecture are still a work-in-progress across the Australian states 
and territories (e.g. NSW PBRC 2006: 68–70).
Accordingly, this chapter concentrates upon the Commonwealth level of 
government, but with modelling implications for other levels of government in 
Australia and other countries in the Westminster tradition. It addresses issues 
affecting the design and regulation of governance arrangements in the public 
sector that stem from a range of sources. These include public sector trends, 
official reviews of governance arrangements, whole-of-government guidelines, 
and legislation for specific public sector bodies that regulates their governance. 
Two case studies are provided that cut across these different sources — the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Future Fund.
The changing environment for governance design
The features of the governance and regulatory environment that surround an 
existing or proposed public sector body affect its design and reform. First, 
the selection of appropriate governance frameworks and arrangements is 
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responsive to the cyclical and counter-responsive trends within the public 
sector itself (chapter 2), as well as the different governance orientations and 
models that are adopted by central government over time (chapter 4). In short, 
the phases of public sector reform and their influence upon systemic, central 
and organisational conceptions and forms of governance have flow-on effects for 
the governance of public sector bodies of all kinds, together with official policy 
and other guidance about their governance.
This connection between public sector reform and governance’s own evolution 
is evidenced by the continuous attention that is given, in official reviews of 
Australian public administration both before and after landmarks such as the 
Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holder 
(Uhrig review) (see chapter 2, this volume), to the structures and forms of 
governance and their connection to governance performance and accountability. 
Indeed, the multiplicity of governance structures and forms across the 
Commonwealth public sector that existed before the Uhrig review stands in 
contrast to the rationalisation and recentralisation of public sector bodies in its 
aftermath. 
Secondly, as governance becomes more integrated within and across societal 
sectors, levels of government, and geographical borders, the cyclical trends and 
counter-trends within the public sector become subject to a series of cross-
cutting influences. This, too, has an influence upon governance structures 
and relationships. For example, Ahead of the Game: Blueprint for the Reform 
of Australian Government Administration, foreshadows a range of innovative 
governance structures for developing strategy and delivering outcomes across 
agency portfolios, societal sectors, and levels of government (AGRAGA 2010; see 
also chapters 2 and 10, this volume).
This sits well with an ‘interconnected environment’ that is witnessing ‘a 
considerable expansion of government and some new approaches to government 
intervention’, as well as ‘some underlying changes in the means of delivering 
government programs and services’ which, according to the Australian Auditor-
General, include ‘increasingly complex inter-relationships between: government 
agencies; different levels of government; and the private sector including 
not-for-profits’ (McPhee 2008b: 3). The continuing attention to governance 
arrangements in subsequent official reviews (e.g. DFD 2012b) evidences the 
ongoing need for sophisticated matching of governance models to evolving 
governance needs, from a range of sectoral and other perspectives.
 Finally, designing and implementing good governance arrangements presupposes 
that the governance architecture thereby established is used properly and 
neither circumvented nor undermined. Much of the potential for systemic 
breakdowns and dysfunctionalities, divergences of expectations, and conflicts 
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of roles and interests amongst ministers, public servants, and other public 
officials, lies in situations in which the integrity of the governance architecture 
that safeguards the public trust is lacking, compromised, or bypassed altogether 
(Finn 1995). Examples of such fault lines from the literature include the use 
of informal ministerial influence to achieve what should properly be the 
subject of formal ministerial direction, the potentially conflicting obligations 
of allegiance for agency heads and board members in serving the twin masters 
of their organisation and the government of the day, and the over-identification 
of ministerial, governmental, and bureaucratic self-interest with the public 
interest.
All of these surrounding environmental features influence the creation and 
operation of governance structures and other arrangements for Commonwealth 
public sector bodies. In light of this, the next part of this chapter covers the aspects 
of governance design that have been embedded in governance architecture as a 
result of recent reviews, and which affect the choice of organisational form for a 
Commonwealth public sector body. 
The impact of governance regulatory 
architecture upon governance arrangements
From Uhrig to Ahead of the Game and beyond
Whatever the shifts in governance priorities and trends from the standpoint of 
public administration that accompany the transition from one Commonwealth 
government to another, the governance regulatory architecture that is enshrined 
in the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cth) (CAC Act) and the 
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) (FMA Act), the Uhrig 
review templates, and other official guidance on governance arrangements (eg 
DFA 2005b, DFD 2011) have ongoing significance until superseded or replaced. 
Even subsequent reviews of governance models, such as those in Ahead of the 
Game and the Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review (CFAR), must 
take as their starting point for reform the interplay between such official sources 
of influence on governance design.
The Uhrig review and its general implications for governance are covered in 
chapter 2. This part of the chapter focuses more particularly upon the specific 
features of the Uhrig review-inspired agenda that have regulated the design 
and implementation of governance arrangements for Commonwealth public 
sector bodies, notwithstanding other ways in which public management and 
administration has moved on from that agenda. This understanding is essential 
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for anyone involved in studying or critiquing governance arrangements, 
implementing or reviewing such arrangements, and reforming or modelling 
them. In addition, it is necessary to cover here at least those analyses and 
criticisms of the Uhrig review that highlight its benefits or, alternatively, relate 
to its gaps and weaknesses, from the standpoint of designing and implementing 
governance arrangements under prevailing official standards. 
Against that necessary background, four scene-setting comments set up the 
analysis that follows. First, the Uhrig review does not cover (or purport to cover) 
all aspects of corporate governance in the Australian public sector. The brief in 
its terms of reference focused upon ‘the structures and the governance practices 
of Commonwealth statutory authorities and office holders’ — hence the primary 
emphasis upon ‘governance arrangements’, ‘accountability frameworks’, 
‘best practice corporate governance structures’, ‘formal accountability and 
risk management requirement’, ‘relationship structures’, ‘accountability and 
reporting mechanisms’, and ‘a template of governance principles and policy 
options’ (emphases added). These have intrinsic relevance for designing and 
restructuring Commonwealth government entities. 
Secondly, while the Uhrig review certainly mentions a number of higher-order 
aspects of governance in passing — e.g. the Australian people’s ownership of 
government, the constitutional system of government, the connection between 
parliament and statutory authorities, and organisational cultures and values — 
its main emphasis lies elsewhere. Reflecting and expanding upon the thrust of 
the Uhrig review, two years after the government received it from him, John 
Uhrig spoke revealingly about the report bearing his name. ‘The more power 
you hand to somebody else, then the more you need governance to ensure that 
that power is not improperly used and is in fact used in a constructive way’, 
he noted, adding that ‘if you’re going to reach the right conclusions about 
governance then you must see all of the issues from the point of view of the owners’ 
(Uhrig 2005; emphasis added). This owner-centred priority has implications 
for how Commonwealth government entities are created and administered in 
ways that enhance those aspects of governance that relate most directly to their 
answerability to ministers and the government of the day.
Thirdly, the Uhrig review adopts a particular conception of corporate governance 
and its key elements. This is evident from the outset, in its conception of 
governance as encompassing ‘the arrangements by which owners, or their 
representatives, delegate and limit power to enhance the entity’s prospects for 
long-term success’ (Uhrig 2003: 21). This particular conception and orientation 
permeate its underlying thrust, its detailed analysis, and its recommendations, 
organised around its professed governance framework of ‘understanding success 
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(clarity of purpose), organising for success (structures, powers and relationships) 
and ensuring success (accountability and disclosure)’ (Uhrig 2003: 37; original 
emphasis). 
As a result, some things that are critical to successful governance risk being 
under-emphasised or untouched, such as a balance between hard and soft 
dimensions of governance, and even the relationship between enhanced 
accountability to government and broader notions of governance, of which that 
relationship forms part (chapter 1). These emphases and limitations condition 
the use of the governance arrangements that flow from the Uhrig review and 
remain enshrined in the regulatory framework for public sector governance to 
this day.
Finally, at present, the governance regulatory framework for Commonwealth 
government entities contains a crucial alignment respectively between the 
choice of Uhrig review-based management templates, applicable governance 
legislation (i.e. CAC Act and FMA Act), and balance of regulatory and commercial 
functions. This also makes the Uhrig review and its implementation and criticism 
of ongoing significance, at least until a subsequent review unravels or reshapes 
those intertwined strands of the underlying governance architecture. At the same 
time, the CFAR review signals the ongoing need for review and possibly reform 
of this governance legislation, to improve its applicability to the multiplicity 
of Commonwealth public sector bodies, enhance their risk and performance 
management, facilitate better compliance and regulatory enforcement, and 
facilitate cross-governmental and cross-organisational outcomes. 
Departing from the Uhrig templates in governance 
design and review
Importantly, from the standpoint of governance arrangements, the Uhrig review 
concluded that board structures are inappropriate for a number of statutory 
authorities, particularly those with mostly regulatory and not commercial 
functions (Uhrig 2003: 54). Together with another important finding ‘that 
entities undertaking similar functions do not necessarily have comparable 
governance arrangements’, especially in terms of the conditions under which 
Commonwealth public sector entities choose to have governing boards (chapters 
2 and 6), these findings support the Uhrig review’s overall recommendation for 
greater ‘clarity’, ‘alignment’, and other enhancement of governance structures 
and processes (Uhrig 2003: 7). These findings sit within the broader movement 
within government ‘to revisit the independent operation of statutory authorities 
and agencies and to bring them closer to the centre of government’ (Gath 2004: 
3; and chapter 4, this volume).
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Most importantly, the Uhrig review creates the management templates that are 
canvassed in chapters 2 and 6 — namely, a ‘board’ template and an ‘executive 
management’ template. These templates dovetail neatly with distinctions 
between board and non-board management structures, on one hand, and 
commercial and regulatory functions, on the other, as well as the conditions 
under which such things are regulated respectively by the CAC and FMA acts. 
In the Uhrig review’s own words, use of the board template is confined to 
situations ‘where government takes the decision to delegate full powers to act 
to a board, or where the Commonwealth itself does not fully own the assets 
or equity of a statutory authority (that is, there are multiple accountabilities)’, 
with the executive management template applying in all other cases (Uhrig 
2003: 10). This step also produces a greater alignment in Uhrig terms between 
organisational autonomy, independent legal status, and financial separation 
from the government for organisations with a commercial focus, which are best 
governed by a proper board under the management, financial and reporting 
accountability framework of the CAC Act. 
Under Uhrig’s rationale, this is distinct from the kind of governmental control 
and ownership, ministerial direction and decision-making, and financially 
responsible use of public funds for policy, regulatory, or essential service 
delivery purposes that is best suited to an agency chief executive (with or 
without an executive management or advisory group: see Uhrig 2003: 8), under 
the different accountability framework of the FMA Act. The central rationale 
and division of functions in play here is crystallised in the Uhrig review in the 
following terms (2003: 45):
The freedom from general government policy associated with the 
use of resources, and accountability to the Minister for Finance and 
Administration for the use of those resources, is justified for those 
authorities competing with the private sector, or for those authorities 
not funded by the commonwealth [but not where] authorities perform 
functions on behalf of the Government and are funded by the 
commonwealth budget, and consequently should comply with general 
government policy in the use of resources. 
However valuable the two management templates offered by the Uhrig review, 
the range and basis of justified exceptions to the templates are critical. The more 
that attention is focused on those bodies in the sector that are not simply engaged 
in service delivery, directed implementation of policy, and departmental advice 
and assistance to ministers, the more that anomalies and exceptions emerge that 
diverge from the two basic Uhrig templates. One Uhrig review-based response 
might be that, despite the wide range of different entities with different roles 
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across the Commonwealth public sector, most will fit one of the two Uhrig review 
templates from both internal management and ‘accountability to government’ 
perspectives.
Another Uhrig review-based response might be that the two basic templates 
do not prevent or limit whatever internal governance arrangements might 
be necessary for essential organisational functioning. Still, the Department 
of Human Services, the auditor-general (and the Australian National Audit 
Office), and the Australian Research Council are different creatures from federal 
courts (including the High Court of Australia), the RBA, official regulators and 
commissions like the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), and a 
federally created university like The Australian National University. Of course, 
none of this necessarily detracts from what might be one of the Uhrig review’s 
ultimate benefits — namely, clarifying and addressing some of the problems and 
inconsistencies in how statutory authorities have been created and managed 
over time.
In any case, both the Uhrig review and the Howard government’s formal 
response to it also accepted that the basic templates might need adjustment or 
modification for particular public sector bodies and circumstances. In words 
pregnant with possibilities that allow exception-arguing lawyers and policy 
advisers some room to move, the Howard government’s published response to 
the Uhrig review accepted that ‘in applying the templates, consideration will 
be given to any unique factors that may require an adaptation of the relevant 
template’ (Minister for Finance and Administration 2004: 2).
The Commonwealth public sector has operated successfully since 1997 with 
a corresponding two-limbed legislative governance framework in the form of 
the CAC Act (i.e. for governmental entities pursuing commercial activities and 
appropriately managed by a corporate board) and the FMA Act (i.e. for other 
entities engaged in non-commercial activities and managed by an executive 
management group, headed by a departmental secretary in whom statutory 
responsibility resides). As others note, this also reflects a broad distinction 
between bodies that remain part of the Commonwealth government for the 
purposes of financial administration and accountability, and bodies that have 
a separate legal status and fund-holding capacity in their own right, but still 
fit broadly within the fold of executive government (Wettenhall 2004 –05: 67). 
The CFAR review, however, raises questions about the viability of the basic 
models in the Uhrig templates and their corresponding governance legislation 
for governance design in the future (DFD 2012b: 32–3 and 87). 
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Formal governmental guidance on governance 
design arrangements
A number of policy and regulatory imperatives underpin the selection of 
appropriate governance structures and other arrangements for Commonwealth 
public sector bodies that operate under whole-of-government guidance provided 
by Finance. This guidance was developed in the post-Uhrig review phase in 
the form of Governance Arrangements for Australian Government Bodies, which 
was originally published in 2005. First, under a policy of reducing ‘unnecessary 
proliferation of Government bodies’, governmental functions and activities 
desirably should be allocated to and performed by an existing governmental entity, 
provided that a suitable governmental vehicle already exists for this purpose (DFA 
2005b: x, 12–15). All things being equal, policy preferences also extend to creating 
new Commonwealth governmental authorities instead of new government-owned 
companies (DFA 2005b: 24–7) and to non-legislative structures for new bodies 
instead of additional legislation for them (DFA 2005b: 13–15). 
Secondly, the policy decision to create a new Commonwealth governmental 
body must devote considerable attention to its overriding purpose, functions, 
and powers, on one hand, and, on the other, ‘its financial, legal and staffing 
status’ (DFA 2005b: x, 18–29). In making that decision, central agencies and 
other stakeholders within government must be consulted (DFA 2005b: x), from 
the standpoint of whole-of-government coordination in general and central 
agency oversight of Commonwealth public sector governance in particular. 
Thirdly, in deciding appropriate governance structures and arrangements for a 
new governmental entity, attention should focus upon key matters such as its 
policy purpose and methods of interacting with governmental bodies, periodic 
review arrangements, financial relationship with governmental budgetary and 
appropriation matters, board or executive management structures, engagement 
of staff under or outside the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) (PS Act), and 
appropriate balance of organisational independence and governmental control 
(DFA 2005b: xiv–xv, 32–42). 
Fourthly, where the new governmental entity needs its own incorporating or 
governing legislation, that legislation must be attentive not only to the new 
entity’s financial, legal and regulatory status, but also to the legislation’s 
interaction with other public sector governance regulation, such as the CAC 
Act, FMA Act and PS Act. Beyond that set of regulation, it must also be 
sensitive to others laws and regulation with which an entity’s incorporating or 
governing legislation might interact, in setting the boundaries of the entity’s 
legal responsibilities, liabilities, and immunities (DFA 2005b: x–xi, xv, 42).
8 . Creating and Regulating Public Sector Bodies
183
Amongst such sources of legal risk that are identified in the Finance’s Governance 
Arrangements for Australian Government Bodies are laws concerning administrative 
and judicial review, taxation, governmental trade practices liability, copyright, and 
the shield of the Crown. The extent to which a statutory corporation or government 
business enterprise has the legal status and immunities of the Crown, and is subject 
to laws applicable to all, is an important question of governance design as well as legal 
responsibility. This affects the applicability of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to the 
Future Fund board, for example.1
Such questions of legal risk allocation are important in contexts as varied 
as government contracting and outsourcing, public–private partnerships, 
establishment of statutory bodies and state-owned enterprises, and 
transformations of governmental status through corporatisation and privatisation. 
For such reasons, Finance’s guidance in the Governance Arrangements for 
Australian Government Bodies includes advice to those creating and advising on 
governmental bodies to address the application of various laws to them, within 
a set of other factors affecting the choice of governance arrangements for these 
bodies (DFA 2005b: 42).
Fifthly, additional policy decisions about the new entity’s regulatory or 
commercial focus, and its need for a governing board, as informed by 
consideration of the Uhrig review templates, determine its location primarily 
within the CAC Act or FMA Act management, reporting, and accountability 
frameworks (DFA 2005b: x–xi, 8). Under the influence of the Uhrig-based 
templates, corporate boards are reserved for commercially focused bodies that 
are legally and financially at arm’s length from the government, with ‘board-
like’ executive management structures being reserved for ‘an advisory function 
to assist the Chief Executive’ or ‘where collective statutory decision-making 
requires a commission’ (DFA 2005b: x, 35–8). The considerations that govern 
selection and use of public sector boards are covered in chapter 6.
Sixthly, given the connection between the FMA Act, the PS Act, and the core 
of executive government, a policy preference exists for new entities and their 
staff to be governed under this framework, unless there is a demonstrated need 
for the kind of commercial focus, governing board, and greater organisational 
independence that characterises the alternative CAC Act framework and Uhrig 
review-based board template (DFA 2005b: x). Seventhly, while departures from 
these Commonwealth public sector governance frameworks are undesirable 
for bodies located wholly within the Commonwealth government sector, the 
contemporary need for coordination, cooperation, and other regulatory action 
across levels of government and even societal sectors raises additional issues about 
governance structures and arrangements for such vehicles (DFA 2005b: x, 28–9). 
Ahead of the Game also addresses these issues (chapters 2 and 10, this volume).
1 Future Fund Act 2006 (Cth), s. 39.
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Finally, whatever governance framework applies, there are important aspects of 
departmental, ministerial and even parliamentary oversight of new governmental 
entities that also apply (DFA 2005b: x). This covers everything from minister –
agency communication, departmental advice, and portfolio oversight (DFA 
2005b: x) to a series of non-executive and even non-governmental accountability 
mechanisms that are evolving along with democracy itself (chapters 1 and 10).
In addition to official guidance from Finance, Ahead of the Game also contains 
analysis and recommendations that relate to matters of governance design. In terms 
of enhancing public sector efficiency and effectiveness, for example, it highlights a 
connection with governance design questions, as follows (AGRAGA 2010: 29):
Agency efficiency can also depend on governance structures. For example 
larger agencies can achieve economies of scale that are not available to 
smaller agencies. In small agencies, different governance arrangements may 
have different costs. It is therefore important to consider what governance 
option will work best, particularly when establishing small agencies.
Most significantly, a number of its recommendations go directly to the public 
sector governance framework for designing and establishing new Commonwealth 
public sector bodies, as well as reviewing existing ones. In particular, Reform 
8 (i.e. ‘Ensuring agency agility, capability and effectiveness’) and Reform 9 (i.e. 
‘Improving agency efficiency’) suggest actions that relate to various aspects 
of governance arrangements, such as regular ‘agency capability reviews’, 
streamlined agency compliance, shared responsibility for cross-portfolio 
outcomes, alternative agency efficiency measures, and simplified and enhanced 
governance structures. 
For example, Recommendation 9.2 (‘Strengthen the Governance Framework’) 
outlines the following brief for Finance, as the lead agency involved in developing 
and revising the Governance Arrangements for Australian Government Bodies 
(AGRAGA 2010: 69):
•	 Simplify governance structures for new and existing entities by 
 consolidating the categories of entities that can be created.
•	 Amend the Governance Arrangements for Australian Government 
 Bodies (Governance Guide) to ensure:
•	 clear governance arrangements for inter-jurisdictional entities;
•	 APS employees are clear about their responsibilities when 
  appointed to company boards; and
•	 all new and existing agencies are fit-for-purpose.
In outline form, some of these recommendations potentially cut across aspects 
of the Uhrig review implementation agenda, while others expand governance 
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reform in new directions. Where the Uhrig review aligned each of its templates 
(i.e. board or executive management) with its corresponding function (i.e. 
commercial or regulatory) and correlative legislative framework (i.e. CAC Act 
or FMA Act) from both organisational and sectoral perspectives, Ahead of the 
Game more directly contemplates the need for innovative cross-portfolio and 
interjurisdictional governance models.2
Indeed, there is much in Ahead of the Game that reflects the virtues of a holistic 
system of public administration, with integration of whole-of-government, 
intergovernmental, and cross-sectoral elements, along with synchronisation 
of cross-agency coordination and shared best practices and outcomes. This 
alternative approach to governance framework-setting is underpinned by 
related themes of innovation (e.g. digitalisation), optimisation (e.g. regulatory 
deburdening), collaboration (e.g. cross-sectoral service delivery and shared 
expertise), participation (e.g. community-involved and business-engaged 
planning and delivery), empowerment (e.g. agency and community capacity 
building), and monitorability (e.g. regular agency reviews).
While reinforcing some of the themes and discussion of Ahead of the Game, the 
initial public discussion paper resulting from the CFAR, Is Less More?: Towards 
Better Commonwealth Performance (DFD 2012b), charts its own directions in 
outlining options that affect the design and implementation of governance 
arrangements. For example, it records that ‘(t)he issue of whether an entity 
is governed by a board or executive management is divisive under present 
legislative settings’ and contemplates a possible reform agenda for ‘revisiting 
the structure of financial framework legislation and considering whether the 
existing delineation of FMA Act and CAC Act entities is optimal’ (DFD 2012b: 
32 and 89).
The dynamic balance between central control and organisational autonomy 
means that ‘(i)t is therefore important to pay close attention to the design 
of the control arrangements for entities’ (DFD 2012b: 31). Importantly, the 
CFAR discussion paper suggests refocusing attention on basic governance 
principles that apply to government bodies across the board, regardless of their 
organisational form and management structure, and signals the possibility of ‘a 
single piece of legislation with templates that outline a set of core governance 
provisions covering financial and governance matters for new government 
bodies’ (DFD 2012b: 32 and 42). Such legislation for ‘fit-for-purpose governance 
arrangements’ would complement moves towards ‘more integrated portfolio 
governance’, ‘improved joint activities’ and otherwise ‘strengthening the 
whole-of-government performance framework’ (DFD 2012b: 12, 33, 39 and 43).
2 Assuming that it becomes law in a form that does not differ too greatly or at all from the Bill introduced 
into the federal parliament in early 2012, the Public Service Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) facilitates these 
developments in its enhancement of the roles and responsibilities of departmental secretaries, along with the 
creation of the Secretaries Board.
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From policy design to legislative implementation
In the discussion to this point, this chapter covers the key public sector sources 
that regulate official decisions to establish, review or restructure Commonwealth 
government bodies. The final part of this chapter covers the two cases studies 
and concluding observations and questions.
What makes the RBA and the Future Fund suitable case studies in designing 
and reviewing governance arrangements? The RBA is one of the regulators of 
relevance to business whose governance arrangements the Uhrig review was 
specifically tasked to examine, along with other key official business regulators 
such as the ACCC, ASIC, and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 
It is not only an example of a major official regulator in its own right, but also 
one whose governance arrangements are left largely intact by the Uhrig review, 
whatever reforms might otherwise affect it. It is governed by legislation that is 
specific to the organisation, and therefore illustrates the important connection 
between governance requirements and legislation beyond the CAC Act and 
FMA Act. The RBA is also the subject of debate about matters of independence 
and allegiance that raise some of the governance issues canvassed in this and 
other chapters. 
The Future Fund serves as a primary example of a major new entity whose 
regulatory design is informed, first, by what the Uhrig review set in train for 
governance arrangements and, secondly, by the choice between governance 
primarily under the CAC Act or FMA Act. It serves as an innovative illustration of 
how to combine aspects of both regulating acts and also provides an example of 
how the basic Uhrig review management templates are customised to particular 
needs in creating major new entities under legislation. Indeed, the statutory 
overlay for both the RBA and the Future Fund also serves to underline the 
importance of considering governance arrangements for statutory authorities 
and corporations through the prism of both executive and legislative domains 
of concern.
The Reserve Bank of Australia
The RBA is Australia’s central bank. The Reserve Bank Act 1959 establishes 
the following governance structure and arrangements for the RBA: it is a body 
corporate, can hold property, and is able to sue and be sued (Reserve Bank Act 
1959, s. 7); it has wide general powers to fulfil its functions (s. 8); it is a CAC Act 
body, although it is statutorily exempted from some of the CAC Act’s provisions 
(ss. 7 and 7A); its board is charged with ensuring ‘that the monetary and banking 
policy of the Bank is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of Australia’, 
and that its powers are directed towards best contributing to ‘the stability of the 
currency in Australia’, ‘the maintenance of full employment in Australia’, and 
‘the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia’ (s. 10).
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The separation between the RBA’s monetary and banking responsibility and 
its responsibility for payment systems is structurally built into the allocation 
of these two responsibilities; respectively to the Reserve Bank Board (RBB) 
and the Payments System Board (s. 8A). This example of aligning functional 
responsibilities with governance structures and other arrangements has 
modelling significance beyond the RBA to central banks in other countries 
(Caruana 2010: 60). These modelling implications go both ways, in light of the 
RBA’s structural divergence from monetary and banking policy models in other 
countries (Uren 2011). For example, the 2007 ‘Statement on the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy’ on behalf of the Australian government and the RBA has been 
criticised for introducing governance reforms that ‘leave the RBA operating 
under an outdated and internationally anomalous governance structure that 
is incompatible with modern demands for central bank transparency and 
accountability’ (Kirchner 2008: 18). In the wake of the global financial crisis 
(GFC), various issues concerning ‘governance structures’ arise for central banks 
across jurisdictions, and also for private sector participants in the market, as 
acknowledged in the RBA’s 50th anniversary symposium (Caruana 2010: 54 and 
60; and Kent and Robson 2010: 3).
For some time, successive Australian governments have publicly emphasised 
the independence of the RBB. At the same time, the Reserve Bank Act creates 
a number of important points of connection between the government and the 
board. The board must keep the government informed of the RBA’s monetary and 
banking policy (s. 11(1)). If the government has ‘a difference of opinion’ with the 
board about how well its monetary and banking policy promotes ‘the greatest 
advantage of the people of Australia’, the federal treasurer and the board must 
strive to reach agreement. In the exceptional situation where they cannot reach 
agreement, the government has formal mechanisms available to ensure that its 
view prevails and that the board complies (s. 11(2)–(7)). The governor of the 
RBA and the secretary of Treasury are statutorily instructed to ‘establish a close 
liaison with each other’ and to ‘keep each other fully informed on all matters 
which jointly concern the Bank and the Department of the Treasury’ (s. 13). 
Matters concerning different aspects of the RBA’s governance regularly feature 
in both official and media scrutiny. Federal parliamentary committees scrutinise 
the RBA’s annual reports, for example. In recent years, scrutiny of the RBA’s 
governance in the financial press has ranged over a wide variety of issues. These 
include: broadening the RBA’s network of overseas offices to provide on-the-
ground assessments to inform monetary policy consideration (e.g. Freebairn 
2011); institutional and personal conflicts of interest for RBB members (e.g. 
Uren 2011; and Kirchner 2011); governance structures and audits of RBA 
subsidiaries that have been targeted in official investigations (e.g. Maiden 2011; 
and McKenzie and Baker 2011); RBB composition and independence (e.g. Kerr 
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2011; and Kirchner 2011); and the impact of the Treasury secretary’s board 
membership upon RBA decision-making and external perceptions (e.g. Uren 
2011; Kirchner 2011; Kerr 2011; Hewson 2007; and Gath 2006).
The historical antecedents of the RBA’s governance structures (e.g. Cornish 2010) 
and the Australian Government’s satisfaction with the RBA’s performance in the 
aftermath of the GFC (Uren 2011) stand apart from these concerns. Although 
not completely separate from each other, assessment of the RBA’s economic 
impact is distinct from assessment of the RBA’s governance performance against 
world-class benchmarks for institutional independence from governmental 
interference, board structures and representation, balance and appointment of 
internal and external members, public communication and transparency, and 
separation of monetary, governance, and statutory roles (Kirchner 2008).
Most significantly for the question of the board’s independence, the membership 
of the board includes the secretary of Treasury, as well as provision for a senior 
public servant who is nominated by the secretary as an alternate member when 
the secretary cannot attend board meetings (ss. 14 and 22). At least five of 
the six board members appointed, in addition to the secretary and the RBA’s 
governor and deputy governor, must not be RBA service staff or public servants 
(s. 14). This means that only a small minority of board attendees could ever have 
a current public service affiliation. Under long-standing practice, it also results 
in business leaders from various industry sectors forming a significant part of 
the RBB’s external membership.
Even if the only person appointed with a dual board membership and public 
service role is the secretary to Treasury, the question is whether that alone 
jeopardises the much-heralded ‘independence’ of the board from governmental 
direction and control in setting monetary and banking policy. The secretary will 
have obligations to the treasurer as a senior public servant and the treasurer’s 
departmental head, as well as to Treasury (and the government of the day) under 
the FMA Act, in addition to whatever obligations they might have as a member 
of the RBA’s board. In particular, could the secretary ever be in a position where 
the secretary’s other obligations realistically compromise or conflict with the 
secretary’s obligations as a board member?
This question can be approached from a number of different angles. The structural 
framework established by the Reserve Bank Act still has to operate in a political 
and behavioural context, where both hard and soft aspects of governance are 
relevant (chapter 1). So, from that perspective, a board member’s expertise, 
behaviour, and judgment are not reducible to matters of formal independence 
from government alone. At the same time, the post-Uhrig reinvigoration of the 
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role of secretaries in agency and portfolio oversight for ministers arguably cuts 
across such representative roles for departmental secretaries and other senior 
public servants (see chapter 9).
Distinctions must also be kept in mind here between individual board members’ 
legal responsibilities, their collective responsibility as a decision-making organ, 
and the impact (if any) of divided loyalties for a minority of individual members. 
Still, the burden of wearing too many hats is at its worst when the employment, 
professional, ministerial, parliamentary, and public service obligations of public 
servants pull them in different directions (Finn 1993: 51–2; and Finn 1995: 22–
3, 26). This potential fragmentation of otherwise interlocking accountabilities 
makes it even more important, for the sake of institutional integrity, to ensure 
that systemic safeguards of independence are in place and followed. 
The question here is whether the perceived or actual influence of government 
over public service members of the RBB undermines, or even compromises, 
its independence as a collective decision-making organ, on legal or other 
governance grounds. At the very least, factors such as overseas models of 
central bank independence, the relationship between Commonwealth ministers 
and departmental secretaries, and the legislative requirement for official liaison 
between the RBA’s governor and Treasury secretary all condition perceptions of 
the secretary’s place on the RBB and also distinguish the secretary from other 
board members. 
In an opinion piece on governance in public institutions, former leader of the 
federal opposition, John Hewson, focuses at first upon the governance issue of 
separation of board roles, as applied to the RBA (Hewson 2007: 90):
The RBA’s board and governance processes, for example, are almost 
farcical. The governor, as chief executive, is also chairman of the board, a 
practice increasingly frowned on and discouraged in governance circles.
The separation of the chairmanship and CEO roles on the board is a long-standing 
issue of corporate governance regulation of the private sector in Australia, the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere, with different approaches prevailing across 
jurisdictions at different times. To the extent that current Australian corporate 
governance thinking in the private sector favours separation of the two roles, 
the RBA’s governance arrangements may seem exceptional (e.g. Uren 2011; 
Kalokerinos 2007). The question is whether the public sector context, past 
practice and the regulatory results justify that divergence. 
Turning his attention to the question of the RBA’s independence, Hewson says 
(2007: 90):
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Much is made of the independence of the RBA. True, it’s pretty 
independent of government these days, but it is still not independent 
within government. There is no reason for the secretary of the Treasury 
to be a designated member of the RBA board. This is a relic of the past 
when Treasury was the dominant source of advice to the government — 
indeed, the bank used to report to the Treasurer only through Treasury. 
Other financial press commentary also singles out the anomalous position of the 
Treasury secretary on the RBB, in terms of both prevailing governance trends 
and international benchmarks, as follows (Uren 2011):
The presence of the Treasury secretary on the board is a further oddity. 
The Campbell committee in the late-70s reviewed this and concluded it 
should be continued in the interests of coordinating both the fiscal and 
the monetary policymaking.
In practice, whenever there is a question of whether interest rates 
should rise or remain steady, the Treasury secretary can nearly always 
be counted on to advocate steady rates.
The New Zealand model, in which the Treasury secretary plays no part, 
appears to be closest to best practice for central bank independence. It 
would be assumed that the Treasury secretary and the governor would 
be in frequent discussion on economic policy, which ought to be enough 
for coordination purposes. 
Importantly, these comments collectively expose different meanings and contexts 
for arguments about independence as a governance design issue. As in the private 
sector, a board member can be subject to a range of influences and relationships, 
not all of which necessarily compromise their independence of mind for board 
decision-making purposes. Independence from formal government direction 
and control is different from independence from all executive government 
involvement and influence. All of these aspects of independence are different 
again from independence from accountability arrangements that are applicable 
to institutions within the executive arm of government.
The question of board representation of senior public servants straddles these 
different standpoints from which considerations of independence might be 
assessed. The presence and appropriateness of such representation varies from 
one organisation to another. No Commonwealth employee or full-time public 
office holder is eligible to sit as a board member on the Future Fund’s Board 
of Guardians, for example (s. 38(4)). Whatever the differences between such 
major institutions, there is a question of consistency and justification here from 
a whole-of-government perspective.
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The question of the RBB’s independence also attracts attention from legal experts 
on governance. Noting both the status of the secretary of Treasury as a board 
member and the secretary’s alleviation of responsibility as a board member 
when acting in accordance with any conflicting obligations as a senior public 
servant, Shaun Gath evaluates the position as follows (2006: 6–7):
How, then, is one to regard the role of the government director on 
the Reserve Bank Board now that he/she is freed from any fiduciary 
obligation to consider the interests of the Bank when performing her 
role and is, rather, it seems duty bound as a public servant to represent 
the views of the Treasurer?
Might it not be said that the changes made to the CAC Act have had the 
practical (even if unintended) effect of circumventing the formal process 
for resolution of disputes between the Board and the Government 
established by the Reserve Bank Act 1959 by ensuring that the Treasurer 
will have as a powerful and direct voice for his views at least one director 
who has no other function other than to directly report the Treasurer’s 
opinions, untrammelled by any considerations going to the interests of 
the Bank itself?
So, one may feel prompted to ask: is the Board of the Reserve Bank 
really ‘independent’ or not? … Perhaps, when one takes into account 
the fact that there are other directors who will always outnumber the 
government director, the answer, on balance, is still ‘yes’ … But this 
much seems to me to be unarguable: it is certainly not as independent 
as it was.
This passage contains a number of important steps in the development of Gath’s 
argument — hence its reproduction here in full. The generic problem — which 
has the potential to create conflicts of interests and duties, particularly for 
governmental board directors — was identified more than 25 years ago by the 
Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Government Operations (SSCFGO 
1982: 76, as cited in Gath 2006: 2):
(A) departmental officer, as a member of the executive government, is 
placed in an impossible position in reconciling that role with his role as 
a member of a statutory authority. It is by no means inconceivable that 
the interests of an authority could conflict with those of a minister … 
(M)embers of authority boards have a corporate responsibility to put 
the interests of the authority before any other interests. Consequently, 
department officers who are also members of authorities could be faced 
with very painful conflicts of interest.
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Underpinning Gath’s concern about the scope of the board’s independence 
is his view of the CAC Act’s conditioning of board members’ duties when 
acting in accordance with their obligations as public officials. Under the 
CAC Act, directors and other officers of government authorities have duties 
that closely mirror their equivalents in the Corporations Act, with suitable 
modifications to account for their transition to a public sector context (chapter 
6). Here, performance of an officer’s statutory duties must also interact with 
and accommodate ministerial and portfolio oversight, adherence to applicable 
government policy, and compliance with financial management, reporting and 
other public sector regulatory requirements.
Since the turn of the century, the chief mechanism for alleviating such concerns 
is the exemption of an officer of a Commonwealth authority from breaching at 
least some of the designated duties where the officer is doing something required 
elsewhere under the CAC Act or else, where the officer is also a public servant, 
the officer acts ‘in the course of the performance of his or her duties as a public 
servant’. However, this legal sidestep around such conflicts is criticised by Gath 
for leaving government directors and other officers ‘effectively removed from 
the scheme of accountability established under the CAC Act … with a stroke of 
the parliament’s pen’ (Gath 2006: 5).
Taking all of these issues into account, the question remains whether or not 
the reporting of ministerial views and relevant policy for the information of 
a board, by someone with multiple obligations as a board member, ministerial 
adviser and senior public servant, inevitably compromises the board’s collective 
decision-making, either in how other board members treat such views or in the 
perceptions of others. In light of such strong concerns about board member 
independence and loyalty, how does the Uhrig review deal with the RBA and its 
board? Consistent with the principle that governing board members should be 
appointed for their expertise and not simply the constituencies they represent, 
the Uhrig review takes a general stance against representational appointments 
on boards (Uhrig 2003: 98–9):
The review does not support representational appointments to governing 
boards as representational appointments can fail to produce independent 
and objective views. There is the potential for these appointments to be 
primarily concerned with the interests of those they represent, rather 
than the success of the entity they are responsible for governing. While 
it is possible to manage conflicts of interest, the preferred position is to 
not create circumstances where they arise.
8 . Creating and Regulating Public Sector Bodies
193
Focusing in particular upon the appointment of public servants (especially 
departmental secretaries) to governing boards in the public sector, the Uhrig 
review maintains a healthy scepticism about such appointments, and views their 
appropriateness as being the exception rather than the norm (Uhrig 2003: 99): 
Similarly, care should be exercised when appointing public servants 
to boards. In circumstances where a departmental staff member is 
appointed on the basis of representing the government’s interests or 
having a ‘quasi’ supervision approach, conflicts of interest may arise 
and poor governance is likely. Through participation in decision-
making, either directly or implied, the departmental representative may 
become an advocate for the organisation rather than contributing critical 
comment. This also has the potential to create an incentive for the other 
members of the board to meet to discuss and agree on important issues 
separately from formal meetings, without involving the departmental 
representative, thereby removing the formal board meeting as the 
main decision-making forum of governance. Membership of the board 
by the related departmental secretary is unwise unless there are specific 
circumstances which require it. (emphasis added) 
In short, representational appointments present governance risks of a lack 
of true independence, an inhibition of candour in boardroom discussion, a 
potential mixing of hat-wearing roles, and a ‘constituency representation’ focus 
(instead of a ‘best interests of the organisation’ focus). The common governance 
problem of wearing multiple hats is particularly acute in the case of departmental 
secretaries, who have a fundamental obligation as public servants to follow and 
communicate government policy as well as comply with lawful government 
directions. They also have a statutory obligation under the FMA Act to ensure 
‘proper use’ of their department’s resources, along with a governmental advisory 
role on matters concerning public sector bodies within their ministerial 
portfolio. Avoiding or managing potentially conflicted institutional loyalties is a 
key aspect of systemic integrity and the norms to which it gives effect. 
Hewson’s final comments on the RBA concern its non-executive directors and 
their governance function in context (Hewson 2007: 90):
Similarly, the RBA’s ‘non-executive’ directors — a spread of business 
people, a token academic — are political appointments who don’t really 
function as non-executive directors should. They are, of course, expected 
to comment on economic circumstances from their own positions, but 
essentially they are fed the information the bank’s management wants to 
give them to achieve the decisions management wants.
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In an important sense, of course, most non-executive directors are dependent to 
one degree or another on the information that is provided and contextualised 
by management. This is a fact of life that leads to governance safeguards to 
ensure effective organisational oversight. Such safeguards include prudential 
supervision of management and corporate controls (especially over two-way 
information and communication flows), active questioning of information 
and advice from management (including drill-down enquiries beyond senior 
management where necessary), and resorting to more independent sources of 
advice from external experts (especially on major corporate decisions affecting 
a company’s future). Still, the present law on differences between executive and 
non-executive directors is in a far from optimal state (Austin 2010, cited in Eyers 
2010: 10-11).
Notwithstanding all of the concerns canvassed above, the Uhrig review 
recommended maintaining the RBA’s existing governance and board 
arrangements. Citing the significance of a board’s ability to appoint and remove 
the CEO, as well as the strength and effectiveness of the relationship between 
the CEO and the portfolio minister, the Uhrig review made an exception in the 
case of the RBA (Uhrig 2003: 41):
One exception to this principle identified in the course of the review 
is the RBA. While the board does not have the power to appoint and 
terminate the CEO, based on evidence provided to the review, the board 
was assessed as providing effective governance in determination of RBA 
policies. The structure of the board and the nature of its responsibilities 
meet the expectations of the international financial community with 
respect to effective governance arrangements. Divergence from such 
arrangements may affect international confidence in the independence 
of the RBA. The governance arrangements should remain unchanged.
Testing these conclusions is difficult, given the conduct of the Uhrig review 
as an internal governmental review with select outside consultations and the 
absence of additional detail in the review itself on the basis for this assessment. 
At the very least, the exceptionalism with which the RBA is treated in the 
Uhrig review represents a pragmatic approach to the RBA’s perceived success, 
independence and international reputation. Such considerations affecting the 
RBA are not necessarily in sync with the Uhrig review’s strong emphasis upon 
enhancing the answerability of public sector bodies to the government of the 
day.
Still, the RBA was specifically identified in the review’s terms of reference, 
and the Uhrig review’s failure to address some aspects of the RBA’s governing 
legislation and other aspects has been criticised (e.g. Wettenhall 2004–5). Senior 
RBA officials accept publicly that the importance of the banking industry to 
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a national economy requires more than ‘the normal principles of corporate 
governance’, including acceptance that ‘certain higher standards of prudence 
are required of banks than of the average corporate entity, and there is more 
intrusive supervision of their activities’ (Stephens 2005). Similarly, the RBA’s 
central role in economic and financial stability gives its independence and other 
governance arrangements a unique context, and also elevates them to a new 
level of significance (Stephens 2005), as tested in the GFC and its aftermath. 
Nevertheless, the countervailing considerations in this chapter point to 
substantive issues concerning appointments, membership, independence, 
oversight and other features that are likely to figure in ongoing scrutiny and 
any future official reviews of the RBA and its governance. 
The Future Fund 
The governance structure and arrangements for the Future Fund, and its 
amenability to governmental direction and influence, are important features 
in any debate about the ultimate policy uses of its investments. Governance 
arrangements for the Future Fund and its Board of Guardians are established 
under the Future Fund Act 2006 (Cth) (Parts 2 and 4). In the election year of 
2007, political disputes occurred federally between the major political parties 
about the best use of the Future Fund. The government established it initially 
to meet at least expected public sector superannuation payments in coming 
decades, as indicated in the statutory objects of the Future Fund (s. 15). It later 
placed its residual Telstra shareholding in the Future Fund, with the opposition 
(and succeeding government) proposing to use the Future Fund for national 
broadband telecommunications infrastructure. 
The legislation establishing the Future Fund draws much from the templates 
that were recommended by the Uhrig review. In establishing the Future Fund, 
Future Fund Board of Guardians, and Future Fund Management Agency, the 
Future Fund Act combines aspects of the Uhrig review’s board and executive 
management templates in the one combined scheme. Moreover, as the Future 
Fund Act itself contemplates, both the CAC Act and the FMA Act apply to 
different component parts of that overall scheme. For example, members of the 
Future Fund Board of Guardians have statutory duties that closely correspond 
to those of board members of governmental corporations and authorities under 
the CAC Act, but the chair of the board cannot breach particular duties simply 
by doing what is required of them under the FMA Act, and the chair also cannot 
be directed by the board in relation to the chair’s functions and powers under 
the FMA Act and PS Act concerning the agency (ss. 56–63 and 79).
Similarly, the Future Fund board and the Future Fund Management Agency that 
support it are together treated as a single agency for various FMA Act purposes, 
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with the board’s chair also responsible to the relevant minister for the agency’s 
management (ss. 76–77 and 80). Indeed, the Future Fund’s combination of 
regulatory features under the CAC and FMA acts is cited in a CFAR case study, 
as ‘an example of an entity structure that involves a board and an FMA Act 
agency’ (DFD 2012b: 33).
The basic legislative framework for the Future Fund under the Future Fund Act is 
as follows: decisions about investments for the Future Fund are the responsibility 
of the Future Fund Board of Guardians, and investments are made in its name (ss. 
16–17); the board is constituted under the Future Fund Act (s. 34); the board is 
a body corporate that can execute contracts, hold property, and sue or be sued, 
but it holds any property or money ‘for and on behalf of the Commonwealth’ 
(ss. 36 and 37); the board comprises its chair and six other members, who must 
each have designated financial or corporate governance expertise (s. 38); board 
members are appointed part-time, and their appointment can be terminated by 
the relevant ministers for breach of duty and other deficiencies (ss. 40 and 44); 
the board also has ministerial reporting obligations (ss. 54 and 55); it is not a 
Commonwealth government authority, and so the CAC Act does not apply to the 
board, except where the Future Fund Act itself makes the CAC Act applicable to 
the board, most notably for the consequences of breaching any statutory duties 
owed by board members (s. 66). 
Mirroring the directors’ duties enshrined in the CAC Act and the Corporations 
Act, the main duties of board members cover duties of care and diligence (with 
a correlative business judgment defence), good faith, use of position, use of 
information, and conflicts of interest, with some of those duties applying to 
agency staff (ss. 56–62 and ss. 68–72). As with directors’ duties in the CAC 
Act, these duties of board members are conditioned by their other statutory 
obligations concerning the Future Fund, so that they will not be in breach of 
duty simply because of compliance with those obligations (s. 63). As in both 
the CAC Act and the Corporations Act, other defences or safeguards for board 
members include reasonable reliance on information or advice that is provided 
by relevant agency staff, professional advisers or experts, or other board 
members or committees (s. 65).
The responsible ministers for the Future Fund set the Investment Mandate for 
the Future Fund (s. 18), in consultation with the board (s. 19); the board is 
bound by that Investment Mandate (s. 20). The board is advised and assisted 
by the Future Fund Management Agency, comprising the chair of the Future 
Fund Board of Guardians and the staff of the Future Fund Management Agency, 
which has no legal identity separate from the Commonwealth of Australia (s. 
74). Relevant accounting, auditing, and reporting requirements under the FMA 
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Act apply to the board and the agency as though they comprise a single agency 
with the chair as its chief executive (s. 80). Similarly, the chair and the agency 
staff are treated as a statutory agency for the purposes of the PS Act (s. 77). 
‘In the performance of its investment functions, the Board must seek to 
maximise the return earned on the Fund over the long term, consistent with 
international best practice for institutional investment’, which is the board’s 
primary investment objective (s. 18(10)). This remains subject, however, to 
directions by the relevant ministers. In the case of any conflict between the 
board’s primary investment objective and the ministerially directed investment 
mandate, the mandate prevails (ss 18(6) and 18(11)).
So, any future controversies about how governments use and influence the 
Future Fund are likely to centre at least upon the mechanisms for governmental 
direction and control that are built into the legislative framework for its 
investment mandate. The starting point is ministerial involvement in setting the 
investment mandate by giving directions: ‘The responsible Ministers may give 
the Board written directions about the performance of its investment functions, 
and must give at least one such direction’ (s. 18(11)).
The ‘responsible Ministers’ here are the treasurer and the finance minister (s. 
5). Any directions given by them collectively form the investment mandate (s. 
18(3)). The boundaries and content of those ministerial directions are framed 
under the Act, in terms of the considerations that must guide the ministers in 
giving directions (s. 18(2)): 
(a) maximising the return earned on the Fund over the long term, 
consistent with international best practice for institutional investment; 
and 
(b) such other matters as the responsible Ministers consider relevant.
The first consideration in that list accords with prudential investment advice and 
practice, and concentrates upon optimising the Fund’s financial performance 
and returns, although it raises in-built issues about what optimises sustainable 
returns from a whole-of-investment-portfolio perspective (Horrigan 2010). 
Nothing in that consideration directly raises political or governance concerns. 
The same cannot necessarily be said, however, for the second consideration, 
which is not limited on its terms to additional matters that simply facilitate 
or support the first consideration. In theory anyway, it is pregnant with the 
possibility of political manipulation of the fund to the potential and even 
unintended detriment of its financial objectives. At the same time, it is difficult 
to foresee any conventional political purpose that would be at cross-purposes 
with optimising the value of the Future Fund, whatever political choices are 
made in the ultimate uses of the fund. 
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Hypothetically, there could be a direction to invest a particular proportion of 
investments in designated areas (e.g. to prefer Australian investments), or to give 
priority in investment decision-making to designated standards (e.g. to promote 
corporate responsibility and sustainability in the overall economy, consistent 
with other governmental policies to that effect (Horrigan 2010)). As this example 
shows, political and other socio-ethical motivations can shape investment 
approaches, although no government in reality will want an outcome of fewer 
financial returns for the Future Fund in the long run, whatever the government 
might do to the Future Fund’s Investment Mandate in the short term. In other 
words, while the political capacity for shaping the fund’s investment mandate 
exists, other systemic and institutional factors combine to inhibit directions 
that stray too far from the central objective of ‘maximising the return earned 
on the Fund over the long term, consistent with international best practice for 
institutional investment’.
In practice, of course, the Future Fund Act facilitates close consultation between 
the government and the board in setting the investment mandate. All parties 
have a common commercial interest in optimising the fund’s investment returns. 
The legislative governance framework for the Future Fund does other things to 
support this, such as making transparent and exposing to parliamentary scrutiny 
any board submission (and concern) about a draft ministerial direction affecting 
the investment mandate, and making public the board’s investment policies 
in accordance with its investment mandate (ss. 18(2) and 24). Accordingly, 
ministerial directions above and beyond what is ‘consistent with international 
best practice for institutional investment’ are perhaps best reserved for matters 
that are truly ancillary, supplemental, and facilitative, rather than broader 
policy matters that risk being financially counterproductive in effect. At the 
very least, such mechanisms provide opportunities for scrutiny and dialogue 
concerning proposed governmental intervention of this kind.
The reputation of the Future Fund can be affected by other governance matters, 
in addition to management of its investment mandate. As with appointments 
to the RBA, the process and outcome of appointments to the Future Fund 
Board of Guardians can affect its reputation in the investment community and 
its future relations with governments of all political colours. The appointment 
of David Gonski as its chair in early 2012 is an example of a meritorious 
candidate emerging from a flawed appointment process (Edwards 2012: 71). This 
appointment generated considerable media debate, which surrounded Gonski’s 
earlier involvement as an adviser to government on selecting a new chair, 
the degree of consultation with Future Fund board members about potential 
successors, the involvement of former politicians as board and chair appointees, 
8 . Creating and Regulating Public Sector Bodies
199
and the publicly unknown aspects of the appointment process.3 The controversy 
in the recent past surrounding various board appointments by government, 
including appointments to the Future Fund and RBA boards, reinforces the need 
for comprehensive, merit-based selection processes of sufficient transparency, 
independence and accountability (see chapter 9).
Conclusion
Such considerations return us to the central theme in this chapter, concerning 
the interplay between governance norms, frameworks and mechanisms in the 
design, implementation and review of governance arrangements. These features 
also relate to the systemic multi-order mechanisms that act as safeguards of 
institutional integrity and other public interests that are enshrined in the 
underlying political and legal architecture for the business of government.
As the discussion in this chapter shows, there are questions surrounding the 
creation and implementation of appropriate governance structures and other 
arrangements for public sector bodies that remain of ongoing significance. Despite 
the transition from the Uhrig review agenda to the respective agendas that are 
expressed in Ahead of the Game and the CFAR, each of those official milestones 
maintains at least some focus upon governance design and implementation. 
More broadly, governance design in the twenty-first century must also embrace 
a new order of shared governance challenges and responsibilities that require 
governance innovations in cross-governmental, trans-sectoral and even 
international coordination and leadership. This is a theme that is picked up in 
the final chapter, which addresses future governance challenges. 
3 E.g. ‘I Told Labor “Fund Board Wants Costello” But They Chose Me: Gonski’, Australian, 15 March 
2012, pp 1 and 4; ‘Future Fund Wanted Costello’, Australian Financial Review, 15 March 2012, pp 1 and 
8; ‘Judgment Day for Future Fund’, Australian, 15 March 2012, p. 28; ‘Costello: It’s Been “a Shemozzle”’, 
Australian Financial Review, 16 March 2012, pp 1–4; and ‘Fund Job Cannot Be One for the Boys’, Australian 
Financial Review, 16 March 2012, p 51.
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9 . Appointments and Boards
This chapter focuses on the senior appointment processes for the public sector 
bodies that were discussed in the last chapter. It deals with appointments at 
the Commonwealth level for authorities that operate under the Commonwealth 
Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cth) (CAC Act). As indicated in earlier 
chapters, these bodies have the power to make and implement decisions on 
matters related to the public purpose of the entity, unlike those that fall under 
the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) (FMA Act) such as 
departments of state. There are guidelines for the selection of Australian Public 
Service (APS) agency heads and other relevant statutory office-holders, which 
come under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) (PS Act) (APSC 2009a). These 
guidelines are comprehensive in defining the role of key players, such as the 
secretary of a department, and how the merit-based process is to proceed. There 
are, however, no comparable guidelines for office-holders within Australian 
public bodies outside the PS Act; the Australian Public Service Commission 
(APSC) guidelines stop short of being applicable to the chairs and directors of 
such boards.
Most state governments have various procedures for making public sector 
appointments: New South Wales (New South Wales Government 2004), 
Queensland (Queensland Government 2006), Victoria (Victorian Government 
2011) and Western Australia (Government of Western Australia 2010) each have 
a set of guidelines with the guidelines in South Australian currently under 
review (South Australian Government 2000). None of the states have procedures 
that are as comprehensive as international better practices. 
In the last few years, two incidents have occurred that have the potential to 
undermine public confidence in Australia’s appointment processes. One was 
the resignation of Adelaide businessman Robert Gerard from his position on 
the board of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) in December 2005, after the 
opposition raised allegations of tax evasion. Another has been controversy over 
recent appointments to the board of the Australian Broadcasting Commission 
(ABC). The former was not a major crisis of confidence and, therefore, did not 
lead to pressure on the government to make the current processes more rigorous, 
transparent and independent. The second example, however, was sufficiently 
serious to spur the Labor Party into commitments for reform, as the case study in 
this chapter on the ABC indicates. The topic of board appointment processes is 
important because it can only be a matter of time before a political appointment 
to a high-profile board in Australia backfires enough to severely dent faith in 
public integrity and confidence in its key institutions.1
1 In March 2012, political controversy arose around the lack of systematic and transparent processes by 
which Mr David Gonski was appointed to chair the Future Fund.
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This chapter first describes appointment processes to Australian public sector 
boards and briefly puts them in a comparative perspective; it then presents 
some findings from research conducted for this book (chapter 3) on the views of 
public sector officials about appointment processes and the consequent tensions 
that arise; and finally identifies some unresolved issues of principle and suggests 
some policy approaches that might best suit Australia into the future. Where 
relevant, the chapter refers to the ABC as a case study.
The Australian context and a comparative 
perspective
The Australian scene
Until recently in Australia, little interest was shown at the Commonwealth level 
in appointment processes to its boards. The Labor government under Kevin 
Rudd (2007–10) made some statements about what it intended to do, and the 
current government is pursuing that intent (see below). To date, however, 
there has been relatively little transparency about the appointment processes 
that have been, or are being, followed in relation to public sector boards at the 
Commonwealth level. What is known is that appointment processes are usually 
neither comprehensive nor systematic, and there is therefore much scope for 
reform. 
The processes of selection and appointment are usually focused around the 
relevant minister, the prime minister, the governor-general and the Federal 
Executive Council, with assistance provided by cabinet, the Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) and other relevant departments. Ministers 
are expected to make appointments on the basis of merit, and to take into 
account skills, qualifications and experience (PM&C 2009a). Boards may or 
may not be involved in identifying the skills and experiences that are required 
when vacancies arise. The Cabinet Handbook states that: ‘Where a significant 
appointment process is proposed, the responsible minister must write to the 
Prime Minister seeking his or, at his discretion, Cabinet’s approval of the 
appointment’ (PM&C 2009a: 19–21). It also notes that ministers must ensure 
that the person being proposed is appropriately qualified and has relevant 
experience; due regard is paid to the government’s policy of encouraging an 
increase in the number of appointments of women; and attention is paid to 
the need to have an appropriate geographical balance in appointments (2009a: 
19–21).
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In some cases, the enabling legislation relating to Commonwealth authorities 
does impose some important restrictions on ministers’ powers of appointment. 
For example, a number of statutes require board members to have expertise in 
a specified area. There are also several acts that specify a process that must be 
followed before members are appointed, for example, the Primary Industries 
and Energy Research and Development Act 1989 (Cth) (PIERD Act). Yet, under 
legislation for these corporations (or authorities), ministers have broad statutory 
powers that seem to be subject to little or no formal oversight or transparency. 
John Howard’s Coalition government (1996–2007) carried out governance reform 
of its boards in the second half of the 2000s, especially through the leadership 
activities of the then Department of Finance and Administration (Finance) 
following the endorsement by the government of key recommendations in the 
Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders 
(Uhrig review) (Uhrig 2003) (discussed in some detail in chapter 8). The Uhrig 
review, while noting how significant appropriate board appointments can 
be, and offering some guidance on how ministers could be supported in the 
appointment process to ensure the necessary experience and skills relevant 
for a particular appointment (Uhrig 2003: 86–7; 97–8), did not include a 
recommendation on this issue of appointment. Nor were its terms of reference 
directed primarily to this topic, which demonstrates that the Uhrig review was 
not intended to cover everything to do with governance.
As chapter 2 has indicated, some useful guidelines, which were devised by the 
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), exist in the form of better practice 
guidance for incremental improvements. For example, its guidance paper 
on potential conflicts of interest for CAC bodies (2003a) suggests procedures 
for managing tensions in the board framework including: ‘Develop with the 
Minister an agreed procedure to enable board members to have input to the 
appointment of new members, chair and organisation head’ (2003a: 5). Similarly, 
its guidance paper on CAC boards provides a checklist on good board practices, 
including appointment protocols (ANAO 2003b: 4). 
The most significant relevant reform of board appointment processes, discussed 
later in this chapter, is the legislation which has recently been drafted for 
appointments to the boards of the ABC and Special Broadcasting Service 
(SBS): the National Broadcasting Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth). If the 
elements in that legislation were to become broader and apply to all boards, 
then a comprehensive merit-based appointment process could be mandated. 
Whatever happens to this legislation (it is currently before the Senate), it 
contains useful steps in developing a comprehensive appointment process and 
is, therefore, worthy of close attention whether that be within or beyond the 
current electoral cycle.
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A comparative perspective
In the United Kingdom and Canada there have been particular triggers for making 
improvements to appointment processes. Changes to reduce perceived cronyism 
in the United Kingdom were driven by a desire to lessen public cynicism in the 
mid 1990’s, following a series of scandals (OCPA 2005a). The United Kingdom 
now has a relatively sophisticated appointment system, which is based around 
oversight and monitoring undertaken by various commissioners for public 
appointments. More recently, in Canada, which has a system of parliamentary 
scrutiny of appointments, change occurred in response to a crisis arising from 
a major sponsorship scandal and an adverse auditor-general’s report in which 
the governance of several public bodies came under scrutiny (Treasury Board 
of Canada 2005). More limited reform has also occurred in New Zealand, where 
board appointments are made by ministers, but in accordance with guidelines 
and advice and assistance from a number of other bodies (NZ, SSC 2009). The 
United Kingdom has by far the most advanced and comprehensive appointment 
system of the countries mentioned, which has modelling relevance both within 
and beyond Australia. 
It is because the United Kingdom system of public sector appointments is so 
much more comprehensive than that found at either the Commonwealth or state 
levels in Australia, or indeed in other comparable countries, that this chapter 
pays particular attention to the better practices to be found in that country and 
compares them to current Commonwealth government practices (see Edwards 
2006b, for more detail on schemes in other countries.) Therefore, the lessons 
drawn from the UK experience could be seen to be relevant not only within 
Australia but to comparable overseas countries such as Canada and New Zealand.
Behaviour of main players and empirical 
findings
It is not surprising that current public sector appointment processes, which lack 
general guidelines, in many cases show a lack of transparency and accountability 
and, hence, integrity. This became clear in research conducted for this book 
through interviews with senior officials of the Australian government and chairs 
and CEOs of CAC boards in the 2000s (chapter 3). What was surprising was 
that appointment processes were so commonly mentioned, even in responses 
to questions that did not focus specifically upon appointment processes. This 
occurred, for example, even to questions that asked respondents to identify 
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constraints to the implementation of effective corporate governance in their 
organisation and to nominate two or three major emerging governance issues 
that were facing their organisation.
Without any systematic approach to appointment processes across Commonwealth 
agencies, there exists much diversity and inconsistency in practice. Diversity in 
practice does reflect the difference in types of CAC bodies, but it also reflects the 
behavioural dynamics that operate between the board members and the minister 
or government. At one extreme is the use of the most systematic processes 
which permeate the generally accepted stages for good appointment processes: 
audit, advertisement, merit-based selection with eventual cabinet approval. The 
practice of appointing ‘mates’ with little due process is at the other end of the 
spectrum — it is a process highly focused around ministers (Edwards 2006a). So, 
while some good appointment practices occur, these practices are by no means 
common and overall could not be described as comprehensive or systematic. 
In addition, lack of consistency in appointment processes leads to many tensions 
such as: 
•	 among board members, particularly between ministerial appointments, on 
the one hand, and those seen to have a conflict of role, as government or 
industry ‘representatives’;
•	 between board members with informal links to the minister and other 
members of the board;
•	 between the chair and CEO, whether one or both are appointed by the 
minister;
•	 between the CEO, board and the portfolio department in attempting to gain 
the ear of the minister; and
•	 between the board and the minister where selection processes around the 
CEO leave some ambiguity.
These tensions and other consequences of the current appointment arrangements 
are elaborated below in the discussion of the role of ministers in appointments, 
the appointment of chairs and directors, the appointment of the CEO, and the 
role of appointed stakeholders and government representatives.
A few qualifications need to be kept in mind in what follows. There was much 
change in government policy during the period that the main interviews were 
conducted, arising principally from the Uhrig review (2003). One consequence, 
for example, was the increased relative power of portfolio secretaries compared 
with chairs of boards, and this was reflected in some interviews. Nevertheless, 
what follows is revealing about the attitudes of major players on whom we 
depend for effective governance of public sector bodies.
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The role of the minister 
In line with democratic principles, it is generally considered that it is the right 
of ministers to exercise ultimate responsibility for appointments — in terms 
of final decisions. This is certainly the case in Australia. Serious problems can 
arise, however,  in perception or reality, when there is no formal process around 
the role of ministers in the appointment process. In these cases, it can be difficult 
for board members to perform their duties and to exercise the independent 
judgment that is expected of them (Edwards, Nicoll and Seth-Purdie 2003: 40).
Many practices occur at the Commonwealth level. At one end of the spectrum 
the enabling legislation is quite specific about the minister’s role (as in the PIERD 
Act, referred to earlier). In others the process is more opaque and our research 
unveiled several and often unsolicited comments because of that. One CEO 
reflected the view of many in saying: ‘What inhibits good governance in the 
public sector is the perception that directors (who are appointed by the minister) 
are doing what the minister wants rather than what is good governance’. Another 
reflected on a minister who had personally selected more than just a few ‘mates’ 
to chair boards who, according to this interviewee, did not necessarily have the 
most relevant skills. At least one of these chairs admitted to being a ‘minister’s 
chum’. 
Board members, however, can display independent behaviour, irrespective 
of their relationship with the minister: once selected, members often operate 
both professionally and independently. As one chair of a board remarked: ‘The 
minister is responsible for all appointments … but despite this, the minister 
has no influence’ (chair). And another: ‘We are totally independent. We are 
absolutely independent despite the fact that board members are all mates with 
the PM’. 
This independent behaviour of board members is also reflected in the case of 
the ABC. While the Labor government’s position is that: ‘“Unlike the previous 
government, we are not going to stack the board with our mates”, the relevant 
minister in 2007, Senator Stephen Conroy went on to admit that previous Labor 
governments “may have been guilty” of this’. (Sainsbury 2007). Despite that 
‘guilt’, Ken Inglis reported, in his study of the ABC, that a member of the (old) 
ABC Commission once said to him (2002: 11): 
‘We leave our guns parked at the door’. Recent and present directors 
make the point more positively, saying that they feel beholden not to the 
government which invited them to come on board, however preferable 
they may find its overall policies to those of the opposition, but to 
the ABC. They develop a common sense of themselves as stewards, 
custodians, disinterested guardians of a national treasure.
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Appointments can reflect ‘merit-cronyism’ (Prasser 2005), as illustrated by one 
CEO: ‘I’m a pragmatist — what you need on a board is someone who your 
Minister trusts and not only skills expertise and talent. So I’m not supportive of 
an appointment process at such an arm’s length as a purist approach. It has great 
practical advantage to have the trust of the minister’. Thus, it is not always easy 
to say appointees were ‘mates’ or were appointed on merit but what is important 
is the actual perception of the reason for appointment, which is likely to be more 
negative than otherwise when processes are not transparent.
Appointing chairs and directors
Diversity of approaches in appointing board chairs and directors can be expected 
when there is a lack of formal process, in the majority of cases, applied to the 
making of appointments. In the case of chairs of boards of CAC bodies, they are 
mostly appointed by the minister, rather than following the private sector practice 
of the chair being appointed by the board itself. A few chairs referred to a phone call 
from the minister inviting them to the position. What we were not able to find out 
was what happened prior to that call: to what extent the search for a chair involved 
people outside the minister’s office. This is as yet largely unexplored territory and an 
obvious issue of lack of transparency. It is an important topic for, as Richard Leblanc 
and James Gillies have observed: ‘it is the selection of a chair that matters most to 
the board process, not the separation (of the chair and CEO)’ (2005: 12). One CAC 
CEO considered that: ‘the more I think about it, the more I realise that the minister’s 
appointment of the chair is the biggest issue’.
For director appointments, some of the practices include:
•	 responding to detailed specification in the legislation (e.g. research and 
development bodies which come under the PIERD Act);
•	 advice from the chair/board to the minister with or without a nominating 
committee; and 
•	 advice from portfolio departmental heads to the minister, which may not 
include taking advice from the board or its chair.
Research for this book showed only a few examples of a systematic process by which 
the board identified skill gaps and informed the minister of what was needed in 
making appointments to the board. In other cases, even though there was a formal 
process, it was not considered effective because of the dominant role of the minister. 
Many tensions can be expected to arise from more informal processes of selecting 
board directors, particularly as boards and departments compete to have the ear 
of the minister: ‘We give formal advice directly to the minister, which is against 
the arrangements that (the secretary) put in place. He wanted all advice for 
board appointments to come directly from the department.’ (CEO)
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Appointing the CEO 
The Uhrig review was categorical about the importance of the CEO of a CAC-
type body being appointed by the board and not by the minister, although it 
stopped short of making that a specific recommendation. It could be argued, 
however, as one CEO did, that: ‘It does not make sense to appoint someone the 
minister doesn’t have faith in. Uhrig takes a technical, purist approach. I think 
this is not quite right or disingenuous’. 
Tension can exist where there are provisions in the legislation for the board to 
select the CEO, but where there is the added requirement to have the appointment 
approved by the minister and cabinet. In one of these cases, we were informed 
by a CEO of the importance of a compromise candidate being selected, where 
necessary: The CEO is appointed by the board but the minister needs to find 
the person nominated acceptable, otherwise a compromise candidate is found. 
There is ambiguity over the minister’s role in the appointment process. This 
needs to be addressed.’ 
Currently, practices around CEO appointments differ across CAC bodies, 
with some bodies having the capacity to select their own CEOs, some making 
recommendations that go to cabinet and some having no capacity to choose at all.
Stakeholders and government representatives
There are several issues around the fact that CAC boards frequently include 
stakeholders in one form or another (e.g. experts or government representatives). 
Lack of clarity about the role of a board director can occur for members of boards 
who have some representative role, such as for a (state) government, industry or 
organisation. As chapter 8 has indicated, the Uhrig review discouraged (but fell 
short of making a specific recommendation on) any representational appointments 
to boards because they ‘can fail to produce independent and objective views’ 
(2003: 98). It is worth noting, however, that this pure principle is difficult to 
practice in the public sector where expertise, as well as representative views 
(e.g. from state governments), is required — as is sometimes specifically stated 
in the enabling legislation.
There are some distinct advantages in stakeholders being represented on 
boards: one chair remarked that ‘You do need some people who understand the 
business’. And then, there is the issue of balance: although some directors come 
with an industry background, they have to: ‘tread a very fine line between 
letting us understand the issues but not acting for their own interests.’ (CEO) 
If there is an awareness of the importance of managing conflicts of interest and 
there exist good processes in place to do that, then it could be argued that the 
Uhrig position is too ‘pure’.
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A different set of arguments applies in the case of departmental representatives 
on boards. Uhrig was opposed to departmental representatives being on boards 
but kept the door open: ‘Membership of the board by the departmental secretary 
is unwise unless there are specific circumstances which require it’ (2003: 99). On 
the one hand, there is the issue of potential conflicts, especially when budget 
proposals are being considered and funding is sought from the department. 
On the other hand, there can be significant advantages: these representatives 
can bring awareness of government thinking and priorities to board discussion, 
such as the membership of the head of Treasury on the RBA Board (chapter 8). 
Much depends on the quality and capacity of particular public servants with 
dual roles.
There are many possible conflicts of interest here and one departmental 
secretary saw three aspects to the role: acting in the interest of the body; as 
portfolio secretary acting for the portfolio as a whole (‘because I carry the can’); 
and keeping a watch on things for the ministers (‘shit management’). Another 
portfolio head was quite clear about the priority role: ‘I’m portfolio secretary 
and I know that informally the minister and prime minister would expect me to 
keep an eye on them even though they have a CEO’. Since the recommendations 
of the Uhrig review have come into force, and the relative power of the portfolio 
secretary vis à vis the board chair has been enhanced, the case for a departmental 
representative on the board could arguably be said to be reduced.
Principles and better practice 
This chapter now turns from current practice on appointment processes to better 
practice principles, and the implications for Australia if they were adopted and 
implemented.
Relevant principles from the United Kingdom2
In the mid 1990s, there was a particular trigger for the UK government to enhance 
public confidence in the integrity of the political process around public sector 
appointments. There was significant ‘public and parliamentary disquiet over the 
issue of patronage, which fed into and exacerbated a broader decline in public 
trust in politicians and political institutions’ leading the Conservative Party to 
be ‘dogged by accusations of sleaze and corruption’ (Flinders 2009: 555). The 
‘widespread public unease at standards in public life’ (HOCPASC 2003: 10), 
including concerns about abuse of power, cronyism and political bias in public 
2 See Edwards (2006b) for details on appointment practices in other comparable countries. 
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appointments led the then prime minister John Major, in 1994, to establish a 
committee to inquire into the standards of conduct of holders of public office 
(called the Committee on Standards in Public Life or The Nolan Committee). 
Amongst a number of matters, the Nolan Committee was concerned to ensure 
that appointments to boards of non-departmental public bodies (so-called 
quangos) were made on the basis of merit, without undue political bias, and 
in accordance with a transparent and accountable process. To this end, the 
committee made a number of recommendations relating to appointments to 
public office, the ‘Nolan rules’ (each of which is discussed below), which were 
subsequently largely adopted by the government. Changes were made to reduce 
perceived cronyism and to lessen public cynicism; attention was paid to a 
more transparent process with a higher degree of independence and with close 
attention to merit-based appointment processes (OCPA 2005a). 
Since the United Kingdom now has a comprehensive and relatively sophisticated 
appointment system that is based around the oversight and monitoring of 
various commissioners for public appointments, it is worth examining the 
relevance of the UK experience for Australia.3 There is an additional reason for 
focusing on UK practices in this chapter. The Labor government committed 
to basing its appointments to the ABC Board on the UK Nolan principles, also 
known as the seven principles of public life. ‘“We are seeking advice as to the 
best way to implement the Nolan principles in terms of new appointments to 
the ABC” Minister Conroy said’ (Sainsbury 2007). And the legislation before 
parliament as of March 2012 embodies these principles. For these reasons it is 
useful to trace events in the United Kingdom which led to the creation of its 
set of comprehensive principles and a code of practice around public sector 
appointments. 
The position of commissioner for public appointments was established soon after 
the publication of the Nolan Committee’s report. The Office of the Commissioner 
has since practiced under a Code of Practice (OCPA 2005b; 2009) (hereafter, the 
code) governing ministerial appointments to public boards that is based on 
principles that were enunciated by the committee. These principles, or ‘Nolan 
rules’ are as follows (OCPA 2009:19-20):
•	 Ministerial responsibility — the ultimate responsibility for appointments is 
with ministers. 
•	 Merit — all public appointments should be governed by the overriding 
principle of selection based on merit, by the well-informed choice of 
3 Prior to 2004, there existed a single UK commissioner. Since then, this system has been replaced by one 
commissioner for England and Wales and separate commissioners for Scotland (2004) and Northern Ireland 
(2005). These countries have separate institutions and processes that share similar principles as those outlined 
above, although the Scottish system is stricter in many regards (See OCPAS 2006).
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individuals who through their abilities, experience and qualities match the 
need of the public body in question.
•	 Independent scrutiny — no appointment will take place without first being 
scrutinised by an independent panel or by a group including membership 
independent of the department filling the post.
•	 Equal opportunities — departments should sustain programmes to deliver 
equal opportunity principles.
•	 Probity — board members of public bodies must be committed to the 
principles and values of public service and perform their duties with 
integrity.
•	 Openness and transparency — the principles of open government must be 
applied to the appointments process, its workings must be transparent and 
information must be provided about the appointments made. 
•	 Proportionality — the appointment procedures need to be subject to the 
principle of proportionality, that is they should be appropriate for the nature 
of the post and the size and weight of its responsibilities.
As a result of the application of these principles for more than a decade in 
England, Scotland and Wales, they have had in place a relatively systematic 
and transparent process of selection and appointment. The system requires 
appointments to be advertised and a shortlist to be compiled by a panel that 
includes or is overseen by an independent or impartial assessor. While the 
final decision on appointment still lies with the relevant minister, the processes 
that have been established reduce the scope for cronyism by increasing the 
probability that such decisions will be publicly exposed.4
In 2011, both the commissioner for appointments in England and Wales and the 
commissioner for appointments in Scotland announced revised and streamlined 
codes. Although the stated principles were reduced, the essence of the ‘Nolan 
rules’ was maintained in the codes;5 hence the discussion to follow is based 
on those rules. The main difference now is that there is more devolution of 
responsibility to relevant government departments to ensure compliance 
with the code and a, related, stepped-up audit process that is overseen by the 
4 The minister can select someone who is not on the shortlist provided by the panel, but this must be 
reported to the commissioner. In Scotland, the minister’s decision on which candidate(s) is (are) appointed, 
and the reasons for this decision, is recorded and retained as part of the audit trail for the appointment round 
(OCPAS 2006: 24.5).
5 The principles have been reduced to three: merit; fairness and openness. The other ‘Nolan rules’ are 
incorporated in the following way: (a) the ultimate responsibility for public appointments resting with 
ministers is stated up front, prior to these three principles (OCPA 2012); (b) independent scrutiny is covered 
through an appointment panel which must have an external perspective and be chaired by an assessor 
appointed by the commissioner (OCPA 2012); (c) equal opportunity and diversity is explicitly woven through 
the code (2011); (d) probity is covered with the panel needing to satisfy itself that candidates are committed to 
the Nolan principles (2011); and (e) proportionality is covered with greater attention to a ‘more proportionate 
independent assurance’ process (OCPA 2011).
Public Sector Governance in Australia
212
commissioner (OCPA 2012; OCPAS 2011). There will also be, for England and 
Wales, a centre of excellence for public appointments that will have the aim of 
widening the pool of candidates applying for vacancies. 
Stages in a good appointment process 
Identifying the main stages in appointment processes is the first step in reforming 
the appointments system. Different jurisdictions have identified a variety of 
ways of selecting and appointing to public sector boards. There is, however, 
widespread acknowledgement of several main stages if better practices are to 
be followed; these are described in appendix 3. Those stages involve: agreeing 
a vacancy profile and timeline for appointment; locating suitable candidates; 
assessing and vetting potential candidates, selecting and appointing; and, less 
commonly, auditing the appointment process.
A well-structured and managed process would cover all these stages in a way 
that not only makes merit a primary consideration, but is also transparent and 
accountable and has a suitable degree of independence. How that independence 
is actually exercised has been the subject of debate (e.g. Aucoin and Goodyear-
Grant 2002). A related issue is whether parliamentary accountability for non-
departmental boards, which has been adopted in the United Kingdom (see below) 
but is uncommon elsewhere (Flinders 2010), should be part of the process. Roger 
Wettenhall is of the view that any serious discussion of the role of statutory 
authorities can never advance far without considering the parliamentary 
relationship, since parliament creates them and specifies how they are to operate 
(2012). The issue is the extent to which parliament plays a role. Irrespective of 
who oversees the process, it is to be expected that it would be accompanied by 
establishing effective board charters that specify the roles and responsibilities of 
directors, with associated monitoring of board and director performance.
ABC case study
For decades, governments on all sides of politics have been accused of stacking 
the ABC board with their ‘mates’ or, as one interviewee called them, ‘chums’. 
The current government announced its intention to change selection processes 
to: ‘ensure that all appointments to the ABC and SBS Boards are conducted in 
a manner that fosters independence, transparency, accountability and public 
confidence’ (Conroy 2008) and ‘to end political interference in the ABC by 
introducing a transparent and democratic board appointment process that 
appoints non-executive directors on merit’ (Albanese 2010). The government 
subsequently introduced into the parliament legislation to this effect but also, 
from October 2008, put into practice the merit-based assessment processes 
which are contained in that legislation.
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The National Broadcasting Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 (hereafter the Bill) 
encompasses all of the stages in a good appointment process, as outlined above. 
Table 9.1 outlines the main proposals contained in the legislation which relate 
to the appointment stage. The Bill formalises a merit-based and independent 
appointment process that is based on the UK system of public sector board 
appointments. In fact, the basis for this policy goes back to the Labor policy 
A Better ABC Board: Labor’s Policy on the ABC Board Appointment Process, 
which was announced in 2003 (Crean and Tanner 2003; ALP 2004). It proposed 
that there be an independent ABC appointment selection committee. The Bill 
that is currently before the Senate encompasses the principles, identified in 
this chapter, for merit-based appointments and so represents a model of better 
practice, which may be of use in the future and to other jurisdictions. The Bill:
•	 places responsibility for assessing candidates in the hands of an ‘Independent 
Nomination Panel established at arm’s length from the Government’;
•	 specifies that vacancies are to be widely advertised; 
•	 uses a set of core criteria (with additional criteria added if the minister so 
decides); and
•	 mandates a report from the panel to the minister, including a short-list of at 
least three recommended candidates.
The amending legislation specifies the functions of the panel and asserts that 
it would act independently from the government and would not be ‘subject to 
direction by or on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth’ (s. 24C). 
The relevant department(s) is required to publish the processes by which such 
appointments were made in its annual report. 
Importantly, if the minister wishes to appoint a person who has not been 
recommended by the panel, after notifying the prime minister of this, and 
once the appointment is made, the minister must table a statement of reasons 
to parliament for that decision. In the case of the chair of the board, the prime 
minister, on receiving the short list from the panel, will be required to consult 
the leader of the opposition before making a recommendation to the governor-
general, and similarly, if choosing an individual who is not on the panel’s 
recommended short list, provide reasons for the selection in a statement to 
parliament (s. 24X).
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Table 9 .1: Legislation by appointment stage
1. Preparation — the process and vacancy profile
Ministerial determination of selection criteria
Independent nomination panel established
2 . Locating suitable candidates
Widely advertised positions
3 . Assessing and vetting candidates
By ‘independent’ panel to set criteria
Background check by panel
4 . Selection and Appointment
Shortlist of candidates — at least three names to minister
Ministers check on suitability of candidate — in relation to selection criteria
Minister gives reasons to parliament — if alternative candidate chosen
5 . Audit
Department publishes annual statement on processes
Source: Based on DBCDE (2010).
The processes that are set out in the Bill represent a paradigm shift from the 
position adopted by governments up until now — on paper at least. As a result 
of the Bill’s implementation, cronyism should be significantly reduced and 
the power of ministers should be significantly constrained. A major advance 
will occur if the articulated aims of the legislation to foster independence, 
transparency, accountability and public confidence are achieved. Even the 
most skillfully drafted legislation, however, carries risks that the government’s 
intentions are not carried through. In that case, the UK implementation 
experience can alert us to potential pitfalls. 
Unresolved issues of principle
This chapter ends by considering several critical issues of principle that need to be 
addressed if a comprehensive reform to processes of appointment to Commonwealth 
boards is to be achieved in Australia. What follows is broadly in line with the ‘Nolan 
rules’ and takes the reformed ABC board appointment process as its illustration. 
The extent of ministerial involvement? 
The breadth of the powers that are given to Commonwealth ministers in existing 
appointment processes, as outlined above, contrasts with the position in the United 
Kingdom, where the code has placed restrictions on ministerial involvement in the 
system and, most recently, has spelt out more clearly their role (OCPA 2012). 
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Despite the existence of the code, there has been a continual, and often heated, 
debate in the United Kingdom about the degree to which ministers should 
be involved — a tension between those that argue for a system completely 
independent of ministers as the only way to ensure appointment on the basis of 
merit and public confidence in the system, and those that argue that ministers 
must be involved in the process in line with the principle of representative 
democracy.6 Until recently in England and Wales, ministers could be kept 
informed about the progress of an appointment round if they wished, but could 
not be actively involved between the planning stage and the submission of a 
short list of suitable candidates (OCPA 2005b; Gaymer 2007: 11). The previous 
commissioner for public appointments for England and Wales is on record 
as saying that some ministers had unrecorded involvement in the middle of 
an appointment process, which could be interpreted as political interference 
(Gaymer 2007: 12). Under the new code, ministers can convey to the panel views 
‘about the expertise, experience and skills of the candidates’ at each stage of the 
process (OCPA 2012: 5) alongside a clearer statement of their role.
Recently, the process has become cumbersome, with parliamentary select 
committees being able to hold pre-appointment hearings to scrutinise candidates 
for key public board positions before they are appointed (such as the chair of 
the BBC Trust) (HOCPASC 2008; Flinders 2009).
Although the proposed ABC/SBS legislation spells out in some detail the 
functions of the nomination panel through the planning, advertising, assessing 
and recommending stages of the appointment process, it pays scant attention 
to the specific role of ministers between the setting of the selection criteria and 
receiving the short list of recommended candidates from the nomination panel. 
Without this attention in the Bill, or a separate code of practice, real difficulties 
can be expected and public confidence undermined for any government that is 
planning to adopt this approach.
If changes are going to be made across Commonwealth boards, a key issue to 
be resolved is what role ministers should play and, related to this, whether 
a more independent body or parliamentary committee should be involved in 
vetting appointments — if not also in the selection process. The related issue of 
independence in the process is discussed below.
6 Peter Aucoin and Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant (2002) argue for the independent decision-maker to appoint 
the most qualified applicant and not merely a qualified candidate (which is in fact the position in Novia 
Scotia). Their conclusion is that if the principle of relative merit is to be effective, then ministers should not 
have a say in appointments: ‘the standard of relative merit demands a process that is separate and independent 
of ministers’ (Aucoin and Goodyear-Grant 2002: 314).
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What is the meaning of ‘merit’?
Appointing on the basis of merit (the overriding principle in the United Kingdom, 
e.g. OCPA 2005b: 21) would seem to be an incontrovertible necessity but, over 
time, the principle has been interpreted in the United Kingdom in various ways. 
In line with the original recommendations of the Nolan Committee, the selection 
criteria take account of a balance of skills and background. Further, under the 
code, the concept of merit must be read in conjunction with the principles of 
equal opportunity and diversity, which are required to be ‘inherent within the 
appointments process’ (OCPA 2009: 23).
In practice, this means that ministers and departments are required to adopt 
a broad definition of merit that not only takes into account competencies and 
capabilities, but also takes into account non-traditional activities and career 
paths, while encouraging a greater number of women, people with disabilities 
and members of minorities to participate in selection processes. 
In Australia, the APSC has set out the meaning of ‘merit’ for its appointment 
processes (2009a: 5). This definition is narrower than that which is contained 
in the code: although the guidelines do include a segment on representation of 
women, they do not specifically provide for the element of diversity. In the case 
of the ABC legislation, however, following closely the wording of the UK code, 
diversity and equal opportunity are specifically taken into account: ‘A broad 
definition of merit will be applied to the ABC and SBS Board appointments 
whereby formal qualifications and traditional work experience will form only 
one element. Non-traditional activities and career paths are recognised and 
valued as suitable qualifications which contribute to an individual’s overall 
suitability for appointment’ (DBCDE 2010). In addition: ‘The principles of equal 
opportunity and diversity will be followed throughout the selection process. 
In particular, consideration will be given to ensuring that the membership of 
boards encompasses diversity in gender and geographical representation’ (2010).
Here, as elsewhere, what is contained in the legislation can differ from practice: 
there is some evidence that British bureaucrats have adopted a rather narrow 
definition of ‘relevant experience’ to favour appointees who have already had 
board experience (Flinders, personal correspondence 2010). And, a relevant 
consideration that is not emphasised in either the UK or Australian cases is the 
importance for board performance of having around the board table the most 
relevant set of expertise and competencies. This means defining merit broadly 
enough to encompass not only inherent skills or qualities of the applicant but 
also how well the applicant’s expertise fits with the expertise of other board 
members and also fits with the job that is required to be done.
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How is independent scrutiny to be assured?
A central part of appointment processes to public sector bodies in the United 
Kingdom has been independent scrutiny by an independent assessor. According 
to the previous commissioner for public appointments for England and Wales, 
independent scrutiny ‘underwrites the integrity of the whole appointments 
process’ (OCPA 2005b: 31). The assessors are selected either by the OCPA, 
or by departments, in a competitive process. Their job is to ensure that the 
appointment process meets the requirements of the code and is in line with its 
principles (UK Cabinet Office 2006: 15; OCPA 2012). The revised code removes 
the requirement for an independent assessor and transfers some of their role to 
the relevant department. The assessment panel, however, must include at least 
one member with an ‘external perspective’ (2012: 6).
How independent will the selection and workings of the Australian nomination 
panel for the ABC be in practice? The panel will be appointed by the secretary 
of PM&C and will include a chair and two or three other members (s. 24E –24P). 
The nomination panel in the original ALP policy consisted of the secretary of the 
relevant department and head of relevant division, the APSC merit commissioner 
and an eminent and independent person. But the Bill does not specify the criteria 
for selection of panel members, or how the process of selection is to take place: 
will the appointees be eminent people who will be expected to ‘not rock the 
boat’ or people appointed because of their institutional affiliations? This needs 
clarification. Independence would also be threatened if the relevant minister 
is briefed orally before the short list is formally lodged with him or her, and 
this part of the process is not made transparent. There is also an issue over the 
independence of the head of PM&C, when compared to the APS commissioner, 
who is a statutory appointment (Nethercote 2010). One possibility would be 
designating the commissioner as an ‘independent officer of parliament’. It is 
worth noting that the current commissioner of public appointments for England 
and Wales is also the civil service commissioner (OCPA 2011).
Probity: How to handle conflicts of interest?
Conflicts of interest (including ‘duty’) arise where ‘the impartiality of an officer 
in discharging their duties could be called into question because of the potential, 
perceived or actual influence of personal considerations’ (ANAO 2003a: 1) (See 
also Finn 1993; OECD 2004b; 2005a, b). There can also be conflicts of role, 
especially in the public sector, with government members being appointed to 
public sector boards. Conflicts of role arise where ‘a person is called upon to 
play incompatible professional roles, and may face pressure to bring selective 
memory to bear on privileged information and/or act with dual personality’ 
(Howard and Seth-Purdie 2005: 61).
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In Australia, under the CAC Act, a director of a Commonwealth authority who 
has a material personal interest in a matter that relates to the affairs of the 
authority is generally required to disclose the interest to the other directors, 
excuse themselves from meetings where the matter is considered and refrain 
from voting on the matter (CAC Act, s. 27F; 27K). The Cabinet Handbook (PM&C 
2009a) and A Guide on Key Elements of Ministerial Responsibility (Howard 1998a) 
also contain some broad guidance on the procedures that should be followed 
to avoid conflicts of interest that can arise in appointment processes. The legal 
requirements contained in the CAC Act, and these statements of principle, leave 
considerable room for conflicts, or the perception of conflicts, to arise. This 
can undermine confidence in the integrity and independence of public sector 
boards.7
The Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) is one Commonwealth 
authority with an established process to deal with potential or perceived 
conflicts of interest, which goes beyond the requirements that are outlined in 
the CAC Act (AFMA 2006) (See also ANAO 2003a). The Bill is, in fact, brief in 
dealing with probity issues but the nomination panel has the responsibility 
for determining the level of background checks to be undertaken prior to 
appointment (DBCDE 2010). 
Will public confidence be enhanced with openness 
and transparency? 
The principle here is about accountability and ensuring that members of the 
public have confidence in the system as a result of having information on relevant 
aspects of appointment processes. The desire for a transparent process must, 
however, be weighed against privacy concerns. The response to this dilemma in 
England and Wales has been to establish mandatory publicising, confidentiality 
and audit requirements. Documentation in relation to appointment processes 
must be kept and retained for a minimum of two years. 
The UK evidence is that, despite detailed legislation and oversight by the 
OCPA, more than a decade later serious breaches of the code still occurred, 
including a number of appointments that were made with the virtual absence of 
an audit trail (Hayward, Mortimer and Brunwin 2004; MORI 2005). Moreover, 
an independent study conducted for the Office of the Commissioner of Public 
Sector Appointments (OCPA) on the perception of ministerial appointments 
processes found, in 2005 (10 years after setting up the OCPA), poor public 
understanding of board appointment processes with only one in five UK citizens 
7 The OECD has produced some guidelines and a toolkit (2005b) to assist governments who wish to minimise 
actual or perceived conflicts. These have already been the basis of tools used by the NSW Independent 
Commission against Corruption and the Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission (OECD 2004b: 8).
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having confidence in the public appointments system. A more recent study 
regards raising knowledge ‘a significant challenge’ on the basis of the current 
lack of knowledge about public appointment processes (Cameron and Skinner 
2010: 6).
The current commissioner for public appointments intends to uses his powers of 
audit to rigorously enforce the merit principle and compliance with the new code 
through spot audits (OCPA 2012: 6). He will report publicly on a department’s 
compliance with the code and will publicise good and poor performance. 
In Australia, as this chapter has shown, there is no real transparency about 
how people are selected for board positions, unlike other countries where 
transparency has been regarded as essential to a process which gains and 
maintains public confidence. This is not just about who is selected, but also 
all the stages in the appointment process. The public should be provided with 
sufficient information to understand what processes are followed to fill positions 
on public boards — from identifying vacancies through to choosing suitable 
candidates. 
In the case of the ABC, one of the stated aims of the current policy is to restore 
public trust in the ABC. The crucial question here is: to what extent can we 
expect the proposed reforms to enhance faith in the system? Obviously, any 
reforms will require a civic education component, transparency and independent 
monitoring processes to shift attitudes of distrust about politicians. If the British 
experience is anything to go by, however, even this may not be sufficient to 
ensure public confidence in the board appointment system.
On the audit issue, the department(s) will be required to provide a statement in 
relation to each process for each director or chair  appointment processes in its 
annual report, but it would seem sensible to have an overall audit from beyond 
the department, for example from the APSC or the ANAO, if not parliament 
itself. This will be all the more important if the government decides to extend 
what will be significantly improved appointment processes beyond the ABC and 
SBS Boards to all boards in the public sector. 
The above suggests that a key issue for Australia to address is how far and in 
what way it wants to go with more rigorous and transparent processes, beyond 
what is intended for the ABC/SBS board processes. The UK experience would 
suggest that a good and transparent communication process will be required if 
the government is to gain public confidence in its board appointment processes.
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Can there be an efficient as well as an effective 
process?
An important consideration in the establishment of appointment processes is 
cost and timeliness: the need for greater accountability, independence and rigour 
must be balanced against the need to use scarce resources cost-effectively. One of 
the seven ‘Nolan rules’ that are taken into account in the code in England and 
Wales is proportionality — the notion that the processes ‘should be appropriate 
for the nature of the post and the size and weight of its responsibilities’ (OCPA 
2009: 27).
A more structured, transparent and independent process for Commonwealth 
public sector board appointments in Australia would be more costly than the 
current informal system. An issue here is whether the additional costs that are 
associated with a more rigorous system could be expected to be offset by the 
advantages associated with greater accountability and public confidence in the 
process, as well as the improvements in organisational performance that stem 
from having a more competent and cohesive board (see Edwards and Clough 
2005; Leblanc and Gillies 2005). Arguably, though, the UK system has gone 
too far in attempting to ensure transparency and accountability: Matthew 
Flinders claims that processes have become ‘too cumbersome and inflexible’ 
and are likely to put off some potential candidates (2010). This is particularly 
so, Flinders claims, since the introduction of pre-appointment processes that 
involve the parliament. A balance is obviously needed here between competing 
principles.
At the Commonwealth level in Australia, a workable balance between efficiency 
and accountability concerns could well be attained in a number of ways: for 
example, by requiring boards to routinely undertake a skills audit before each 
new appointment and by giving the APS commissioner the additional function 
of being commissioner of public appointments, as is now the case in England 
and Wales (Nethercote 2010). Given that the APSC already oversees merit-based 
appointment processes that occur under its current jurisdiction, this would not 
be an excessive burden but would give the perception (which would, hopefully, 
be the reality) of a more independent voice in the process of selecting and 
appointing members of public sector boards. A third way of gaining the balance 
would be to involve parliament (e.g. a senate committee), but only in the case of 
major appointments, such as the chair of the ABC or RBA.
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Conclusion
This chapter has presented the current picture of board appointment 
processes, as they relate to Commonwealth boards. Over the past several years, 
improvements have been made or are intended, most notably with the processes 
around appointment of directors of the ABC and SBS boards. The findings of 
the empirical survey on the pervasiveness of political appointments and lack 
of current good processes across all boards, however, leave much room for 
improvement. The chapter has raised a number of in-principle questions, such 
as what should be the role of the minister in board appointment processes and 
how independent can the process in fact be with the minister having final say? 
Is there any role for parliament in this process? And can Australia expect, in 
the foreseeable future, to have the proposed reforms to the ABC appointment 
process expanded to cover all major public sector boards? Or is this only likely 
to happen, as the experience in the United Kingdom suggests, after there has 
been a crisis in public confidence?
There is an opportunity now to begin a measured process of reform that could help 
enhance and protect public confidence in the governance of public institutions. 
As a newcomer to reform in this area, and in line with the encouragement that 
was given in Ahead of the Game to learn lessons from other jurisdictions, much 
can be gained from examining the changes that have been made in recent years 
in the United Kingdom, as indeed the current government has done for its 
Broadcasting Legislation Bill. The principles that are articulated in the code 
provide a framework for improving outcomes and public confidence. While there 
is considerable scope for variation in the processes that are adopted, departing 
from these general principles could jeopardise the integrity of the appointment 
process and the institutions that those boards are intended to serve.
Good governance around appointment processes to public sector boards 
requires the exercise of the norms or values which are contained in the 
framework provided in chapter 1: values of trust, public accountability and 
transparency in the context of legitimate exercises of political authority by 
elected representatives. Public servants and board members must be able to 
distinguish between what is legitimate and what might be informal government 




10 . Public Governance: Challenges 
and Issues in an Age of Uncertainty
This concluding chapter has four purposes: to identify system-wide challenges 
arising from recent governance trends; to review the continuing tensions that 
emerge from contemporary public sector governance; to assess the implications 
of these for good governance and performance; and to canvass possible ways 
forward, given the contradictory agendas and uncertainties in the current 
environment. These include the ability to deliver on official objectives, such as 
an adaptable public governance system for the twenty-first century. The analysis 
draws on key themes and issues from the preceding chapters, and relates them 
to ongoing and emerging governance priorities and challenges. 
Governance trends and challenges
New forms of governance
A decade ago, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) foreshadowed fundamental changes in the way in which public 
governance would be viewed in the future. The main messages that it identified 
were threefold. First, traditional forms of government had become ineffective. 
Secondly, new forms of governance that were expected to become important in 
the future would involve a wider range of actors. Thirdly, primary features of 
governance systems were expected to change, in particular, the permanency 
and power of organisational structures (OECD 2001b: 3).
These OECD messages, like those in this book, point to the observable shift 
over recent decades from hierarchical governance relationships, in which 
the boundaries around the organisation, sector or country are clear, to more 
horizontal or collaborative forms of governance with boundaries that blur across 
organisations and sectors, nationally and globally. Power is seen as shifting 
(although neither mainly nor fully) from decision-makers in government towards 
the many actors outside of government who are now involved in public policy 
processes. How governments engage in governance is adapting accordingly. This 
trend presents fundamental public governance challenges, which are discussed 
below.
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Challenges of policy complexity and global 
interdependency 
On the policy side, problems are increasingly complex, politically sensitive 
and inherently multidisciplinary in character. Regulation increasingly comes 
in a variety of state-backed and other forms. Service (Wanna, Butcher and 
Freyens 2010) is also more complex today, compared, even, to 10 years ago, 
with the involvement of more players from government and non-government 
organisations having often diffuse responsibilities.
A number of whole-of-government priorities, which currently confront the 
Commonwealth government, present the challenge of interdependency, such as: 
a sustainable environment (especially water and energy reform: Gillard 2010), 
rural and regional affairs, productivity improvements and service delivery 
to Indigenous Australians. That these types of issue are not new (compare 
former prime minister John Howard’s policy statement in 2002), underscores 
how they have become a permanent part of the policy landscape. The major 
domestic policy challenges, according to the secretary of Treasury (Parkinson 
2012), cover complexity in fields such as health, aged care, infrastructure and 
service delivery, as well as issues such as productivity performance and the 
sustainability of cities, and a disgruntled citizenry. 
Similar examples of complex governance challenges can be found at the 
international level. External challenges have usually been fiscal in nature and 
economic factors (e.g. international competitiveness) have remained a driver, 
although nothing compares to the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008. At 
the very least, the GFC presented ongoing governance challenges in the form 
of shared responsibility for global governance problems, vulnerability of 
interdependent systems, coordination and harmonisation of global regulatory 
responses, and enhanced expectations of governmental regulators of markets. 
It is worthy of note that the chair of the Australia 2020 Summit and public 
governance expert, Glyn Davis, at the turn of the century observed that ‘The 
challenges for governance … are not directly those of globalisation or an 
information economy. Rather they are the difficulties of adjustment, of finding 
a coherent course as change works through the economy and society’ (Davis 
and Keating 2000: 242). In a continuing age of uncertainty, these issues remain 
central to effective governance.
The challenge of permeable boundaries
It is generally accepted that the future direction for public governance will 
require greater use of new forms of interactive processes and structures to 
10. Public Governance: Challenges and Issues in an Age of Uncertainty
225
manage complex issues alongside more traditional ones. It will no longer be 
simply enough to draw boundaries around sectors more clearly — innovative 
ways of bridging boundaries will be needed for effective governance. Into the 
future, it will be necessary to find better ways of matching problems with 
appropriate governance arrangements, if complex policy and delivery issues are 
to be effectively handled across the main players in governance decision-making 
processes. But, more than this will be required, given the blurring of boundaries 
around government and non-government sectors, as well as matters of national 
and global concern. Non-government players are increasingly found within 
bureaucracies as part of decision-making processes, government players are 
increasingly found working alongside non-government players in communities, 
and coordination and cooperation between different governments increasingly 
comes to the fore.
Governability and governance
Australia has institutional stability and continuity, together with a well-
performing system of government. Yet significant questions exist about 
effectiveness in decision- making and its implementation. The major issues 
of the day are not experiencing resolution, principally for two reasons. First, 
political leadership appears to be ailing, if public perceptions are taken into 
account. In the space of three years, former prime minister Kevin Rudd’s position 
soared to enviable heights and then plunged as his exalted agenda was found 
to lack grounding. His successor, Prime Minister Julia Gillard, has struggled to 
consolidate her position as the country’s leader. The political realities of minority 
government also affect delivery of the legislative and policy agenda. Secondly, 
while complexity undoubtedly plays a significant part, other questions about 
capacity, connectivity and the roles of government are relevant. The series of 
official governance reviews that were undertaken in the first decade of this 
century and beyond are a testament to that. The implications for government 
are discussed below.
Governance regulatory frameworks
Whole-of-government frameworks and regulation are characteristically 
conceived in terms of what a particular level of government can control and 
legislate. As this book demonstrates, governance interactions within one level of 
government, across different levels of government, and amongst governmental 
and non-governmental parties are increasingly important in the twenty-first 
century. This development presents challenges for the ongoing evolution and 
adaptation of governance regulatory frameworks. Recurring issues of appropriate 
governance structures, public accountability mechanisms, performance and 
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risk management, and multi-stakeholder engagement permeate the governance 
discussions in the Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities 
and Office Holders (Uhrig review) (2003), Ahead of the Game: Blueprint for the 
Reform of Australian Government Administration (AGRAGA 2010) and the 
Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review (CFAR) (DFD 2012b).
These challenges are particularly evident in shared responsibilities and outcomes, 
cross-governmental governance initiatives, and governmental use of regulatory 
tools in addition to laws in governing the community. For example, governments 
now have a range of regulatory drivers that are available to them and which relate 
to governance concerns in one way or another, along a spectrum that includes 
conventional law-making and regulatory enforcement, official standard-setting, 
policy and regulatory incentives, multi-stakeholder initiatives, and whole-
of-government frameworks (Horrigan 2010). This reinforces the connections 
and interactions between different forms of contemporary governance and 
regulation.
Continuing and emerging tensions 
The several dimensions of governance that are addressed in this book raise a 
number of basic tensions. These are of varying degrees of saliency and immediacy, 
and may be continuing or emerging. Three sets of tensions are reviewed below.
Tensions in horizontal and vertical governance 
At its heart, public sector governance is about managing some fundamental 
tensions, which have been identified as a theme of this book and which will 
need to be confronted by Anglophone governments into the future. The most 
pressing would appear to be that between the traditional vertical or hierarchical 
accountabilities of the Westminster system through ministers and parliament, 
and the horizontal responsibilities of departments and agencies out toward other 
government organisations and beyond toward non-government organisations 
and citizens. This is not a matter of which, but of a balance between the two. 
There are important accountability and other implications in managing this 
tension, which are discussed later in this chapter.
Many dimensions of this ongoing but growing tension can be identified. First, 
there are those that arise as part of the relationship between a public department 
or agency and other departments or agencies of government, which were 
discussed in chapter 5. The Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) (PS Act) and Financial 
Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) (FMA Act) give the departmental 
secretary responsibilities for the administration of his or her department under 
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the minister, but also responsibilities for management of the department. 
Increasingly, however, the government is expecting collaborative behaviour of 
a department of state with other Commonwealth organisations in delivering on 
the government’s agenda and in forging cross-portfolio networks. The tension in 
the roles of the secretary could be intensified with the added responsibility that 
is placed on the public service today as a result of the inclusion in Ahead of the 
Game of a responsibility for Australian Public Service (APS)-wide ‘stewardship’, 
in partnership with other secretaries.
Secondly, there are the difficulties that arise in multi-level governance, and 
specifically the relationship between Commonwealth and state agencies under 
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agenda as discussed in chapter 
4. Here, there is a tension between the Commonwealth and the states in 
collaborating on outcomes, such as for health, education and policy relating 
to Indigenous Australians, with the Commonwealth intervening on methods of 
state delivery to ensure value for money from Commonwealth funds. Not to be 
forgotten are the relationships that are place- and locality-based, or devolved 
systems of governance, which are needed to achieve whole-of-government 
objectives for both state and Commonwealth governments. 
The final set of vertical and horizontal tensions was identified in chapter 
7 as governments increasingly attempting to engage with non-government 
organisations and citizens, not only in delivery of services but also in the policy 
development process. For officials, a particular challenge today is between 
serving democratically elected representatives of the people and working 
directly with citizens in participatory democratic processes (chapter 1). The 
demands by government to deliver on budget and on time conflict with the 
time it takes to both build up policy capacity and for officials to engage outside 
of government to gain broader ownership of policy objectives. So, pursuit of 
the most efficient practices can conflict with the resources that are required to 
gain trust and work collaboratively over lengthy periods of time for possibly 
more effective outcomes, which is particularly so in the areas of relevance to 
Indigenous Australians.
Tensions in central coordination 
There are four significant areas of potential tension in central coordination. The 
first is the relationship between the political executive and the machinery that 
exists to support its agenda and priorities. There have been dramatic reminders 
of how much central effectiveness is dependent on political leadership as well as 
the capacity of the system to respond. If leaders’ aspirations exceed this ability 
to respond, a likely result is shortfalls in capacity and possible dysfunctions. 
If the development of capability is miscalculated — which can easily occur 
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when there are skill shortages — a mismatch also results. Successful system 
governance requires mastering several intricate levels of relationship within 
central government and nationally, and the reconciling of contending political 
and environmental pressures. 
The second source of tension derives from the question of how to organise 
the machinery of government and the design conundrum that arises from the 
system imperative for central steering, coherence and coordination, and the 
need for specialised agencies to undertake managing and delivery. Enhancing 
central policy capacity and coherence, may, as in the United Kingdom, lead to 
centralisation (Smith 2011). An ongoing challenge is the extent to which degrees 
of centralisation and decentralisation are appropriate. 
A third tension arises from the question of where to locate capacity: internal to 
the APS or through external support and third parties. The internal capacity 
building of the public service runs up against pressures to respond to the 
supply conditions for expertise and the environmental demands for choice and 
customer focus. External sourcing provides expertise and flexibility but at the 
cost of developing internal capacity.
A final tension stems from the federal impulses to provide policy and executive 
direction to jurisdictions within the federal system and/or to improve the 
performance of delivery systems. The evolving COAG agenda has set new levels 
of aspirations, but has floundered in some respects on jurisdictional politics 
(COAG Reform Council 2011).
Tensions in agency and board governance 
Several institutional tensions have been identified in chapter 3, which arise 
from the Commonwealth government’s adoption of corporate governance 
concepts and practices into its public administration practices. Tensions arise, 
for example, where independence is accorded to statutory authorities under 
the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cth) (CAC Act), but 
within a public sector context where the relevant minister may have broader 
governmental objectives to achieve. There is also a related tension between the 
independence of the CAC body and the fact that ministers are responsible for 
appointment of the members of that body. Internally, CAC bodies must work 
through ongoing tensions in the different roles of the board and management. 
These tensions are exacerbated by the addition of more people (e.g. political 
advisers) and mechanisms (e.g. advisory groups) to the information and 
communication flows between ministers and public sector bodies — hence, the 
need for protocols or guides such as the APS Commission’s (APSC) Supporting 
Ministers, Upholding the Values — A Good Practice Guide  (2006), which deals 
with how public servants relate to ministerial advisers.
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This book has also addressed the tension arising between the duties and 
obligations of public servants to the government of the day and the duties and 
obligations of board directors to the organisation on whose board they sit. This 
is recognised in Ahead of the Game, which recommended the development of 
better guidance for all directors of Commonwealth companies, whether they are 
APS employees or not, including ‘the legal obligations of government employees 
appointed to company boards, particularly on conflicts between public 
servants’ duties under the Public Service Act 1999, and directors’ duties under 
the Corporations Act 2001’ (AGRAGA 2010: 69). Many of these tensions will 
continue into the future because they are endemic to particular relationships in 
the public sector, and must therefore be recognised and managed appropriately.
Implications for government
The above catalogue of issues and tensions are of varying significance. Tensions 
between institutions and actors engaged in governance are par for the course, and 
can be regarded, particularly where governments and politicians are involved, 
as a part of democratic processes. They nevertheless point to potential hot spots 
or areas where vulnerabilities may exist and weaknesses in the governance 
fabric may be exposed, if not handled properly. It is also clear from several cases 
that a concentration of factors accounts for governance failure.
There are four types of implications raised for government. They are: reform 
of governance regulatory architecture; disconnects and mismatches in both 
processes of governance and in the capacity to handle complexity and to adjust 
to the changing environment; modernisation and the potential efficacy of the 
official reform agenda; and areas where best practice has received insufficient 
attention.
Reform of architecture
The 2012 CFAR (DFD 2012b) has signalled that the twin-track model of 
governance structures exemplified in the CAC and FMA acts, and their respective 
‘board’ and ‘executive management’ templates, no longer match (if they ever 
did) the array and complexities of public sector bodies and the governance 
challenges that they now face. At the same time, there is emerging disquiet in 
the Australian business sector about the respective roles and liabilities of boards 
and management, as fuelled by a series of landmark cases (e.g. the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) litigation involving the James 
Hardie, Centro and Fortescue Metals companies). This has flow-on implications 
for the interpretation and application of the legal duties of public sector boards 
and management, given how closely the CAC Act tracks developments under 
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the Corporations Act 2001. In turn, this correlation between these acts has other 
significance in a public sector context, such as the reform option of having 
the official corporate regulator (i.e. ASIC) investigate and prosecute breaches of 
directors’ and officers’ duties in both public and private sector contexts (DFD 
2012b: 100). 
Disconnects and mismatches
A transition is occurring in structures, processes, culture, policy, delivery tools 
and organisational relationships in the public sector to cope with the above 
trends and tensions, particularly to deal with the complexity of weaving together 
the aspects of horizontal and vertical governance. These transitional changes 
of the last decade or so have been, however, slow to adapt to the increased 
interdependencies of government and non-government players. 
Implementation has long been the neglected part of the policy development 
process and most affected by these interdependencies. The implementation 
of government policy was an issue at the beginning of the reform era, in the 
1980s, as a result of political concern with program failures and public service 
independence, which produced a sustained process of redistributing power 
between politicians and public servants (Halligan 2001). Despite the use of 
different instruments, political control and performance continued to be an issue 
for governments, with the concern in the 2000s being that political priorities 
were not sufficiently reflected in policy directions, and were not followed 
through in program implementation and delivery.
Failures in implementation have become more acute with the increasing 
prevalence of complex whole-of-government policy priorities, crossing 
organisational and jurisdictional boundaries. The auditor-general’s view is that 
the public sector needs to focus, not so much on governance frameworks, as on 
implementation (McPhee 2009a: 5).
Delivery systems are failing to match the problems that they are meant to solve. 
As Donald Kettl (2009: 25) puts it, ‘many of the most important problems we face 
simply do not match the institutions we have created to govern them’. He goes 
on to argue that there are ‘interlocking public–private–non-profit systems that 
lack adequate governance or a clear government role’, and that in the United 
States there are many systems for dealing with important issues ‘in which no 
one is in control’ (2009: 26). 
A real danger in the future is that, because of the increasing mismatch between 
the political demands for policy capacity and the lack of capability to meet those 
demands, a dysfunctional public sector will emerge.
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Managing system complexity and unintended 
consequences
It will often be the case that, while the purpose of system-change may be clear 
— for example, in the complex area of natural resource management — the 
decision-maker or decision-makers may not be able to mandate the actions 
required to achieve that purpose (Stewart 2010: 3). The behaviour of the system 
will emerge as a result of the many interactions within it (Ryan et al 2010: 
17). Stephen Dovers (2010: 4) explains this, in the context of natural resource 
management: 
Institutions are singular, but a resource complex like water and the many 
human activities that interact with it (agriculture, industry, emergency 
management, recreation, etc) draw into the picture multiple institutions, 
organisations, policy processes, actors, and so on. Adjustment to 
one element may or may not have the desired effect if other elements 
provide countervailing incentives or disincentives. The idea of an 
institutional system reminds us of the multitude of organisations, rules, 
norms and players to be considered, their interdependencies, and that 
important systems characteristics such as feedbacks, time lags and path 
dependencies will be at play.
Those who work in the public sector are increasingly confronted with outcomes 
that are not what were intended in the policy or delivery design — for example, 
a tougher approach to crime may not lead to better public safety but only 
overcrowded prisons (Stewart and Ayres 2001: 79). Jenny Stewart and Russell 
Ayres explain this failure as partly ‘due to a failure to anticipate the implications 
of change in one part of an interconnected system. In many cases, policy advisers 
are only too aware of these interconnections and are frustrated by structures 
and procedures which fail to bring actors together in productive ways, or by 
political imperatives which force ill-considered choices’ (2001). 
Stewart and Ayres (2001: 83) go on to recommend applying systems thinking to 
complex public policy problems, along the lines that are suggested in chapter 1 
and elsewhere in this book: ‘Rather than selecting instruments to fit a particular 
kind of policy problem (the conventional approach to policy design) systems 
analysis suggests that the nature of the problem cannot be understood separately 
from its solution’. An example of this is in the reduction of illicit drug use which, 
if conventional tools were used, would probably involve sanctions on users and 
sellers of drugs. However, a systems approach would ‘examine relationships 
between sellers, users, suppliers, health professionals and the law and attempt 
to model responses to different types of interventions, before selecting one or 
more to apply’ (2001: 84). They argue that, in the future, there will need to be 
a searching for ‘distinctive ways of connecting goals and instruments, in that 
Public Sector Governance in Australia
232
new approaches to causation, intervention and evaluation are implied’ (2001: 
91). These systemic, relational and other connections are part of the evolving 
governance landscape.
System reform as an approach to complexity and 
modernising governance
A reform agenda can be distinguished according to whether: the focus is limited 
to fine-tuning; extends to introducing new instruments and techniques; or 
represents a fundamental form of change that subsumes the others, and which 
can be observed in the historic shift to new public management. A further type, 
system design and maintenance, addresses systemic coherence and balance in 
which there is systematic refurbishing of the components. This type is in the 
tradition of a comprehensive review and provides a reform context in which 
fine-tuning and new techniques can be introduced. The Australian reform 
agenda fits this type as a large-scale crafting of the system. The influence of the 
previous head of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Terry Moran, 
as a systemic thinker and operator was important here. He argued that the 
reform agenda in Ahead of the Game for the public service was ‘more than the 
sum of the parts’ (Moran 2010a). 
Ahead of the Game provides a generalised road map for an extended reform 
process to be managed by the public service. There is a rolling agenda for change 
with a large range of elements that encompasses many players, in particular, two 
leadership groups, the Secretaries Board and APS 200, a senior leadership forum 
for supporting the secretaries. Numerous processes have been under way to 
implement Ahead of the Game recommendations. One of the most significant was 
the augmentation of the APSC’s powers to make it the lead agency for around 
half the recommendations. The A$39 million allocated under the 2010 budget 
was, however, subsequently cut by Prime Minister Gillard when projecting 
fiscal rectitude in the election campaign, leaving uncertainty about the pace 
and direction of reform.
Significant resources have not been allocated to the reform task. But, assuming 
that implementation proceeds in part, to what extent can fundamental change 
be expected to flow from the agenda in Ahead of the Game? Much of the language 
of new governance is there: citizen engagement, whole-of-government, shared 
outcomes across portfolios, cooperative federalism, and external relationships 
and partnerships. While the strength of the reform agenda is its focus on 
attending to a wide range of aspects of the existing public service system, less 
convincing is how it will produce changes to cultures, mind-sets and practices 
that derive from how that system is constituted. There remain, therefore, a 
number of issues with the reform agenda and process.
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Fundamentals for future public governance
The changing governance environment, with its many interconnections, multi-
faceted problems and cross-sector boundaries, can be expected to lead to governance 
practices that are out of tune with the standard set of good governance principles. 
As already indicated, the next decade may well see a good governance system being 
recognised, not so much for the focus on appropriate internal governance processes, 
but more for achieving good organisational and broader societal outcomes through 
effective interactions between system components (Ryan et al 2010: 21).
What follows is an examination of the condition of public governance and several 
dimensions that are likely to be needed for good governance into the future. 
In doing this, standard sets of principles of good public sector governance are 
drawn on (ANAO 2003c; APSC 2008). Key principles will be strong and consistent 
leadership of a type to manage complexity and its inherent tensions, and clear 
and applicable concepts of accountability. Additional relevant principles 
permeate Ahead of the Game (such as integration, innovation, collaboration, 
participation and shared responsibility).
Leadership 
Modern leadership approaches are much more team-based and collaborative 
than they were a decade or so ago; emphasis is now required on gaining 
commitment at all levels. The traditional hierarchical approach to leadership 
relied more on compliance, where strong personalities tended to dominate and, 
hence, responsiveness to the broader public and its involvement in the policy 
process was not emphasised (Althaus and Wanna 2008: 123).
Having said that, rhetoric around collaborative governance and inclusive 
leadership can be at odds with the practice, as in John Howard’s Coalition 
government’s Northern Territory intervention in 2007. In practice, there 
may be a real tension for a government attempting to achieve horizontal and 
vertical alignment — in connecting policy intent with delivery and integrating 
organisational goals and performance. Nevertheless, increasingly we can expect 
successful leadership in the public sector to display a capacity to drive complex 
multi-organisational networks that encourage individual and institutional 
contributions to shared goals, if not also shared leadership.
Accountability
The traditional hierarchical view of accountability is now being challenged 
(McPhee 2008a: 3). If, in some complex and interdependent policy and delivery 
circumstances, as indicated above, no one can be said to be in charge, how can 
accountability be pinpointed? (Kettl 2009: 123). We have moved into a new era 
of multiple and interactive accountabilities. 
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The United Nations has identified several challenges to be faced in terms of 
coming to grips with accountability issues in the new governance environment 
(2007: 32–3):
•	 an increase in accountability conflicts (e.g. between ‘output’ or performance 
accountability and multiple stakeholder accountability);
•	 for public officials, a need to ‘increasingly exercise judgment over which 
form of accountability to prioritise in a given circumstance’;
•	 increasingly important professional and personal accountabilities for public 
officials;
•	 less dominance of political accountability; and
•	 increasing accountability roles for political representatives ‘i.e. monitoring 
the “accountabilities system” for its overall results and integrity.’
These challenges can make life hard for senior government officials; as Catherine 
Althaus and John Wanna state (2008: 123, relying on Shergold 2004a; 2007b): 
Public officials appear now to pay more attention to interdepartmental 
cooperation and horizontal alignment. They are meant to work in dynamic 
partnership with private and non-governmental organisations, to show 
initiative and take calculated risks to achieve exemplary social outcomes 
… All this at the same time as they are supposed to be responsive to 
community demands and have been placed under strict accountability 
regimes that demand almost excessive process requirements. 
This, with the dangers that accompany diminishing trust, puts the relationship 
between senior public servants and their ministers under greater pressure.
In part, it could be argued that some of the more recent implementation 
problems of the Australian government are due to the often long and complex 
chains (which Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky called ‘the complexity 
of joint action’ quoted in Kettl 2009: 216) that go through government, out 
to non-government organisations and back to government as various market, 
regulatory and other mechanisms are used in complex partnering or contracting 
arrangements (Kettl 2009: 216; Edwards 2011). 
To this list of challenges can be added those complications that federalism 
brings, especially with an active COAG agenda of complex issues. Refinement 
of accountability to government at the federal level of government through 
the Uhrig review templates, recognition of shared governance responsibility 
through Ahead of the Game, and improvement of financial performance and 
accountability through the CFAR process still leaves all three to be integrated 
with another order of public responsibility and accountability. 
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These ‘internal to government’ mechanisms must additionally be aligned with 
‘external to government’ mechanisms that are becoming prominent as democratic 
government evolves to embrace new forms of participatory, deliberative and 
monitory democracy (chapter 1), and as a technologically innovative digital 
society embraces new forms of networking, collaborating, and communicating, 
both nationally and globally. In addition, it can be argued that there is a need 
for accountability systems to move from ‘a focus on organisations inside ... to an 
assessment of the system’s results from the outside’ (Kettl 2009: 233). Managing 
and integrating these ‘inside out’ and ‘outside in’ perspectives are part of the 
organisational governance challenges for public sector bodies too.
Towards shared outcomes and accountabilities
The need for effective interagency, intersectoral and interjurisdictional 
collaboration is well established, yet, a system of shared accountability for 
system-wide and societal results is lacking (Bourgon 2011; Halligan 2010d). 
Achieving public results is increasingly challenging because the process is 
multi-dimensional, multi-level and multi-sectoral; but demands have been 
increasing for such solutions.
There is an expanding range of experiments involving sharing of outcomes and 
accountabilities. At the interface between levels, the Australian Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Federal Financial Relations is designed to improve the wellbeing 
of Australians through collaborative working arrangements and enhanced 
public accountability, which covers outcomes achieved and outputs delivered. 
The arrangement provides for public accountability for outcomes at the federal 
level, with state-level flexibility regarding how these outcomes are to be 
delivered (APSC 2010a).
Stewart provides an example of lower-level public servants working in an 
area related to Indigenous Australians who had to operate ‘under the radar’ 
in order to gain good outcomes on the ground. This required not only sharing 
outcomes and responsibilities, but, most importantly, prior establishment of 
trusting relationships (2010: 7). One example is of a community request for air 
conditioning that did not appear to be a government priority. The provision 
of air conditioning, however, not only established trust but led to discussion 
about other mutual objectives, such as improved school attendance, which the 
air conditioning enhanced. By opening up to ideas in this way, public servants 
tapped into ‘virtuous possibilities of system interconnection’. Important here 
was that resources could be made available to adapt to outcomes, rather than 
being rigidly confined to set ‘pots’ of money (Stewart 2010: 8).
Ahead of the Game recommends the introduction of shared outcomes across 
portfolios. It is not clear, however, for public servants and those who co-
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produce with them in policy or delivery, whether accountabilities, as well 
as outcomes, are to be shared. When outcomes are shared, what are the 
accountability mechanisms? Roles should be distinct even if responsibilities are 
shared, but does this mean that accountabilities are also shared and, if so, how 
is this to work in practice? In addition, when are risks also to be shared across 
departments, with other governments or with non-government partners? These 
are issues that need the attention of government if there is to be alignment 
between collaboration and accountability and quality shared governance is to 
become a reality (see Edwards 2011 for more detail on these issues). 
Governance for the twenty-first century 
The Australian Government today needs to give priority to designing and 
participating in a public governance system that is sufficiently flexible to deal 
with new challenges as they arise. This will test its relationships with other 
sectors operating at its boundaries. 
There is also the important question of what type of public governance system 
will emerge from uncertainty about the roles of the Commonwealth, new policy 
issues and the turbulent international environment. How much will its role 
veer towards society-centric governance, and what changes does this entail 
for how government manages its relations with others? Given the APS’s mixed 
performance on service delivery and citizen engagement, how viable is ‘service 
transformation’ and co-design (Dutil et al 2010; Lenihan and Briggs 2010)? These 
questions will be answered by what is accomplished in the rest of this decade.
Leveraging governance: The new role for government
Just as government has recently relied heavily on outsourcing many of the activities it 
traditionally undertook, into the future it is likely that non-government organisations 
will operate from within the public arena as partners in policy development and 
service delivery, which will necessitate attention to new processes, structures and 
relationships. Governments will therefore be increasingly faced with boundary 
issues, which in turn raise questions about the respective roles for government and 
non-government players. As Kettl (2009: 239) has remarked:
The importance of boundary spanning … suggests a new approach 
for government — an approach that democratizes the process by 
spreading participation, privatizes government by relying more on 
nongovernment partners, governmentalizes the private sector by 
drawing its organizations more into strong public roles, and ultimately 
challenges the framework of … democratic institutions.
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Public officials will need to emphasise more the serving and empowering of 
citizens to better meet their needs. In terms of accountability, this means public 
servants will need to interact with and listen to citizens in a way that empowers 
them as members of a democratic community (Denhardt and Denhardt 2007: 23, 
134). The existing tension between serving the bureaucracy hierarchically and 
meeting the demand of democracy will intensify and, hence, require careful 
management.
The role of government into the future, therefore, will be much less ‘active’ 
and more one of stewardship — enabling, and leveraging — than in the 
past. According to one scenario, it is envisaged that government leaders will 
effectively align public, private, non-profit, national and global players across 
messy boundaries; responsibility will be broadly shared and full control less 
apparent; and leadership, management and coordination mechanisms will be 
less able to be institutionalised (Kettl 2009: 178, 186; Schick 2011).
Apart from predicting a democratising governance future for the reasons stated, 
and the tensions that this may create, good governance into the future can also 
be expected to have built into its processes the ability for decision-making units 
to learn from past practices. This will necessarily involve ongoing monitoring 
of implementation structures and processes to see if they remain appropriate to 
the task as it unfolds. The potential tension here, between project management-
type systems and a learning process, ‘can only be resolved by building into our 
organisations effective monitoring and communication and the will and capacity 
to make change in response’ (Shergold 2007b: 14). This may well emerge as 
a result of the capability departmental reviews that the APS is intending to 
implement as part of the Ahead of the Game agenda and the proposed delivery 
boards (Moran 2010b). 
New capabilities 
The skills of public servants in the future may well need to embrace a total shift 
to making ‘networking’ and a set of ‘enablement skills’ a prime focus, wherever 
third parties and/or citizens need to be engaged. This was recognised some years 
ago by Lester Salamon (2002: 16): 
Unlike both traditional public administration and the new public 
management, the ‘new governance’ shifts the emphasis from management 
skills and the control of large bureaucratic organisations to enablement 
skills, the skills required to engage partners arrayed horizontally in 
networks, to bring multiple stakeholders together for a common end in 
a situation of interdependence.
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Multiple capabilities are needed in the new era of public governance and for 
a high performing public service, which Ahead of the Game aims to achieve. 
Public servants will now need to be more responsive to medium and longer-term 
issues; better equipped to handle complexity; more effective users of current 
information and communications technology, and more active networkers and 
collaborators within and beyond the public service.
In addition, there will be an increasing role for people who can broker knowledge 
across the boundaries at which public servants work — with industry, non-
government organisations and academics, as well as citizens. As yet, the role 
of knowledge brokers is not clearly defined in the literature and in practice, 
whether for individuals or organisations (Knight and Lightowler 2010: 547), 
but that can be expected to occur as the need for them becomes more apparent.
Conclusion
This book has sought to outline the main features of Australian public 
governance at the national level, and to give careful attention to several important 
dimensions. The basics of governance are in good shape, but attention needs 
to be paid to the challenges that have been identified in this book and recent 
international studies (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Bourgon 2011; Pal 2011).
The public sector faces distinctive issues in an era of governance that involves 
a wide range of players, but also because it is up against the demands of the 
international sphere at a time of great uncertainty (Cohen and Roberts 2012). 
In terms of the dimensions of governance that are covered in this book, the 
Australian public sector is better equipped to handle the issues of today than 
many others internationally and, to date, has been more comfortable with 
‘government’ rather than ‘governance’. How effectively the public sector will 
absorb the governance orientation and maintain the strengths of a central 
government is the ultimate meta-challenge.
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Appendix 1: Methodology for 
Interview Study 2004–07
In the period 2004–07, the authors undertook a total of 43 formal interviews 
with departmental secretaries, chief executives of agencies reporting under 
the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) (FMA Act), and 
representatives of authorities and companies reporting under the Commonwealth 
Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cth) (CAC Act). 
A total of 25 interviews, including 13 with departmental secretaries and 12 
chief executives, were undertaken with interviewees from departments and 
agencies reporting under the FMA Act. The 18 interviews with bodies reporting 
under the CAC Act covered authorities, companies and government business 
enterprises and included interviews with six board chairs, six chief executives 
and six directors/managing directors.
Following the authors’ findings in earlier interviews that were undertaken in 
2002–03, this new series of interviews sought to obtain clearer qualitative data 
with respect to the adoption of concepts and principles of corporate governance 
(and governance generally) within the federal public sector. In particular, 
the interviewers sought the views of relevant participants as to the roles and 
operation of executive and management boards within government departments 
and central agencies, and as to the authority and operation of authorities and 
companies reporting under the CAC Act. 
The Interview Schedule comprised three sets of questions. The first set comprised 
open questions for both FMA and CAC interviewees and they addressed three 
general areas of interest that are associated with public sector governance: 
interviewees’ understanding of the meaning of corporate governance (and 
governance generally across the Australian public sector), their understanding 
of the governance ‘system’ as a whole (i.e. the legislative framework for 
accountability, performance and stakeholder participation), and their views as 
to who should bear responsibility for the oversight of public sector governance. 
The second set of questions was directed specifically to the representatives 
of FMA bodies. These questions required interviewees to consider the role 
and operation of executive and advisory boards that were utilised within 
departments and the role of the chief executive and boards in central agencies 
reporting under the FMA Act. Interview questions sought to explore the 
character of these boards given the adoption of the decision-making board 
and more prescriptive ‘corporate’ governance requirements of the CAC Act. 
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Questions also sought to establish the arrangements of departments and agencies 
to achieve whole-of-government coherence through the use of representatives 
on each other’s committees.
The final set of questions was directed specifically to those representing 
CAC bodies and sought to test the perception of interviewees regarding the 
independence of government given their role as participants in a corporate entity 
within the public sector. In particular, how did they see their independence 
manifested in practice, how were the ‘corporate’ requirements of the CAC Act 
being adopted in practice and how compatible were the requirements of the 
CAC Act with the requirements of the FMA Act in reflecting the authority of the 
chief executive and the chief executive’s responsibility to the minister? Specific 
issues that were raised by these questions included the role of government 
policy in the work of boards, the processes for appointment of the chair and 
directors by ministers, and whether these processes affected the dynamics of the 
board in making collective decisions.
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Appendix 3: The Stages in a Good 
Appointment Process
(1) Preparation — the process and vacancy profile. The first step is to agree on a 
process and timeline for the appointment. After the process has been agreed, 
the board should carry out an assessment of its current skills and expertise 
so as to identify gaps that need to be filled. The assessment would need to 
consider required expertise in line with the current and emerging priorities of 
the board. It would also need to consider personal qualities that are required for 
board members generally. Following this process, selection criteria for a specific 
vacancy or vacancies would be drawn up in line with the criteria that has been 
set for board membership as a whole.
(2) Locating suitable candidates. Suitable candidates who meet the position profile 
(or selection criteria) need to be located and encouraged to apply in accordance 
with the agreed appointment process. To promote transparency and diversity, 
this would typically involve the publication of a job advertisement. For certain 
appointments, there may also be a need to target particular individuals on 
the recommendation of ministers, departments, professional recruiters and 
other relevant organisations. An important part of this stage in the process 
is the provision of information to potential candidates. Under the Code of 
Practice for Ministerial Appointments to Public Bodies for England and Wales, 
for example, information packs must be sent to all applicants. These packs 
must contain an application form, a role description and position profile, an 
indication of the required time commitment, remuneration details, information 
on the organisation and a complaints leaflet on the commissioner for public 
appointment’s complaints procedure (OCPA 2005b: 30). 
(3) Assessing and vetting potential candidates. After suitable candidates have 
been identified, a selection committee needs to assess candidates against the 
selection criteria. The candidates’ qualifications and prior experience also need 
to be verified and an understanding gained of the extent of the candidates’ 
commitment to fulfilling the responsibilities of the position (i.e. probity check). 
Part of this process involves the evaluation of potential conflicts of interest.
(4) Selection and appointment. This stage in the process usually involves the 
selection of a candidate from a shortlist in accordance with relevant statutory 
and customary requirements. At the federal government level, this often involves 
a decision being made by a minister after consultation with the prime minister, 
Cabinet and other relevant individuals. Whatever processes are followed, they 
need to comply with any pre-determined, merit-based procedures and all 
applicable legal requirements.
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(5) Audit. A less common element of assessment processes is auditing, whereby 
an internal or external group reviews the documentation that has been kept 
throughout the assessment so as to determine how appointments have been 
made. As discussed, the Code of Practice for England and Wales now dictates that 
regular audits be conducted on appointments that are made by organisations 
that fall within the remit of the Commissioner for Public Appointments. No such 
process currently applies in Australia, although it offers a number of potential 
advantages, including greater rigor and transparency, which can help to promote 
public confidence in public sector boards and appointment processes. 
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